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INTRODUCTION
The United S ta te s  o f  America fo rm ally  secured  i t s  independence 
from G reat B rita in  on January l i t ,  17%» On th a t  d a te , th e  Congress o f  
the  Ifcited  S ta te s  r a t i f i e d  the  .Tireaty o f P a rig j America gained i t s  
independence from G reat B r i ta in , which a lso  g ran ted  im portant though 
in  some in stan ces dangerously i l l - d e f in e d  t e r r i t o r i a l  concessions.
The Congress o f  the new n a tio n  which approved o f  th a t  T reaty  o f  P a r is  
had been opera ting  under the  A r tic le s  o f C onfederation s in ce  March o f  
1781, rep lac in g  the "ex tra  le g a l"  Second C o n tin en ta l Congress as the  
o v e ra ll  d ire c tin g  body fo r  the  R evolu tion .
The A r t ic le s  o f C onfederation r e f le c te d  th e  u n ity  o f  purpose 
c h a r a c te r is t ic  o f  the  th i r te e n  u n ite d  s ta te s  during  the  R evolution; but 
i t  r e f le c te d  the d e s ire  on the p a r t  o f those  s ta te s  to  m ain tain  t h e i r  
sep a ra te  and in d iv id u a l so v e re ig n tie s . The Art i c l e s  gave the new gov­
ernment considerab le  powers. Congress was e n t i t le d  to  make war o r 
peace and to  f ix  s t a te  quotas fo r  men and monies f o r  th e  n a tio n a l  arm ies, 
to  make t r e a t i e s  and a l l ia n c e s ,  decide i n t e r s t a t e  d isp u te s , l im i t  s t a te  
boundaries and admit new s t a te s ,  borrow money and regula,te the coinage 
o f the  United S ta te s , and e s ta b l is h  post o f f ic e s  f o r  th e  coun try . The 
r e a l  sense o f  th e  A r t ic le s ,  however, la y  in  the  p ro v is io n  th a t  "Each 
s t a te  r e ta in s  the so v ere ig n ty , freedom,, apd independence, ^ d  every 
power, ju r i s d ic t io n ,  and r ig h t  which i s  no t by th is  con federa tion  ex­
p r e s s ly  d e lega ted  to  the  U nited S ta tes, in  Congress assem bled,"^ Thus,
^Jonathan E l l io t  ( e d , ) , The Debates in  the  Several S ta te  Gonven- 
t io n s  on th e  R a ti f ic a tio n  of the  F edera l C o n stitu tio n  
P h ilad e lp h ia , 1876), I ,  79"
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th e  A r tic le s  o f  C onfederation acknowledged th a t  the  powers o f war and 
fo re ig n  a f f a i r s  were n a tio n a l in  scope, kep t a l iv e  th e  id ea  o f  union
2
during the  post-R evo lu tion  p e rio d  when th a t  idea  was a t  i t s  low est ebb, 
and u ltim a te ly  provided th e  means f o r  th e  o rd e r ly  t r a n s i t io n  from ru le  
by Parliam ent to  self-governm ent under the  C o n s titu tio n , N onetheless, 
i t s  basic  weakness remained un reso lved .
The e s s e n t ia l  d e fe c t o f  th e  A r tic le s  was theft they  opera ted  upon 
th e  s ta te s  in  t h e i r  co rpo ra te  c ap ac ity ; Congress under th e  A r tic le s  was 
n o t , in  f a c t ,  a  c e n tra l  government as such, but r a th e r  the c e n tra l  
agency o f  an a l l ia n c e  o f  sovereign  s t a t e s .  Consequently, even t^ e  
powers th e o r e t ic a l ly  belonging to  Congress were p r a c t ic a l ly  unenfo re- 
a b le , w hile  the th e o re t ic a l  scope o f  i t s  a u th o r i ty  was unduly narrow . 
Because taxes were to  be c o lle c te d  from the  in d iv id u a l s t a t e s .  Congress 
could n o t levy them; inasmuch as commerce was an a f f a i r  o f the  in d iv id u a l 
s t a t e s .  Congress could no t re g u la te  i t ;  t r e a t i e s  could n o t have th e  
fo rce  o f law sin ce  as t r e a t i e s  they  would have opera ted  d i r e c t ly  on 
in d iv id u a l s ta te s  by-passing  the  s t a te  l e g i s l a tu r e s .  In  s h o r t ,  a com­
mon p o lic y  in  th ese  f i e ld s ,  where such a p o lic y  was n ecessa ry —the  
source and c o lle c tio n  o f  revenues, re g u la tio n  o f commerce, fo re ig n  
r e la t io n s —was v i r tu a l ly  im possib le , fo r  the power o f  th e  A r tic le s  
remained w ith the  s t a t e s ,^  These weaknesses p layed d i r e c t ly  in to  th e  
hands o f th e  c h ie f  d e fe c t o f the  government o f  th e  s ta te s ;  a too g re a t  
co n cen tra tio n  o f  power in  the  hands o f l e g i s l a t iv e  departm ents o f  those
Edwin So Corwin, "The Progress o f  P o l i t i c a l  Theory Between th e  
D ec la ra tio n  of Independence and the  Meeting o f  th e  P h ila d e lp h ia  Conven­
t io n ,"  American H is to r ic a l  Review. XXX (192^), 527,
^ Ib id ,
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governm ents.^ D espite  i t s  d e fe c ts , and d e sp ite  those  American p o l i t i c a l  
le a d e rs  who, re fu s in g  to m inimize those d e fe c ts ,  saw th e  A r t ic le s  only  
as a  means to  a b e t t e r  p lan  o f  c e n tr a l  government, the  s ig n if ic a n c e  o f 
th e  A r tic le s  must no t be d iscoun ted .
The s i tu a t io n  in  1787-1788 was very  fav o rab le  fo r  th e  c re a tio n  
and adoption of a  new p lan  o f government. For, f i r s t ,  the experience 
gained from the  R evolutionary  s t a te  c o n s t itu t io n s  and from the A r t ic le s  
o f  C onfederation had accustomed the people o f  th e  U nited S ta te s  to  th e  
ide^a p f  fram ing government by choice and d e lib e ra tio n ^ : blending o ld  
in g red ien ts  from th e  c o lo n ia l p e rio d  w ith  new rep u b lican  elem ents, and 
fin d in g  th a t  th e  r e s u l ts  worked q u ite  w ell in  p r a c t ic e .  Secondly, the  
experience o f  about a  decade o f o p e ra tio n  o f the A r tic le s  had revealed  
th e i r  d e fe c ts , and in d e e d  among m a ^  Americans an in c l in a t io n  toward 
change. And th i r d ly ,  though the d o c tr in a ire  th in k in g  so resp o n sib le  
fo r  th e  A r tic le s  was s t i l l  w idely p re v a le n t in  the  U nited S ta te s , among 
many Americans th e re  e x is te d  a f l e x i b i l i t y  and r e c e p t iv i ty  to  new p o l i t ­
i c a l  ideas and in s t i t u t io n s ,  a sober bu t co n fiden t w i l l  toward p o l i t i c a l  
experim entation  along rep u b lican  l in e s .^  E ven tually  the d e s ire  o f  many 
Americans fo r  a s treng thened  c e n tra l  government culm inated in  th e  
Annapolis Convention o f Septem ber, 1786. C alled  o s te n s ib ly  to  achieve 
a more s a t is f a c to ry  re g u la tio n  o f i n t e r s t a t e  commerce on th e  Chesapeake,
^ I b id . . pp. 528-^29.
^The h is to ry  o f th e  fram ir^  o f  the  M assachusetts C o n s titu tio n  of 
1780 i s  an e x c e lle n t example o f p u b lic  d e lib e ra t io n  on th e  form ation  o f 
s t a te  governments and c o n s t i tu t io n s .  See Robert J .  T aylor ( e d . ) ,  
M assachusetts, Colouv to  Commonwealth? Documents on the  Form ation of 
i t s  C o n s titu tio n . 1 7 7 ^ 7 0 0  (Chapel H i l l .  19&1%
^C ecelia  M. Kenyon ( e d . ) ,  The A n ti f e d e ra l is ts  (New York, 1966), 
pp. x x x iii-x x x iv .
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th e  Convention ended w ith  a  p a l l  f o r  a new conventign^M  
mente f o r  th e  A r t ic le s ,  to  meet a t  P h ilad e lp h ia  th e  fo llow ing  May. This 
l a t t e r  convention, ^ e  C cm stita tio n a l o r F edera l o r  P h ila d e lp h ia  Çonvm- 
tio n  as i t  has been v a rio u s ly  c a l le d ,  convened f o r  work on May 2 ^  1787- 
T h e re a f te r , f o r  th e  n e x t fo u r  m onths, th e  d e legates to  t h a t  Convention 
were in  co n tin u a i se s s io n , s tru g g lin g  over a  p lan  o f  goveznment which 
one d e le g a te , a  fu tu re  A n ti-F e d e ra lis t ,  considered
would end e i th e r  in  monarchy, o r  a ty ra n n ic a l a r is to c ra c y , 
which, he was in  doubt, bu t one o r  o th e r  he was su re . 
C o n s titu tio n  had been formed w ithou t th e  knowledge o r idea  o f
+\na mo/\‘nn a _ #th e  peop le .
With th e  sign ing  o f  th e  C o n stitu tio n  by a l l  bu t th re e  o f  th e  d e leg a te s  
o f th e  Convention, th e  w>rk o f th a t  body was c lo sed . In  th e  fu tu re ,  
however, la y  an even more form idable ta s k —to  secu re  the  acceptance by 
th e  people o f the  new a r t i c l e  o f  government. This ta sk  would  occupy 
the  a t te n t io n  o f  those  supporting  th e  C o n s titu tio n , th e  N a t io n a lis ts ,
O
o r F e d e ra lis ts  as they  p re fe r re d  to  c a l l  thonse lv e s , u n t i l  August o f  
1788.
The s tru g g le  fo r  th e  r a t i f i c a t i o n  o f  th e  C o n s titu tio n , from the 
w in te r  o f  1787-1788 to  l a t e  summer o f  1788, was, in  essence, th e  f i r s t  
p o l i t i c a l  can^aig^ waged on a n a tio n a l  8cs0.e in  the  U nited S ta te s .  From 
th e  le v e l  o f dozens o f lo c a l  a re n a s , w ith  b a t t le s  fough t over lo c a l  and 
even p e t ty  is s u e s ,  the  s tru g g le  f o r  some manner o f  p o l i t i c a l  supremacy 
in  th e  country  moved in to  th e  n a tio n a l coliseum , where a l l  could  take
7james Madison, The Debates in  th e  F edera l Convention o f  1787 
Which Framed th e  C o n s titu tio n  o f th e  Tfaited S ta te s  o f America, G a illa rd  
Hunt and James Brown S co tt ( e d s .) ” (New York, 1920), p . ^76.
8See fo o tn o te  number one o f F o r re s t  MacDonald. "The A n ti-F ed era l­
i s t s , "  W isconsin Magazine o f H is to ry . XLVI (1963), 209.
^Kenyon, 0£ . c i t . ,  p . x x i i i .
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an a c tiv e  p a r t .  The p r in c ip a l  Issu e  a t  s tak e  appeared sim ple enough on 
the  su rfa ce —s h a l l  th e  C o n s titu tio n , as d ra f te d  by th e  F edera l Conven­
tio n  o f  1787, be adopted o r  re je c te d ?  But beneath th e  su rfa ce  o f  th is  
Is su e , and n o t a  very  g re a t  depth a t  t h a t ,  la y  a  much la r g e r ,  alm ost 
th e o re t ic a l  p o l i t i c a l  q u e s tio n . Accompanying th a t  p o l i t i c a l  q uestion  
was a  consuming p o l i t i c a l  s tru g g le  between two g re a t ,  opposing, though 
by no means c le a r ly  drawn n o l l t l c a l  f a c t io n s .
On th e  one hand were th e  su p p o rte rs  o f  th e  C o n s titu tio n , men o f
II I I .ill - I  -I - •     I. ,— «■ ■      .
a sm all, d ed ica ted , and r a th e r  c lo se ly  though In fo rm ally  a s so c ia te d , 
n a tio n a l I s  t-minded o rg a n iz a tio n . T y p ica lly  r a th e r  younger than t h e i r  
opponents , the  men o f  th is  p o s i t io n  and m e n ta lity  were m ostly  th e  p ro ­
ducts o f  the  R evo lu tion , and o f  the  p o l i t i c a l ,  economic, and s o c ia l  
re s h u ff lin g s  consequent o f t h a t  g re a t ev en t. A c le a r ly  overwhelming 
m a jo rity  in  the F edera l Convention, th e  C o n stitu tio n  r e f le c te d  t h e i r  
s tro n g ly  c e n t r a l i s t  p o l i t i c a l  Ideology to  no su rp r is in g  degree.
Opposing the N a tio n a lis ts  were th e men o f  the " e s ta b lish m e n t," 
o ften  men o f  the s t a te  and lo c a l  governments. These men, g e n e ra lly  o f
,I, ■■.■1111 lailli™ 11.1. , , 1̂, „  -------------------I y     - —- . — - ■■■    
pre-R evo lu tionary  War vi n ta g e , were a c tin g  to  m ain ta in  th e  p o s i t io n  o f  
the  s t a te  governments w ith in  the  framework o f  the  A r tic le s  and thereby  
a lso  m ain tain  t h e i r  own entrenched p o l i t i c a l  p o s i t io n .  These men r e a l ­
ise d  th e  th r e a t  posed by th e  C o n stitu tio n  to  th e  A r t ic le s ,  th e  supremacy 
o f  th e  s ta te  governments, and t h e i r  own entrenched p o l i t i c a l  m achines.
Roughly In  th e  mlddle_ofL±heae.. W a_nnnoajng .extrem es were a 
r e l a t iv e ly  few men. In  terms o f  numbers though c e r ta in ly  n o t In  terms 
o f  a b i l i t y ,  i n t e l l e c t ,  o r  n a tio n a l  renown. T y p ica lly , th ese  men were
^^MacDonald, c i t . ,  pp. 209-211.
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the  m oderates in  idie co n tro v ersy , tend ing  toward a  p o s i t io n  o f c l a s s ic a l ,  
d o c tr in a ire  republican ism . I t  was easy , and indeed n o t unexpected, fo r  
th ese  few men to  oppose the  C o n s titu tio n  on th e  grounds th a t  i t  con ta ined  
too many im perfec tions from th e  p o in t  o f  view o f  repub lican  p r in c ip le s  
o f  p o l i t i c a l  th eo ry . These men, ELbrldge Gerry o f  M assachusetts, Mel- 
ancton S a l th o f New York, J ohn Fran c is  M ercer o f M aryland, and George 
Mason and Edward Randolph o f V irg in ia , were men o f the  e ig h teen th  cpntury  
n a t io n a l i s t  t r a d i t i o n ,  reasoning  from p r in c ip le s  to  p a r t i c u la r s .  For 
th ese  men no n a tio n a l government was b e t te r  than an im perfec t one which 
m ight subsequently  degenerate  in to  ty ranny .
The men \Aio opposed the  C o n s titu tio n , those  o f  th e  l a s t  two des­
c rib ed  p o s i t io n s , have come to  be known as th e  A nti-Feder a l i s t s . That 
d e s ig n a tio n  s ig n i f ie s  on ly , as F o rre s t MacDonald has argued, th a t  t h e i r
p o s it io n  was opposed to  th a t  o f the  F e d e ra l is ts ,  n o t th a t  they  were
X2t r u ly  a n t i - f e d e r a l  in  t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  ideo logy . I t  was a name given 
tg_m§m_hy_.th9i.r_9PJBm@at&. and t h o u g k , J t o . r e E e a t e ^  
th ey , and no t t h e i r  opponents ,  were t r u ly  . f e d e r a l i s t s ,  th e  A n ti-F ed era l­
i s t s  never were q u ite  ab le  to  l iv e  th e  d esig n a tio n  down. A nti-Federalism  
was, th u s , as v a rie d  as the men re p re se n tin g  th a t  p o s i t io n .
I t  i s  the  purpose o f th i s  th e s is  to  exp lo re  and document the  
A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  f e a r  o f  th e  strong  c e n tra l  government proposed by the  
C o n s titu tio n . The problem in  a th e s is  o f  th i s  n a tu re  i s  the  m u l t ip l i ­
c i ty  and in te rn a l  c o n tra d ic tio n s  o f  th e  A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  arguments and 
o b je c tio n s , and th e  la c k  o f  trea tm en t o f  c e r ta in  m ajor to p ic s ,  n o tab ly  
ju d ic ia l  review . Thus, w hile  t h e i r  o v e ra ll  th e o re t ic a l  c o n s t i tu t io n a l
^^ Ib id .o p . 209. ^ ^ Ib ld .
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and p o l i t i c a l  p o s itio n  i s  q u ite  easy to  a r r iv e  a t ,  i t  i s  more d i f f i c u l t  
to  danons t r a te  and evidence to e  A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  ' so m e ^ a t tm conscious 
fe a r s  o f  s tro n g  Only by a  c a re fu l  exam ination o f
A n ti= F ed era lis t l i t e r a t u r e  and speeches in  th e  r a t i f i c a t i o n  co n tro v ersy , 
to g e th e r  w ith  some understand ing  o f th e  man uho made the  o b je c tio n s , 
can an accu ra te  p ic tu re  o f th e  A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  f e a r  be determ ined<,
This th e s is  w i l l  examine th e  A n ti-F edera lists '*  f e a r s  o f  a  s tro n g  
c e n tra l  government in  th e  fo llow ing  fashion» Chapter one w i l l  be con­
cerned w ith  to e  b a s is  f o r  th a t  f e a r —toe A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  theo ry  o f
repub lican  government» A summary o f  th is  th eo ry  i s  ve ry  n ecessa ry  f o r  
the understand ing  o f the  A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  p o s it io n  on the C o n stitu tio n  
and th e  proposed fe d e ra l  government| i t  i s  a lso  im portan t i f  one i s  to  
comprehend th e  t ru e  s ig n if ic a n c e  o f  th e  A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  in  th e  c o n s t i ­
tu t io n a l  development o f the  th i t e d  S ta te s  » C hapter two w i l l  deal w ith  
expressions o f  A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  f e a rs  o f  New England o r ig in ,  t h a t  i s ,  
from those  New England s ta te s  which d isp layed  any s ig n i f i can t An t i -  
FMer a l  1 s t  support (C onnecticut and, p a r t i c u la r ly ,  j0 ,s s a c h t^ e t ts ) » 
Chapters th ree  and fo u r  w il l  cover, re s p e c tiv e ly , the  A nti-Federalism  
of the  Middle A tla n tic  s ta te s  (Pennsylvania , New York, New Je rse y , and 
Delaware), and the  Southern S ta te s  (V irg in ia , North and South C aro lina, 
Maryland, and Georgia)» This s e c t io n a l  approach to  the  study o f A n ti-  
Federalism  prov ides th e  most c o n tin u ity  in  dem onstrating the se c tio n a l 
d if fe re n c e s  in  the  A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  ° o b je c tio n s  to  th e  C onstitu tion»  
The concluding ch ap te r w ill  summarize b r ie f ly  the p o s it io n  o f A n ti- 
Federalism  in  American c o n s t i tu t io n a l  and p o l i t i c a l  development»
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CHAPTER I
THE ANTI=FEDERALIST THEÛRT OF REPUBLICAN QOVERMMENT
The A n ti-F e d e ra lis t*s p o s it io n  on rep u b lican  government was 
c lo se ly  t ie d  tQ „.tha.iiidesp re M _ b e lle f ..th a t  JMpuJ^ifiSn^ggysîmeïÜLMS.
* « I ■ r m 1 - - - " » I mm I * #  l<
p o ss ib le  only In  sm aU , As rep u b lican s
in  the  c la s s ic a l  understand ing  o f th e  word, th e  A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  read  
w idely in  th e  works o f  such well-known and w idely  resp ec ted  p o l i t i c a l  
and le g a l  th e o r i s t s  as John Locke and S i r  W illiam B lackstone» They 
were, however, p a r t ic u la r ly  im pressed by th e  works o f  Baron Montesquieu 
whose name c a r r ie d  g re a t w eight in  America. M ontesquieu 's op in ion  was 
c i te d  f re q u e n tly , p a r t i c u la r ly  th a t  on th e  n a tu re  o f  repub lican  govern­
ments
The natu r a l  prop e r t ie s  o f  sm all s t a te s  i s  to  be governed as a 
re p u b lic T " ^  m ones, to  be su b je c t to  a monarchy;' an 3 ^
o f la rg e  empires to  be swayed bv a despot p rin ce  » » » The 
consequence i s  t h a t ,  in  o rd e r to  p rese rv e  th e  p r in c ip le  o f th e  
e s ta b lish e d  government, the  s ta te  must be supported  in  th e  
e x te n t; and th a t  the s p i r i t  o f  the  s t a te  w il l  a l t e r  in  p ropor­
t io n  as i t  extends o r  c o n tra c ts  i t s  l im it» ^
The h is to ry  o f America re in fo rc e d  th i s  b e l i e f ,  and in  tu rn  le d  
to  fu r th e r  g e n e ra liza tio n s»  Before the  R evo lu tion , the  Americ a n s  en­
joyed self-governm ent on ly  as in d iv id u a l co lonies»  The A r t ic le s  o f 
C onfederation m ain tained  th a t  t r a d i t io n  o f  lo c a l  se lf-governm ent by 
se v e re ly  r e s t r i c t in g  th e  ex ten t o f  power ex erc ised  by the c e n tra l  
a u th o r i ty .  A J a ig g jz g p u ^ ic  w as^^^pqssible,. t^^^ argued,
^Jonathan E l l i o t  (ed» ), The Debates in  th e  S ev era l S ta te  Conven­
t io n s  on the R a ti f ic a tio n  o f th e  F ederal
i m r  â i î S e ï p h i a ,  i 8 7 é ) ,T r 7 T 2 î ;
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beeanaa_the c e n te r  o f  goverpment would tm avoidab lz .jzS L ^W ant th e
peop le . The in te r e s t  o f  th e  people would then  n a tu ra l ly  decrease , 
s e t t in g  th e  s tage  f o r  a change in  rep u b lican  government to  a r is to c ra c y  
o r  monarchy»^ Any se lf-g o v e rn in g  peop le  must be r e l a t iv e ly  homogeneous 
in  in te r e s t s ,  op in io n s , h a b i t s ,  and m ores. The A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  were 
h ig h ly  conscious o f  and emphasized th e  c u l tu r a l  d iv e r s i t i e s  o f  the Amer­
ican  peop le , and argued th a t  no one s e t  of laws could  o p e ra te  over such 
d iv e r s i ty  e q u a lly .^
The A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts “ f e a r  o f  the s tro n g  c e n tra l  government 
proposed by the  C o n s titu tio n  stanmed a lso  from t h e i r  conception o f 
human nature»  The ‘A n tis ” shared  w ith  t h e i r  opponents many o f  the  
assum ptions o f human n a tu re  c h a r a c te r i s t ic  o f  th e  l a t e  e ig h teen th  cen­
tury» Man”3 domonant m otive in  l i f e ,  they  believed^, was s e l f ^ ^ t e r e s t . 
The most extreme form o f  th is  s e l f - i n t e r e s t  m an ifested  i t s e l f  in  th e  
l u s t  f o r  p o l i t i c a l  power» R eferences to  t h i s  l u s t  f o r  power were r e -  
peatedly_mada by men on both s id e s  o f  the  r a t i f i c a t i o n  s tru g g le» ^
James Madison, a  lead in g  F e d e ra l is t ,  w rote in  F e d e ra l is t  Number $1;
M b itio n  [fo r  power in  government] must be made jW co u n te rac t 
ambitio n s  » The in te r e s t  o f  th e  man must be connected wïtïT^tHe 
éo n s titu E lo n a l r ig h ts  o f  th e  place» I t  may be r e f le c te d  on 
human n a tu re  th a t  such dev ices should be unnecessary  to  c o n tro l 
th e  abuses o f government » But what i s  government i t s e l f  bu t 
the  g re a te s t  o f  a l l  r e f le c t io n s  on human n a tu re . I f  men were  
a n g e ls9 no government  would be n ece ssa ry . I f  angels were to"' 
govern men, neïtK ef^ e x te rn a r^ o F 'in te rn a l  c o n tro l on government 
would be n ece ssa ry . ]ji fram ing a government which i s  to  be 
adm in istered  by men over men, the g re a t  d i f f i c u l ty  i s  th i s  g
^C ecelia M» Kenyon (ed » ). The A n ti f e d e ra l is ts  (New York, 1966]
P» x l .
3 lb id .
^ I b id . ,  PP» I x i i - l x i i i .
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3Dau,jmat.Xlrjfe_enaW^ the  ^ p v e ^ e n t  to  cont^l^^ 
andJui.^tM  B W . p lace  o b lig e  i t  to  c o n tro l i t s e l f
In  a passage s t r ik in g ly  s im ila r  to  M adison 's, the  New York A n ti-F eder­
a l i s t  le a d e r , John Lansing, J r . ,  sa ids
Samples would be im p e rtin e n t, arguments would be in  v a in , 
checks would be u s e le s s ,  i f  we were c e r ta in  our ru le r s  would 
be good menj bu t f o r  the  v ir tu o u s , government i s  n o t i n s t i ­
tu te d ;  i t s  ob.iect i s  to  r e s t r a in  and punish  v ic e , and a l l  
f r e e  c o n s titu t io n s  a re  formed w ith  th e  view s—to  d e te r  the  
governed from crim e, and th e  governors from ty ran n y .°
Because o f  t h e i r  skep tic ism  o f man's m o tiv a tio n , th e  A n ti-  
Feder a l i s t s  v i ewed rep re sen ta t iv e  governmen t  only  as a s u b s t i tu te  f o r-  —— ——  —— ' ■  r III -Tlf ' ' ***' " *' -  . . .1 .s..-, —
d i r e c t  democracy. They d e s ire d  th e  r e s t r i c t i o n  o f  th a t  governm ent's 
op era tio n  to  such fu n c tio n s  so n a tu ra l  in  scope as to  make th e  l e g i s ­
la tu r e  the  p e rs o n if ic a t io n  o f the people  them selves.^  The Antj.-F ed e r- 
a l l^ s ^  doubted th e  p e o p le 's  judgment o f th e  is su e s  in  r a t i f i c a t i o n ,  
indeed o f  the  n e c e s s i t ie s  and requirem ents o f  rep u b lican  government 
i t s e l f .  They i«3Q [ e _ ^ e p ^ a l  o f  tM  ,cap ac i%  as e le c to r s .
The 'A nti s '  d id  n o t f e e l  th e  peop le , as e le c to r s ,  were capable  o f 
p reven ting  .corruptio n  in  choosing th e  l e g i s l a t i v e  and execu tive  branches 
o f th e proposed fe d e ra l _gpyenimgn^ Indeed, co rru p tio n  was bound to  
creep in  and a f f e c t  even the s ta te  and lo c a l  governments, so deep d id  
th e  A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts ' skep tic ism  re a c h , F in a lly ,  and perhaps most 
im portan t, was the  b e l ie f  th a t  the  p eo p le , v o tin g  in  th e  la rg e  c o n s t i ­
tu en c ie s  provided  by th e  C o n s titu tio n , would e i th e r  lo se  e le c to r s  to
^Alexander Ham ilton, James Madison, John Jay , The F e d e ra l is t ,  
C lin ton  R o ss ite r  ( e d . ) (New Yorfc, 1961), p . 322.
% l l o t ,  D ebates, I I ,  29S-296.
^C ecelia  M. Kenyon, "Men o f  L i t t l e  F a ith s The A n ti f e d e ra l is ts  on 
th e  N ature o f  P o l i t i c a l  Man, " The W illiam and Mary Q u arte rly , H I  (1955) 
10.
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th e  a r i s to c r a t s  o f  th e  country  because o f  th e  l e t t e r ' s  su p e rio r  organ­
iz a t io n a l  c a p a c ity , o r would f in d  them selves choosing re p re se n ta tiv e s
Q
s o le ly  from among a number o f  p ro ffe re d  a r i s to c r a t s .
For th ese  rea so n s , th e  A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  were e s s e n t ia l ly  lo -  
c a l i s t s  on th e  m a tte r  o f re p re se n ta tiv e  government. They lacked  the  
f a i t h  needed to  extend the  p r in c ip le s  o f  rep u b lican  government beyond 
th e  s ta te  l e v e l .  T heir democracy was sm all, sim ple , and homogene-
O U S e
The c e n tra l  q u estio n , th en , th a t  tro u b le d  th e  A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts ,  
was the  e x te n t o f  power to  be given to  th e  genera l government. The 
course o f  the  R evolution and th e  t r i a l s  which i t  p resen ted  were s t i l l  
very  d i s t i n c t  in  th e  minds o f th o se  Americans who l iv e d  through and 
took an a c tiv e  p a r t  in  i t .  P o l i t i c a l  power over th e  th i r te e n  co lo n ies  
had been tra n s fe r re d  from England to  the  th i r t e e n  s ta te s  o p e ra tin g  as 
se p a ra te , se lf-g o v e rn in g  p o l i t i c a l  e n t i t i e s .  Having su ffe re d  under 
what o f te n  seemed ^  o verly  c e n tra l iz e d , and th mrohy nnr a s tH  A+.ivm 
government, th e  A n ti°Feder a l i s ts.,.H:ere- loa the , to ..a ss ig n  any more power 
to  a new cen t r a l iz e d  government than  was n ecessa ry  f o r  th e  b e n e f i t ,  
s a fe ty , and continued l ib e r ty  o f  a l l .  The A r t ic le s  o f C onfederation 
had been in  e f f e c t  f o r  some y e a rs—c e r ta in ly  long enough to  show th a t  
i t s  powers fo r  d ea lin g  w ith  a l l  th e  problems fac in g  th e  young n a tio n  
were g e n e ra lly  I n s u f f ic ie n t .  The post-R evo lu tion  years under th a t  
a r t i c l e  o f government were years  o f  p e t ty ,  lo c a l  r i v a l r i e s  and scram­
b les  fo r  p o l i t i c a l  power. The A r tic le s  d id  l i t t l e  to  a l l e v ia te  th e
Q
Kenyon, The A n t i f e d e r a l i s t s , pp . x c i i - x c i i i ,
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power s tru g g le s s indeed, as th e  years  passed , those  s tru g g le s  only  
in te n s i f ie d ,  to  the de trim en t o f a l l . ^
The fram ers o f  th e  Consti tu t io n  considered  i t  as the  so lu tio n  
t o th e  in te r n a l  p o l i t i c a l  problems fac in g  the U nited S ta te s .  The 
C o n s titu tio n a l Convention evidenced th e  id ea  th a t  f o r  g r e a te s t  e f fe c ­
tiv e n e ss  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  reform must be n a tio n a l  in  scope and must
embrace the  e n ti r e  n a tio n a l  Anerican p o l i t i c a l  system in  a  s in g le  
10coherent program. The l a t e r  phase o f  th e  C onvention 's ta sk  was 
s ig n i f ic a n t  because i t  drew a t te n t io n  to  the most p e r s i s te n t  c o n s t i-  
tu t io n a l  problem o f  the  Ifiiited S ta te s —th e  ex is ten ce  o f  a Tupl t l p l i n l l y
o f lo c a l  le g is la tu r e s  w ith in d e f in i te  p o w e r s . T h e  C o n stitu tio n  was
designed and couched w ith  s u f f ic ie n t  working room f o r  c o n s tru c tio n  to
12supply th e  shortcom ings o f th a t  a r t i c l e  o f government. The C onsti­
tu tio n  p laced  undisputed  h ig h es t a u th o r ity  in  th e  n a tio n a l  government.
I t  was s ta te d ,  and understood by the  s ig n e rs  a t  l e a s t ,  to  be th e  
supreme law o f  the  la n d .
But was th e  United S ta te s ,  a  n a tio n  l i t t l e  more than  a decade 
o ld , ready to  rec e iv e  such a government as proposed by th e  C o n stitu tio n ?  
Could i t s  people , t h e i r  i n s t i t u t io n s ,  and t h e i r  degree o f  p o l i t i c a l  
awareness m ain tain  such c e n tr a l iz a t io n  w ithou t th e  accompanying lo ss  
o f p o l i t i c a l  freedoms and in d iv id u a l l i b e r t i e s  h i s to r i c a l l y  consequent
^Robert A llen R utland, The Ordeal o f th e  C o n s titu tio n s The A nti-  
f e d e r a l i s t s  and th e  R a ti f ic a t io n  S trugg le  o f  1787-1788 (Norman. 19^j%  
p .
^^Edward S. Corwin, "The P rogress o f  P o l i t ic a l  Theory Between th e  
D ec la ra tio n  o f Independence and the Meeting o f th e  P h ilad e lp h ia  Conven­
t io n ,"  American H is to r ic a l  Review. XXX (1925 )> 520.
^^ Ib id .g p .  513o ^^Xbid. .  p . 521.
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o f such c e n tra l iz a tio n ?  Power to  handle t h e i r  own a f f a i r s  had been 
w rested  f r m  th e  Mother Country on ly  w ith  g re a t s a c r i f i c e  and e ffo r to  
That power was n o t considered  a commodity to  be to sse d  about l ig h t l y .  
Thus 5 ih e  A n ti-TPaHAfai i a t s  th e  b a s is  f o r  c o n f l ic t  was t h a t  a
s trong  cent r a l  governme n t, given s u f f ic ie n t  tim e, wouM weaken and 
u l tim a te ly  d estro y  lo c a l  government and i t s  accompanying p o l i t i c a l  
freedoms and in d iv id u a l p e rso n a l l i b e r t i e s . O t h e r s  be lieved  th a t  
n a tio n a l  government mus t  become .an.aggrandiging.^ari3 to  th e
de trim en t o f those  hard-won freedom s.
.M ti-W g W = l8 ts _ in  th^^ Conventlcm were from the
s t a r t  § m _ ex ceed in g ]^ ^ ^  Indeed, at  th e  end on ly  George
Mason and Govem or.JW m m dJW dol^^ a n d ^ b r i ^ e  Gerqr
o f Jîasaachusatts,.râm ainedo Gone were JbbnJ^nnsijng, J r . ,  and Robert 
Ya te s  o f New York, and M aryland's L u ther M artin , d isappo in ted  a t  th e  
C onvention 's continued in s is te n c e  on c e n tra l iz e d  government. They 
need n o t have been su rp r is e d , however, nor f e l t  so bad ly , about the  
outcome o f th e  Convention, f o r  a rrayed  a g a in s t them was the g re a te s t  
c o lle c tio n  o f N a tio n a lis ts  ever c o lle c te d  to g e th e r  in  one p lace  in  
American h ist-o ry . R ichard Henry Lee, subsequen tly  one o f th e  forem ost 
o f the  A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  e s s a y is ts ,  d ec lined  a ttendance  a t  th e  Convention,
^% orton  Borden ( e d .) ,  The A n t i f e d e ra l is t  Papers (Ann Arbor, 
1961), pp . hO -hl. ~  _ _ _ _ _
James Madison, The Debates in  th e  F edera l Convention o f  1787 
Nhich Framed th e  C o n s titu tio n  o f  the  IM ited S ta te s  o f  America, G a illa rd  
Hunt and James Brown S c o tt (e d s .)  (New York, 1920), p .^^7^.
^^Edmund Randolph ap p aren tly  had second thoughts on th e  m a tte r  o f 
continued  opposition  to  th e  C o n s titu tio n  between th e  c lo s in g  o f  th e  
P h ilad e lp h ia  Convention and th e  opening o f  th e  V irg in ia  R a tify in g  Con­
v e n tio n . At l e a s t  he sa id  he d id . E l l i o t ,  D ebates, I I I ,  23=28.
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In  view o f  t h e i r  sm all number a t  th e  Convention, and in  view 
a lso  o f  the  stro n g  N a tio n a lis t  co n tin g en t, the  A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  gained 
few successes in  t h e i r  e f f o r t s  to  thw art th e  c e n tra l iz in g  tendency o f  
th e  n a tio n a lis t-m in d e d  d e le g a te s . Qf thm ir many p ro p o sa ls , only th e  
ex c lu siv e  r ig h t  o f th e  House o f  R ep resen ta tiv es to  o r ig in a te _ ^ p ro p r ia -  
t io n  b i l l s  was accep ted j t h e i r  o th e r  p ro p o sa ls  found l i t t l e  support 
among th e  d e le g a te s . As i f  to  ven t t h e i r  d isappointm ent over th e  o u t­
come o f th e  Convention, th e  th re e  rem aining 'A n tis  ' re fu sed  to  g ive  
t h e i r  s i ^ e d  a ssen t to  th e  C o n s titu tio n  as i t  emerged from th e  s e c re t  
deba tes , nor d id  they  h e s i ta te  to  review the outcome o f  th e  proceedings 
in  th e  f i n a l  days o f the  Convention. Each o f  th i s  famous "d is se n tin g  
t r i o " expressed in  h is  own way grave concern over the  dangerous tendency 
toward c e n tra l iz a tio n  o f  a u th o r ity  adopted in  p a r t  o f th e  C o n s titu tio n !^
Though the Anti -F e d e ra l is t s  tr a n s fe r re d  t h e i r  o p p o sitio n  to  the  
C onfederation Congress, t h e i r  p reven t t  passage o f thO
Co n s t i t u t i o n .o n _ J ^ e  people f a i l e d .  But the  C o n s titu tio n  s t i l l  faced  
i t s  most d i f f i c u l t  t e s ts  r a t i f i c a t i o n  in  s p e c ia l  s t a te  conventions by 
the  req u ired  n ine  o f  th e  th ir te e n  s ta te s  rem ained. This p resen ted  the  
A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  w ith  t h e i r  f i n a l  o p p o rtu n ity  and t h e i r  s tre n g th , a b i l ­
i t i e s ,  and perseverance were p u t to  the  t e s t .
The A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  ga thered  a l l  t h e i r  de te rm ina tion  and f a c ts  
a t  c h e ir  d isp o sa l f o r  the  f i n a l  c o n te s t .  But t h e i r  n a t io n a l i s t  oppon­
en ts  were no le s s  a c t iv e . The F e d e ra l is ts ' s t ra te g y  was to  secu re  th e
l^ F o r the  o b jec tio n s  o f Edmund Randolph to  th e  C o n s titu tio n , see  
Madison, op. c i t . .  pp. ^7^-576. For George Mason's o b jec tio n s  to  the 
C o n s titu tio n , see I b id . .  p . 5?6. And f o r  th e  c r i t ic is m s  by E lbridge 
G erry o f the  C o n s titu tio n , see i b id . , pp . 576- 577 .
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e a r ly  c a l l in g  o f  th e  s t a te  r a t i f y in g  conventions and consequent speedy
ra t i f ic a t io n o  Thus, they  hoped to  b u ild  up a momentum o f  r a t i f i c a t i o n
idilch would be d i f f i c u l t  to  s to p .^ ^  The s t r a t e gy was a c t i on. % e^
A n t^ e d e ra U § i.5 ,,Q0_̂  ̂ fo r j ie la y ^  co u n se llin g  slow
18and c a re fu l  c o n s id e ra tio n  o f th e  new p lan  o f  government. The Feder­
a l i s ts *  s tra te g y  p a id  o f f ,  w ith  se v e ra l quick and r e la t iv e ly  easy 
su ccesses . But th e se  e a r ly  successes by no means d e te r re d  the  A n ti-  
F e d e ra l is ts ,  f o r  th ese  successes were c h ie f ly  in  the  sm all New Ehgland 
s ta te s  : th e se , w ith the  exception  o f  îfa ssac h u se tts , had been acknow­
ledged as give-aways from the f i r s t .  The ‘Antis* looked forw ard to  
the  la r g e r  s t a te s —New York, V irg in ia , North C aro lina—f o r  t h e i r  hopes. 
And they  came very  c lo se  to  success in  t h e i r  campaign.
17au tland , 0£ . c i t . , p . U9.
^^ Ib ld . .  p . 36 .
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
CHAPTER I I
THE NEW ENGLAND STATES
The Federal Convention h e ld  i t s  l a s t  se ss io n  o f  debates on 
% ptem ber 17, 178?o The C o n stitu tio n  was then  p resen ted  to  th e  Confed­
e ra tio n  Congress, which q u ick ly  gave th e  new a r t i c l e  o f  government i t s  
app roval,^  and recommended th a t  th e  s ta te  l e g is la tu r e s  p lan  e le c tio n s  
fo r  d e leg a tes  to  th e  s p e c ia l  s ta te  r a t i f y in g  conven tions. While th ese  
proceedings were in  p ro g re ss , F e d e ra l is ts  throughout America were a c tiv e . 
T heir s t ra te g y , as o u tlin e d  in  Chapter I ,  had p rev io u s ly  been decided 
upon, and they moved s w if t ly  to  implement th a t  s tra te g y .. The F e d e ra l­
i s t s  o f the  fo u r New England s ta te s  were e sp e c ia l ly  a c t iv e , fo r  they
re a liz e d  th e  g re a t advantage p resen ted  to  them by th e  in te rn a l  s i tu a t io n  
2
in  those  s ta te s»  The p ro sp ec t o f e a r ly  and r e la t iv e ly  easy r a t i f i c a ­
tio n  was indeed th e  case in  New Ehgland, and th e  F e d e ra lis ts  planned to  
g e t th e  b a l l  o f quick r a t i f i c a t i o n  moving e a r ly  in  th a t  region»^
^D espite the  e f f o r t s  o f  R ichard Henry Lee and o th e r  A n ti-F ed era l­
i s t s  in  th e  C onfederation Congraas to  convince th a t  body n o t to  approve 
the  C o n s titu tio n , the  Congress
to  approve th e new a r t i c l e  o f government» The Congress se n t a re s o lu ­
t io n  to  th e  le g is la tu r e s  o f  th e  se v e ra l s ta te s  in s tru c t in g  them to  c a l l  
e le c tio n s  fo r  d e leg a tes  to  the  r a t i f y in g  conven tions. James Madison,
The Debates in  the  F edera l Convention of 1787 Which Framed the  C o n stitu ­
t io n  o f the  T hited  S ta te s  o f America, G a illa rd  Hunt and James Brown 
S c o t tT e d s ») (New fo rk , l9 § 0 ) , p» 6 k l »
^Robert A llen  R utland, The Ordeal o f  th e  C o n s ti tu tio n s The R a ti f -  _ 
Ic a tio n  S trugg le  o f  1787-1788 (Norman, 19^^)»
^Robert M orris i s  rep o rted  to  have considered  th a t  a l l  th e  s ta te s  
above New York, Rhode Is la n d  excep ting , la y  in  th e  F e d e ra l is t  Gamp» His 
e s tim a tio n  was very  a c c u ra te | indeed , on ly  M assachusetts and New Hampshire 
(unexpectedly) and Rhode Is la n d  (expectedly") “dem onstrated any A nti-Fed­
e r a l i s t  s treng th»  R utland, ib id » , p» SO»
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C onnecticut ; th e  f i r s t  New Bagland s t a te  to  c a l l  i t s  r a t i f y in g
convention , dem onstrated some meager A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  o p p o sitio n . The
C onnecticut ratiJfy ijig  convention re q u ire d  only  one week to  g ive  i t s
approval to  th e  C o n s titu tio n .^  I t  must n o t be thought from th i s  rap id
v o te , however, th a t  A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  o p p o sitio n  was lack in g  in  e i th e r
ex is ten ce  o r  s p i r i t ;  th e  sm all A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  co n tin g en t p re se n t In
th e  F edera lis t-dom inated  convention s tro n g ly  m ain tained  i t s  p o s i t io n .
The determ ina tion  shown by the  ‘A n tis ’ p re se n t in  H artfo rd  i s  a c re d i t
to  t h e i r  b e l i e f  in  t h e i r  p o s itio n  and to  th e  le a d e rsh ip  shown by General
James Wadsworth and h is  com patrio t. Judge E lip h a le t  Dyer. General
Tffedsworth was a capable d eb a te r, and h is  staunch o p p o sitio n  to  h is
F e d e ra l is t  opponents undoubtedly caused them some disparagem ent, though
he re a liz e d  th e  is su e  o f  r a t i f i c a t i o n  was never s e r io u s ly  in  doubt.
General Wadsworth‘s o p p o sitio n  to  th e  C o n s titu tio n  cen tered
e s p e c ia l ly  on th e  broad tax ing  powers g ra n te d  to  th e  proposed Congress.
In  g iv ing  Congress both the power o f the  purse  (A r tic le  I ,  se c tio n s  7
c;
and 8, o f  the F ederal C o n s titu tio n ) and the  power o f  the  sword (A rtic le  
I ,  s e c tio n  8 ) , ^  a  n e a r-d e sp o tic  a u th o r i ty  was g ran ted  to  the  n a tio n a l 
l e g i s l a tu r e .  Not only  was power o f such ex tensive  n a tu re  but one sh o rt
^Pennsylvania was th e  f i r s t  s t a te  to  c a l l  i t s  r a t i fy in g  conven­
t io n  (November 21, 1787), Delaware follow ed w ith  a c a l l  f o r  December 3, 
1787. The vo tes on r a t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  these  two s ta te s  came on December 
12 (ii6 f o r ,  23 a g a in s t ) ,  and Decanber 7 (unanimous approval o f th e  Con­
s t i t u t i o n ) ,  r e s p e c t iv e ly . New Je rse y  and G eorgia became th e  th i r d  and 
fo u r th  s ta te s  to  r a t i f y  th e^ C o n stitu tio n  on December I 8 , 1787, and 
January  2, 1788, re s p e c tiv e ly , and follow ed th e  example o f Delaware in  
r a t i f y in g  unanim ously. Conn e c t ic u t  c a lle d  i t s  r a t i f y in g  convention f o r  
January 1 , 1788; i t s  r a t i f io a t ld n  came on January 19, w ith  a v o te  o f 
128 f o r  r a t i f i c a t i o n  and UO a g a in s t .
E d i s o n ,  0£ , c i t . .  pp. 629- 630.
^ Ib ld .o  p , 630.
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s te p  from enfo rceab le  coercion  by th e  fe d e ra l government, Wadsworth 
charged, bu t th e  de lega tes  to  th e  F edera l Convention had no r ig h t  to  
d e leg a te  to  Congress th e  r ig h t  to  u ra rp  s t a te  p re ro g a tiv e s  o f  tax ing  
th e  c iti 'z e n s  o f th e  se v e ra l s t a t e s . F in a lly , he b i t t e r l y  concluded 
th a t  such ex tensive  a u th o r i ty  would serve in  the  l a s t  r e s o r t  to  b e n e f i t  
th e  South a t  the  expense o f  the  North
Wiadsïmrth .on th i s  m a tte r  o f  fe d e ra l  ta x a tio n  p a r a l le l s
c lo se ly  th a t  o f the  anonymous au th o r o f an essay  reproduced in  Morton
g
Borden “ s The A n ti f e d e ra l is t  Papers » The new government, the  au tho r
contended, would prove much more expensive than  th e  Confederationo 
Though Alexander Ham ilton, in  F e d e ra l is t  Number 13, reasoned t h a t th e  
government as proposed by the  C o n stitu tio n  would be f a r  cheaper to  
op e ra te  th an the o ld  C onfederation ^ o v e im  by v i r tu e  o f  i t s  s in g le
g
c iv i l  l i s t  assuming more powers, —n o t so conteM@dL_the A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  
e ssa y is te  For th e  h is to ry  o f  G reat B r i ta in , w ith i t s  scheme o f  re p re s ­
e n ta tio n  in  the  House o f Commons bore ou t th e  p o s it io n  th a t  a la rg e  
c iv i l  l i s t  i s  n o t n e c e s s a r ily  cheaper in  o p e ra tio n  than th ir te e n  se p a r­
a te  and le s s  pow erful governments <, Moreover, the w r i te r  asked, i s  i t  
p roper to  g ran t both power and p ro p erty  to  any group o f  men, befo re  the  
p u b lic  d eb t, in c lud ing  the  p re se n t and fu tu re  expenses o f th e  f e d e ra l
7%dsTimrth^ p re d ic tio n  was on ly  the f i r s t  o f  many, such p r e d ic  
t io n s  Jh a t p a r t i c u la r  s e c tio n s  o f th e  C o n s titu tio n  would b e n e f i t  the  
Southern s ta te s  a t  th e  expense o f th e  North (o r  v ice  v e rsa  depending 
upon whether the  source o f  th e  p re d ic tio n  was from the North o r  the  
South)» P re d ic tio n s  o f a s im ila r  n a tu re  w i l l  be p o in ted  ou t in  subse­
quent chap ters » R utland , o£o c i t . ,  pp , 70-7^.
8Morton Borden (ed») ,  The A n ti f e d e ra l is t  Papers (Ann A rbor, 
1961), ppo 35“36o
^Alexander Ham ilton, James Madison, John Jay , The F e d e ra l is t ,  
C lin ton  R o ss ite r  (ed») (New York, 1961), pp. 97=-99.
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government g i s  f u l ly  exp la ined  to  th e  p u b lic?  Even under th e  Confeder­
a t io n , no one, contended the  w r i te r ,  was quite.-S.ure o f th e  ex ten t o f 
thÆ juW ^.,^^ nor_whatJh9_expaaa9i4lf-..^i^ •
Prudence demands ,  he concluded, thmsA m a tte ra , o f the  g rav es t
economic im portance, b ^  knnwn Jgu% jp JiSfSXP th e  powers o f  ta x a ­
t io n  o f  th e  proposed fe d e ra l  government, and i t s  r ig h t  to  extend i t s  
uncon tested  a u th o r i ty  over th e  immense a re a  o f  th e  coun try , be g ran ted .
D esp ite  a l l  o f W adsworth's e f f o r t s ,  th e  r a t i f i c a t i o n  o f the 
C o n s titu tio n  by the  C onnecticut convention was assured  as a m a tte r  o f 
course , By th e  end o f  JanuarVf__12&8_. f iv e  s ta te s  had given th e i r  ap­
p roval to  the  C onstitu tion»  W ith th e  excep tion  o f  Pennsylvania, a l l  
these  s ta te s  which r a t i f i e d  th e  C o n stitu tio n  by January were re a l iz e d  
and accepted  by the  A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  elsew here as give-aways» The r e a l  
show o f s tre n g th  was sh o r t ly  to  begin , however, fo r  among the  rem aining 
conventions to  be c a l le d  were the  s ta te s  th a t  could make o r break 
eitheg^^side iu  th e  c o n te s t—M assachusetts, New York, and V irg in ia»  The 
c o n te s ts  in  th ese  th re e  'l a r g e ' s t a t e s ,  n o t to  mention th e  sm aller 
s ta te s  o f  New Hampshire, M aryland, and North C aro lina, were recognized 
as extrem ely close» A se tback  in  any one o f th e  th re e  m ajor s ta te s
could ve ry  w ell be the undoing o f a l l  the  e f f o r t  and p lanning sp en t in
secu ring  r a t i f i c a t i o n  up to  th a t  time»
The f i r s t  o f  the  th re e  'l a r g e ' s t a te s  to  open i t s  convention 
proceedings was Massachusetts»^® Though the is su e  o f r a t i f i c a t i o n  in  
th e  s t a te  was in  doubt, th e re  was an o th e r f a c to r  o f  equal im portance in  
th e  f i n a l  outcomes The a c tio n  taken  by the  M assachusetts convention
^®The M assachusetts r a t i fy in g  convention opened on January 9 ,
1788»
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would v e ry  l ik e ly  determ ine, and was c e r ta in  to  in f lu e n c e , the  outcome 
o f th e  New York, V irg in ia , and Maryland conventions o
The F e d e ra l is t  ranks in  the  Boston convention su ffe re d  from no 
d e a rth  o f  w idely known, w ell re sp e c te d , and undoubtedly ta le n te d  men, 
f o r  men l ik e  N athan iel Gorham, F ish e r  Ames, Rufus King, Theodore Sedg­
wick, and F ranc is  Dana ro se  and spoke in  support o f  the  C onstitu tiono  
Though in  term s o f pure numbers the  F e d e ra lis ts  were a t  a  d isadvantage, 
th e  convention was he ld  in  s tro n g ly  F e d e ra l is t  Boston, and th a t  s in g le  
f a c t  was c e r ta in ly  o f  no sm all m oral value*
The A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts*  ranks lik ew ise  included  numerous w e ll-  
known and resp ec ted  man, though th e  most capable ‘A nti* , E lbridge G erry, 
f a i l e d  in  h is  b id  fo r  e le c tio n  as a de legate*  Then to o , many o f th e  
A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  p re se n t were m oderates, tend ing  towards v a c i l l a t in g ,  
and a sudden s h i f t  in  F e d e ra l is t  s t r a te g y  aimed a t  cap tu rin g  th e  sup- 
p o r t  o f  th ese  men caught the  A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  le a d e rs  o f f  t h e i r  guard*
The r e s u l t ,  as w i l l  be seen, was d is a s te r  to  th e  A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts ‘ 
a s p i r a t io n s ,
The M assachusetts A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  were extrem ely s tro n g , v o ca l, 
and p r o l i f i c  in  t h e i r  p o s i t io n , p resen tin g  a  s iz a b le  q u a n tity  o f l i t e r ­
a tu re  in  the  form of essay s, l e t t e r s ,  b roadsides, and pamphlets to  the
^^During th e  l a t e r  course o f th e  d eb a tes , tW  F e d e ra l is t  le a d e r ­
sh ip  in  th e  convention convinced Governor John Hancock, whose support 
was v i t a l  to  th e  F e d e ra l is t  cause , to  p re se n t c e r ta in  ^endm ents to  the  
C o n s titu tio n  In  r e tu rn  f o r  W iich .the  F e d e ra lis ts  promised t h e i r  support 
in  secu ring  Hancock an appo in tive  p o s it io n  in  th e  a d m in is tra tio n  o f 
George Washington as P residen t*  F o rre s t MacDonald, "The A n ti-F ed era l­
i s t s , "  The Wisconsin Magazine o f  H istory* XLVI (1963), f  »n. Though th e  
amendments were only  recommendatory, th e  move was su ccessfu l in  changing 
the  minds o f a , s u f f ic i e n t  number o f ‘Juatis^ to  g ive  the  F e d e ra l is ts  th e  
v o tes  th ey  needed f o r  r a t i f ic a t io n *  See Jackson Turner Main, The A n ti-  
F e d e ra l is ts  8 C r i t ic s  o f ^  C onstitu tion*  1781-1788 (Chapel H i l l , ’ 19^1},
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publico  Both th e  su p p o rte rs  and th e  opponents o f  th e  C o n s titu tio n  had 
more than  s u f f ic ie n t  tim e to  p repare  t h e i r  re sp e c tiv e  arguments f o r  
d issem ination  to  th e  p u b lic  befo re  th e  convention began, and both s id e s  
were ex tra n e ly  busy in  doing so . The m a jo rity  o f  the s t a t e 's  newspapers 
were lo c a te d  in  F ed era lis t-d o m in a ted  Boston, and consequently  r e f le c te d
the  N a tio n a lis t  p o s i t io n .  The bulk o f  th e  A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts*  w ritin g s
XPwere found in  a s in g le  p ap e r, Edward Power's American H erald , but 
ag a in , they  were numerous.
The a b le s t  A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  pam phleteers were E lb ridge  Gerry and 
Agrippa, and both were extrem ely a c tiv e  in  t h e i r  e f f o r t s .  G erry, the 
n o rth ern  member o f th e  "d isse n tin g  t r io "  a t  th e  F edera l Convention, 
rep e a te d ly  evidenced h is  f e a r  o f th e  p o ss ib le  consequences o f adopting 
a C o n s titu tio n  which was both ambiguous and, to  h is  mind, incom plete.
As he explained  in  h is  l e t t e r  to  the  M assachusetts ' L e g is la tu re , h is  
re fu s a l  to  a f f ix  h is  s ig n a tu re  to  th e  C o n s titu tio n , "h is  only m otive 
fo r  d is se n tin g  from th e  C o n s titu tio n  was a firm  persu asio n  th a t  i t  would 
endanger the  l i b e r t i e s  o f America. . . .  He was n o t ,"  he con tinued , 
"au th o rised  to  an a c t ,  which appeared to  him was a su rren d er o f  l i b e r ­
t ie s ." ^ ^  Close exam ination o f  G e rry 's  pamphlet to  th e  p re s id in g  o f f ic e r  
o f the M assachusetts L e g is la tu re , e n t i t le d  "O bservations on the  New 
C o n s titu tio n  and on th e  F edera l and S ta te  Convention," makes fo r  h ig h ly  
illu m in a tin g  read in g . More im portan t, however, i s  the key th a t  i t  p ro ­
v ides f o r  the understand ing  o f the  man h im se lf .
^^R utland, o£. c i t . . pp. 66-7S.
13Paul L e ic e s te r  Ford ( e d . ) .  Essays on th e  C o n stitu tio n  of the  
Iftiited S ta te s  (Brooklyn 1892), pp. 127-127. "
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Independently  w ealthy , w ith  a  prosperous m ercan tile  business in  
Boston, and w ith  no apparen t p o l i t i c a l  a s p ira t io n s ,^ ^  (Jerry’s re fu s a l  
t o ^ i ^  an a r t i c l e  o f government which appeared so improper a ffo rd ed  
him l i t t l e  b e n e f i t  but much p e rso n a l r i s k .  Thilike many o f  h is  oppon­
e n ts ,  and many o f  h is  co lleagues in  a l l  f a i r n e s s ,  who served to  p r o f i t  
from a p o l i t i c a l  o r  economic stan d p o in t from t h e i r  re sp e c tiv e  p o s it io n a , 
G erry’s opp o sitio n  was q u ite  conv incing ly  derived  from a genuine f e a r  
o f th e  e f fe c ts  th e  C o n s titu tio n  would have upon the  people and t h e i r  
freedom s. His p o s i t io n , th en , ranks him as one o f the  very  few t ru e  
^ statesm en in  th e  country  on ei t h e r  s id .e.
G erry’s '*O bservations” d e ta i l  a  number o f o b jec tio n s  which th e  
au tho r b e liev es  re q u ire  immediate c o rre c tio n . A g re a t many o f h is  ob­
je c tio n s  were repea ted  again  and again  during the  m onth-and-a-half 
long convention, and th i s  th e s is  w il l  a ttem pt to  c o r re la te  h is  “Obser­
v a tio n s” w ith  s im ila r  ones p resen ted  in  th e  convention.
By no means the  l e a s t  o f h is  and o th e r  A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts ’ o b jec ­
t io n s  to  the C o n stitu tio n  concerned th e  proposed House o f R epresent­
a t iv e s .  So im portant do th ese  o b jec tio n s  become in  A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  
speeches and w r i t in g s , in  M assachusetts and elsew here, th a t  some 
re c a p itu la t io n  o f  A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  theory  o f re p re se n ta tiv e  government 
Is  v a lu ab le  h e re .
Both th e  F e d e ra l is ts  and the  A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  were in  agreement 
th a t  w hatever government opera ted  in  the  Ifiiited S ta te s ,  i t s  b asic  form 
must be rep u b lican . For men o f  both p o s i t io n s ,  a ls o , the  lower house 
o f th e  l e g i s l a t iv e  branch, on both th e  s t a te  and n a tio n a l le v e ls ,  the
l% o r r e s t  MacDonald, %  People (Chicago, 19^8), p . ^9.
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houses b road ly  re p re se n ta tiv e  o f  th e  peo p le , was understood  to  be th e  
dominant house. This was a ca rry -o v e r from c o lo n ia l  tim es and i t  was 
u n th in k ab le , to  the  A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  a t  l e a s t ,  th a t  th e  power o f  th e  
lower houses be s ig n i f ic a n t ly  r e d u c e d . A  p a r t  o f t h i s  a sp ec t o f  
A nti-Federalism  was th e  p r in c ip le  th a t  th e  government should r e s t  on 
the  consent o f  a t  l e a s t  a  s u b s ta n t ia l  p ro p o rtio n  o f  th e  governed, though 
j u s t  what segments o f the  f r e e  a d u lt  male p o pu la tion  m ight be excluded 
from th e  f ra n c h ise  was no t agreed  upon.^^
As c la s s ic a l  r e""bl inanm, t.h» A n tt-F e d a ra lis ta  ware n a tu ra l ly  
very  concerned wjj;b.Jhe_^zl m W & _ w h is ^  people^KOJild, bji
rep re sen ted  in  th e  proposed fe d e ra l  government, and th e  degree to  which 
th ey  would e x is t  as th e  a u th o r i ty  behind th a t  government. The fram ers 
o f th e  C o n s titu tio n  designed the House o f R ep resen ta tives as th e  house 
o f  the peop le ; indeed, i t  was the  so le  house over whose members the  
people had a d i r e c t  s e le c t io n .  The House, acco rd ing ly , g re a t ly  con­
cerned th e  A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  o f M assachusetts.
The p ro spec t o f b ie n n ia l e le c tio n  o f  re p re se n ta tiv e s  was the  
f i r s t  o f  G e rry 's  many c r i t ic is m s  of the  C o n s titu tio n .
[W]hen s o c ie ty  has depu tied  a c e r ta in  number o f  th e i r  equals 
to  take ca re  o f t h e i r  p e rso n a l r ig h ts ,  and th e  in te r e s ts  o f  
the  whole community, i t  must be considered  th a t  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  
i s  th e  g re a t s e c u r i ty  o f in te g r i ty  and honor, and th a t  annual 
e le c tio n  i s  the  b a s is  o f  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty .17
l^ C e ce lia  M. Kenyon, The A n ti f e d e ra l is ts  (New York, 1966), pp. 
xxv-xxvi.
^^Ib id o B p . x x v i i i .
^7paul L e ic e s te r  Ford ( e d . ) ,  Pamphlets on th e  C o n s titu tio n  o f  
th e  U nited S ta te s  (Brooklyn, 1891), p
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The problem o f  the  frequency o f  n a tio n a l  e le c tio n s  was h o tl ĝ  
d isp u ted t hroughout the  F edera l Convention, and continued to  form the 
su b je c t o f ex tensive  debates and exhaustive  coverage in  w r itte n  form in  
most o f th e  s ta te s  during the  r a t i f i c a t i o n  s tru g g le . I t  was, moreover, 
a problem which was never answered to  many A n ti -F e d e ra lis ts ” s a t i s f a c ­
tio n  during th e  course o f th e  r a t i f i c a t i o n  movement. Mon te s q u ie u 's
epigram, "The g rea tn ess  o f power must be compensated fo r  by th e  b re v ity  
1 fio f  the d u ra tio n 9* was repea ted  again  and again  as the maxim f o r  the
19guarantee  o f con tinued  p o l i t i c a l  l i b e r ty  and p e rso n a l freedom.
I t  was no t uncommon throughout the  th ir te e n  s ta te s  to  f in d  p u b lic  
o f f i c i a l s  whose term s o f  o f f ic e  req u ired  re e le c tio n  every s ix  monthsj 
annual e le c tio n  to  n a tio n a l  and e s p e c ia lly  s ta te  o f f ic e s  was the  ru le.^O  
The An ti°F e d e ra l i s t s  o f  M assachusetts, however, appeared to be p a r t ic u ­
l a r l y  concerned w ith  th e  nroblem o f e le c tio n s  to  n a tio n a l  o f f ic e s ,  and 
were extrem ely vexed w ith the  p ro v is io n  o f  A r tic le  I ,  se c tio n  2, o f  the  
C o n s titu tio n . C uriously  enough, r e la t iv e ly  l i t t l e  was made o f  th e  p ro -  
v is io n  fo r  b ijn n ia l_ q le e tio n s  o u tside_ the  Bay s ta te ,. I t  may be, as 
C ece lia  Kenyon suggests in  h e r in tro d u c tio n  to  The A n t i f e d e ra l is ts ,
Jonathan E l l io t  ( e d . ) ,  The Debates in  the  Several S ta te  Conven- 
t io n s  on th e  R a ti f ic a tio n  o f  the  F ederal C o n stitu tio n  v o ls . .  1076- 
i m r  P h iH d e lp h ia , 1Ü76),— l T 3 ,  13, 1 $ - ! ^ ------ ---------
^^Ford, E ssays, p . ^9.
^®The M assachusetts C o n s titu tio n  o f  1780, f o r  example, p rovided 
th a t  th e  members o f  both the  Senate (Chapter I ,  se c tio n  I I ,  a r t i c l e  I )  
and the  House o f R ep resen ta tiv es (C hapter I ,  s e c tio n  I I I ,  a r t i c l e  I )  
were to  be e le c te d  to  th e i r  o f f ic e s  an n u ally . Robert J .  T aylor ( e d . ) , 
M assachuse tts, Colony to  Commonwealths Documents on the Formation o f i t s  
C o n s ti tu tio n , 1775-1780 (Chapel H i l l ,  19^1), pp. 133 and 13$, re sp ec - 
t iv e iy .
21Kenyon, o£„ c i t . , p . I v i .
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th a t  th e re  seemed to  be a g re a te r  w illin g n e ss  on the  p a r t  o f  th e  A n ti- 
F e d e ra l is ts  to  concede the  leg itim acy  o f  th e  F e d e ra lis t  argument th a t  
the  d i f f e r e n t  circum stances o f a c e n tra l  government and th e  len g th  of 
time req u ire d  f o r  re p re se n ta tiv e s  to  t r a v e l  from th e i r  home d i s t r i c t s  
to  th e  s e a t  o f government j u s t i f i e d  th e  lo n g er terms o f o f f ic e .  
C e rta in ly , on the  o th e r  hand, i t  seems ju s t  as expected th a t  in  th e  
th ir te e n  s ta te s  o f America, only M assachusetts A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  would 
p ro te s t  th e  C o n s ti tu tio n 's  ignoring  o f  the  s a fe ty  and se c u r i ty  provided 
fo r  in  annual e le c t io n s . The exp lanation  fo r  th is  conduct may l i e  in  
Robert Brown's th eo ry  th a t  the  Bay s t a te  dem onstrated more m id d le -c lass  
democracy than d id  h e r s i s t e r  s t a t e s M o r e  l ik e ly ,  however, the  
conduct o f  th e  Massach u se tt s  A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  a rose  from the  c o n s t i tu ­
t io n a l  h is to ry  o f the  s t a t e ,  which had h i s to r ic a l l y  d isp layed  a r e l a ­
t iv e ly  w ider su ffra g e  than  the  o th e r  s ta te s  o f  America. Indeed, the  
r e s t r i c t io n s  on su ffra g e  were one o f the  main reasons f o r  the  r e je c t io n  
by the people o f  th e  M assachusetts C o n s titu tio n  o f  1778.23 The A n ti- 
F e d e ra lis ts  o f th e  Bay s t a te  were th e o re t ic a l  in h e r i to r s  o f  th is  
t r a d i t io n ,  and as such th e i r  o b jec tio n s  to  A r t ic le  I ,  se c tio n  2, o f  
the C o n stitu tio n  a re  e n t i r e ly  p re d ic ta b le .
As a c o llo ra ry  to  th is  c r i t ic is m  o f th e  proposed re p re se n ta tiv e  
n a tu re  o f the government, i t  was w idely  agreed th a t  only one re p re se n t­
a t iv e  per t h i r t y  thousand in h a b ita n ts  o f  a s t a t e 's  popu la tion  was
22Robert Brown, Middle C lass Democracy and the R evolution in  
M assachusetts , I 68I - I 78O (I th a c a , 195
23The in h a b ita n ts  o f th e  town o f Mendoy, W orcester County, s a id , 
f o r  example, th a t  " i t  appears to  us th a t  i t  i s  very  unreasonable th a t  
no person  s h a l l  be allowed to  g ive h is  vo te  f o r  Governor, L t. Governor 
o r Senators . . . u n le ss  he make oath  th a t  he i s  q u a lif ie d  v iz  th a t  he 
i s  worth <^0o" T aylor, c i t . , p . 62.
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e n t i r e ly  too sm a ll. Agrippa complained th a t  given th a t  r a t io  o f
re p re se n ta tiv e s  to  p o p u la tio n , i t  was u n lik e ly  th a t  the re p re se n ta tiv e s
would m ain tain  any a f fe c t io n  fo r  t h e i r  c o n s titu e n ts ,^ ^  As General
Heath exp la ined , during the e a r ly  days o f th e  debatess
I t  i s  a novel id ea  th a t  re p re se n ta tiv e s  so chosen fo r  a  con­
s id e ra b le  tim e, in  o rd er th a t  they  may le a rn  t h e i r  du ty . The 
re p re se n ta tiv e  i s  one who appears in  b eh a lf  o f ,  and a c ts  f o r ,  
o th e rs j  he ought, th e re fo re ,  to  be f u l ly  acquain ted  w ith th e  
f e e l in g s ,  c ircum stances, and in te r e s t s  o f th e  persons he 
rep re se n ts  I and th is  i s  l e a m t  among them, no t a t  th e  d is ta n t
c o u r t«^5
P re c is e ly  because few men would re p re se n t many, ihey should re tu rn  
o ften  to  th e  people from whence they  came and consequently  be more 
re sp o n sib le  to  them. Annual e le c t io n s , th e re fo re ,  were favorgd
among A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  in  M assachusetts,
Then to o , given the  power g ran ted  Congress by A rtic le  I ,  se c tio n  
ii^^-“ '*The Time, P lace , and Manner o f holding E le c tio n s  f o r  Senators and 
R epresen tatives s h a l l  be p re sc rib e d  in  each s ta te  by th e  L e g is la tu re  
th e re o f j  but the  Congress may a t  any tim e by Law make o r a l t e r  such 
R egulation , . . was i t  n o t l ik e ly  th a t  Congress could v i r tu a l l y  p e r­
p e tu a te  i t s e l f  in  power in d e f in i te ly ,  o r  a t  b e s t so re g u la te  the  tim e,
p la c e , and mode o f e le c tio n  so as to  ensure the  e le c tio n  o f  such o f f i -
27c ia ls  as i t  d esired ?  I t  was a p o in t o f te n  repeated  in  the deb a tes , 
and in  th e  p u b lic  e s s a y s . M o s t  o f te n , th e  suggestion  was to  w i# h o ld
^^Ford, E ssays, p . $ho 
^ % l i o t ,  D ebates, I I ,  13.
^ ^ a d is o n , 0£ . c i t . , p . 628.
^"^E llio t, D ebates, I I ,  22, 23, 2$, 30-31 < 
^®Ford, E ssays, p . lOS.
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such power which i f  chosen could be so g re a t and dangerous, and th a t
29th e  people had b e s t to  hold  such powers»
The ere^htest f e a r  o f  the  M assachusetts A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  was 
t h e i r  b e l ie f  th a t  t he proposed fe d e ra l  government would u lt im a te ly  
r e s u l t  in  a c o n so lid a tio n  o f  the  s t a t e  governments* The s t a te  govern- 
m ents, Agrippa so ab ly  exp la ined , were MsJborJ,caX3^,J^^^^ 
source o f  p ro te c tio n  o f th e i r  c i t i z e n s ' r ig h ts  and freedom s, and had 
proven them selves v igorous in  handling  problems o f  a l l  k i n d s M o r e ­
over, no ex tensiv e repub lican-governed empire had p reserved  i t s  p p l i t -  
ici^.,%i%Wm8 of..gonfede^r#lpns o » Only
by lo c a l  laws made by lo c a l  re p re se n ta tiv e s  could  the  p e o p le 's  happ i­
ness be m aintained*
Di h is  s e r ie s  o f L e t te r s ,  Agrippa p resen ted  a r a th e r  comprehen­
s iv e  exam ination o f ü ie  C o n stitu tio n  in  h is  endeavor to  dem onstrate i t s  
c o n so lid a tin g  nature*  Though s im ila r  o b jec tio n s  were voiced during  the  
d e b a t e s , A grippa' s arguments were f a r  su p e rio r  in  terras o f b read th  
and a n a ly t ic a l  reasoning* For th is  reason , th i s  th e s is  w il l  examine 
th a t  a sp ec t o f A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  f e a r  o f th e  C o n s titu tio n  p r im a rily  fipm 
h is  L e tte rs*
Agrippa was e s p e c ia l ly  concerned w ith th e  e x te n t o f  ju d ic ia l  
power g ranted  by the  C o n stitu tio n  to  th e  fe d e ra l ju d ic ia ry *  Indeed, 
in  the  eyes o f the  n o tab le  A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  w r i te r ,  the p ro v isio n s fo r
^ ^ E ll io t ,  Debates « I I ,  37*
^^Ford, E ssays, p* 63*
^ I b td * a p* 61i*
3 2 E llio t,  Debates* I I ,  63, 69, 73, 77, 80-81,
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th i s  fe d e ra l^ ju d ic ia l  th e  mgs t  o f  a l l  poyera. p f
th e  cantral-^gojAnament enumerated by th e  C o n s titu tio n . A r t ic le  I I I  o f 
33the C o n stitu tio n  proposed th e  estab lishm en t o f  a fe d e ra l  ju d ic ia ry  
w ith  a  s in g le  Supreme Court on top  and an u n sp e c if ie d  system o f  in f e r io r  
fe d e ra l  co u rts  beneath . The Congress o f  the fe d e ra l  government possessed  
th e  r ig h t  to  make laws which would in  no u n c e r ta in  term s be the  supreme 
law of th e  lan d , s t a te  c o n s titu t io n s  and s t a te  laws to  the  co n tra ry  
no tw ith s tan d in g . The fe d e ra l ju d ic ia ry  was bound by the  C o n stitu tio n  
to  support these  law s, again  no s t a te  c o n s titu t io n s  o r  laws to  the  con­
t r a r y  n o tw ith stan d in g .^^  On th ese  p ro v is io n s , Agrippa was vocal in  h is  
c r itic ism s?
Questions o f every kind re sp ec tin g  p ro p e rty  a re  determ inable 
in  a c o n tin e n ta l c o u rt , and so a re  a l l  kinds o f c rim in a l c ase s .
The c o n tin e n ta l l e g i s la tu r e  h as , th e re fo re , a  r ig h t  to  make 
ru le s  in  a l l  cases by ^ i c h  t h e i r  ju d ic ia l  c o u rts  s h a l l  proceed 
and decide c a se s . No r ig h ts  a re  reserved  to  the  c i t iz e n .  The 
laws o f Congress, a re  in  .aj.! case3,J.a.J?.9, tha,,gup^r law., o f th e  
land  g and paramount to  the  c o n s t itu t io n s  o f th e  in d iv id u a l s t a te s .
The Congress may i n s t i t u t e  what modes o f t r i a l  they  p le a se , ^ d
Agrippa d id  n o t, by any means, s top  w ith  th ese  few o b je c tio n s , however.
In  L e t te r  Number V, he begins a c a re fu l ly  co n stru c ted  exam ination o f
th e  fe d e ra l  ju d ic ia r y 's  powers under th e  C o n stitu tio n s
Causes o f a l l  k in d s, between c i t iz e n s  o f d i f f e r e n t  s t a t e s ,  a re  
to  be t r i e d  before  a c o n tin e n ta l c o u r t .  This c o u rt i s  no t 
bound to  t r y  i t  according  to  the  lo c a l  laws where th e  co n tro ­
v e rs ie s  happen^ f o r  in  th a t  case i t  may as w ell be t r i e d  in  a 
s t a te  c o u rt . The ru le  which i s  to  govern th e  new c o u rts , m ust, 
th e re fo re , be made by th e  co u rt i t s e l f ,  o r  by i t s  employers, 
th e  Congress. I f  by the  form er, th e  l e g i s l a t iv e  and ju d ic ia l
^% adison , c£ . c i t . ,  p . 635. 
^ I b i d o q p . 631.
% o r d .  Essays, pp. 6ii-6S.
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departm ents w i l l  be blended; and i f  by th e  Congress, though 
these  departm ents w i l l  be kep t se p a ra te , s t i l l  th e  power o f 
l e g i s la t io n  d eparts  from the s ta te s  in  a l l  c a s e s .
The Congress o f  the  proposed fe d e ra l  government. Agrippa con tinued , has
the  power to  make ru le s  f o r  try in g  qu estio n s o f  any n a tu re  re sp ec tin g
p ro p e rty  o f  any kind  o f c i t iz e n s  o f  two d i f f e r e n t  s t a t e s .  Because
37A rtic le  VI o f th e  C o n stitu tio n  s p e c i f ic a l ly  prov ides th a t  th e  Con­
s t i t u t i o n ,  any law , and any t r e a ty  made under th e  C o n stitu tio n  a re  th e  
supreme law o f th e  lan d , s t a te  judges a re  bound to- su p p o rt them.
The ju r is d ic t io n  of the  f e d e ra l  c o u rts  thus supercedes th a t  o f  
the s t a te  c o u rts . Agrippa concluded;
As no a u th o r i ty  remains to  the  s t a t e ,  indeed, but to  decide 
questions between c i t iz e n s  o f the  same s t a t e ,  and those judges 
a re  to  be bound by the  laws o f Congress, i t  c le a r ly  fo llo w s,
The same ru le  o f  procedure would apply in  cases between a s t a te
and i t s  own c i t iz e n s ,  namely, the  su p e r io r  p o s it io n  o f th e  fe d e ra l
c o u rts  to  the  s t a te  c o u r ts .  This c o n tra s ts , Agrippa concluded, w ith
th e  u su a l procedure o f handling  such cases—the  p e t i t io n in g  o f  th e
UO
supreme a u th o r ity  o f  th e  s t a t e s .
In  cases o f  c rim in a l p ro secu tio n s w ith  the  s t a te  as p l a i n t i f f  
and th e  accused the defendant, th e  procedure would be fo r  the a ttorney^ 
g enera l o f  th e  s t a te  to  commence h is  s u i t  befo re  th e  n e a re s t fe d e ra l 
c o u rt. To th a t  c o u rt  th e  defendant must t r a n s p o r t  h im self and h is  w it­
n e sse s . Because th e  t r i a l  would tak e  p lac e  among s tra n g e rs , who in  no 
way know w hether the  defendant i s  a  good o r bad man, the e f f e c t  o f  th e
3^I b id . , p . 66. 37I b i d pp.  66-67. ^ ^ Ib id .,  p . 67.
39 ib id . ^° I b id . .  pp . 67-68.
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p ro ced are . Agrippa argued, would be th e  derangement o f  l ib e r ty ;  f o r  the  
defendant must ru in  h im self to  prove h is  innocence before  th e  fe d e ra l  
co u rt
Agrippa, as weM_ ,so_mem o f the_toU^^^^^ was f irm ly
cpDvlpced th a t  the  in te n tio n  o f those who framed the  C o n stitu tio n s 
c e r ta in ly  one u ltim a te  e f f e c t  o f  th a t  a r t i c l e  o f government, was th e  
congglW a^cm  o f th e  s t a t e s . For one th in g , the new p lan  i s  to  be 
considered  as an e n t i r e  system w ithou t any o th e r  sources o f exp lanation ; 
only by comparing th e  se v e ra l p a r ts  o f the system to g e th e r  can th e  whole 
of i t  be u n d e r s t o o d , W i t h  t h i s  in tro d u c tio n , the  M assachusetts "Antis" 
launched in to  a  new s e r ie s  o f observations on th e  C o n s titu tio n ,
The Congress o f th e  f e d e ra l  government i s  empowered to  e s ta b l is h  
such fe d e ra l  co u rts  as i t  f e e ls  a re  n ecessa ry . This power to  e s ta b l is h  
c o u rts . Agrippa argued, im plies the  power to  d e fin e  th e  ju r is d ic t io n  o f 
th e se  cou rts  and to  determ ine the  ru le s  by which t h e i r  judgment w i l l  be 
re g u la te d . I t  i s  an accepted  p ra c t ic e ,  in  common law , f o r  the l e g i s l a ­
tu re  to  a l t e r  t h a t  law. For t h i s  reason , and th is  g e ts  to  th e  h e a r t  o f 
th e  f e a r s  o f such men as George Mason and E lb ridge  G erry, a d e c la ra tio n  
o f r ig h ts  i s  so badly needed fo r  th e  C o n s titu tio n ; i t  e s ta b lis h e s  those 
p r in c ip le s  which th e  c e n tra l  government may never invade w ithout a lso  
v io la t in g  th e  fundam aita l compact between the people and th e i r  govern­
m ent,^^ But th e  re a l  evidence o f the  in te n t  o f c o n so lid a tio n  la y ,  
Agrippa vehemently argued, in  the  r ig h t  o f  Congress to  re g u la te  commerce, 
M assachusetts was a s t a te  well-known throughout the  Iftiited S ta te s  
f o r  i t s  hardy s e a fa re r s ,  Boston was one o f  the  lead in g  p o r ts  o f America
^ 4 b i d , ,  p , 69, ^^ Ib id , ,  pp , 69-70, ^ ^ Ib id ,,  p . 71.
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and enjoyed a considerab le  fo re ig n  trade*  Agrippa* as a  good son o f 
M assachusetts, was proud o f h is  s t a t e 's  re p u ta tio n  as a commercial 
le a d e r , n o t only o f  New Ehgland bu t o f  the  e n t i r e  country  as w e ll. 
A r tic le  I ,  se c tio n  8, o f  th e  C o n s titu tio n  v e s ted  in  Congress idie v i r ­
tu a l ly  u n lim ited  r ig h t  to  re g u la te  e x te rn a l and in te rn a l  com m erce.^
I t  i s  q u i te  understandab le  th a t  Agrippa should express f e a r s  on th is  
m atte r, f o r  the  power reserved  to  Congress was very  c lo se  to  those 
M gu la tp ry  powers plam@d.j?y # e  ^  before
the R evolutionj
Though th is  power [to  re g u la te  tra d e ]  under c e r ta in  l im ita t io n s  
would be a p ro p er one fo r  the  departm ent o f  Congress; i t  i s  in  
th is  se c tio n  c a r r ie d  too f a r ,  and much f a r th e r  than  i s  neces­
sa ry  . . . The new c o n s t itu t io n  n o t on ly  p ro h ib its  v e s s e ls , 
bound from one s t a te  to  an o th e r, from paying any d u t ie s ,  but 
even from en te rin g  and c le a r in g . The only use o f  such a  regu­
la t io n  i s  to  keep each s t a te  in  complete ignorance o f i t s  own
reso u rce s .
Freedom o f  a c tio n  in  th e  f i e l d  o f  commerce. Agrippa m aintained*
has a tw o-fo ld  e f f e c t :  business w il l  f in d  the  means f o r  i t s  g r e a te s t
g a in , and in d iv id u a ls  in  commerce would a l l  have a f a i r  share  o f  the
a v a ila b le  o p p o r tu n it ie s . He continued:
I t  i s  va in  to  t e l l  u s t h a t  we ought to  overlook lo c a l  in te r e s t s .
I t  i s  only by p ro te c tin g  lo c a l  concerns th a t  the  in te r e s t  o f 
th e  whole i s  p rese rv ed . No man when he e n te rs  s o c ie ty  does i t  
from a  view to  promote thq  good o fp o th e rs , b u t he does i t  f o r  
h is  own good. A ll men haying the , same viaw a re  bound eq u ally  
to  promote th e  w elfare  o f the  lA o le . To secu re  them to such a  
p r in c ip le  as th a t  lo c a l  in te r e s t s  must be d isreg ard ed , i s  r e ­
q u irin g  o f  one man to  do more than an o th e r, and i s  subverting  
the  foundation  o f f r e e  government.^®
The s ig n if ic a n c e  o f  th e  l a s t  phrase  o f the  l a s t  sentence i s  p a r t i c u la r ly
in te r e s t in g ,  fo r  i t  seems a lso  to  d is c lo s e  the  c h a ra c te r  o f th e  w r i te r
^^4iadison, 0£ . c i t . * p . 630,
^^Ford, E ssays, p . 70. ^ ^ Ib id .* pp. 72-73.
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—a man irtio though concerned w ith probable  r e s t r i c t io n s  on th e  economic
gain  to  be had by h is  s t a t e ,  acknowledges a t  th e  same tim e th e  im port-
ance and w orth o f  th e  in d iv id u a l in  government. I t  i s  a theme th a t
would be repea ted  again  and again  by A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  in  o th e r  s t a t e s ,
as George Mason and R ichard Henry Lee o f  V irg in ia  s tre s s e d  th e  n e c e s s ity
o f a b i l l  o f  r ig h ts .^ ^
The p e rfe c tio n  o f  a government depends on th e  e q u a lity  o f  i t s  
o p e ra tio n , as f a r  as human a f f a i r s  w il l  adm it, upon a l l  p a r ts  
o f  the  empire and upon a l l  c i t iz e n s  . . . sm all e n q u a le tie s  
[s i c ] may be e a s i ly  compensated. There ought, however, to  be 
no in e q u a lity  in  th e  law i t s e l f ,  and the  government ought to  
have th e  same a u th o r i ty  in  one p la c e , as in  an o th er. . . .
The most p la u s ib le  argument in  favour o f  th e  new p lan  i s  drawn 
from th e  in e q u a lity  o f i t s  o p e ra tio n  in  d i f f e r e n t  s t a te s .
Agrippa continued by lay in g  ou t in  concise form th e  sources o f  fe d e ra l
c o lle c tio n  o f revenues in  se v e ra l s ta te s  to  prove h is  con ten tions
“C onnecticut have been to ld  th a t  the  bulk o f the  revenue w il l  be ra is e d
by imposed and e x c ise , and, th e re fo re , they  need no t be a f r a id  to  t r u s t
li9Congress w ith  the  power o f  levy ing  a  dry ta x  a t  p le a su re ."  But New 
York and M assachusetts a re  commercial s t a te s ;  C onnecticut n a tu ra l ly  
hopes th a t  those two s ta te s  w i l l  pay the  bulk o f  the c o n tin e n ta l ex­
pense. But i f  th e  tra d e  i s  no t overtaxed , th e  consumer pays the  ta x .
on the  o th e r  hand, the  tra d e  i s  o v e r-tax ed , tra d e  la n g u ish e s , and 
th e  fa rm er,to o , lo s e s  h is  m arket. In  sh o r t , th e  proposed p lan  o f tax a ­
t io n ,  and th e re  a lso  the  power o f Congress to  re g u la te  both in te rn a l
See George Mason’s "The O bjections o f  the  Hon. George Mason to  
th e  Proposed F edera l C o n s titu tio n ; Addressed to  the  C itiz en s  o f V ir­
g in ia ,"  in  Ford, Pam phlets, p . 329. A lso, R ichard Henry Lee, "L e tte rs  
o f a F edera l Farm er," in  Ford, Essays, p . 200.
^®Ford, E ssays, p . 7li.
^ ^ Ib id .
t
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and e x te rn a l taxes i s  d e lu s iv e , unequal, and u l t im a te ly  d e trim e n ta l to  
th e  coun try  as a whole.
A ll s ta te s  have c e r ta in  in te r n a l ,  lo c a l  advantages. Agrippa con­
tin u e d  in  a  l a t e r  L e t te r ,  and can to  a considerab le  degree supply each 
o th e r 's  w ants. F rien d ly  in te rc o u rse  between the in d iv id u a l s t a t e s ,  
th e re fo re , can be very  e a s i ly  e s ta b lis h e d . The U nited S ta te s , under 
th e  A r t ic le s ,  e x is ts  as a  t ru e  f e d e ra l  rep u b lic s  each s t a te  w ith in  i t s
own l im i ts  m ain tains so v ere ig n ty  over i t s  own c i t i z e n s ,  W iile some
<1
genera l concerns a re  g ran ted  to  Congress. I t  i s  t r u e .  Agrippa re a d ily
adm itted , th a t  Congress has p a r t i c u la r  d e f ic ie n c ie s ,  bu t:
I f  the  new system should be adopted, the whole im post, w ith an 
u n lim ited  claim  to  e x e rc ise  and dry  ta x , w il l  be given to  Con­
g re s s . There w i l l  remain no adequate fund fo r  th e  s t a te  d e b t, 
and the  s ta te  w il l  be su b je c t to  be sued on t h e i r  no tes . . . 
i f  we su rren d er the  im post, we s h a l l  s t i l l ,  by th is  new c o n s t i­
tu t io n ,  be h e ld  to  pay our f u l l  p ro p o rtio n  o f the  rem aining 
deb t, as i f  no th ing  had been p a id . The impost w il l  n o t be 
considered as being p a id  by th is  s t a t e ,  but by the  c o n tin e n t.
The f e d e r a l i s t s .  Indeed, t e l l  us th a t  th e  s t a te  deb ts w i l l  a l l  
be inco rpo ra ted  w ith  th e  c o n tin e n ta l debts and a l l  pa id  out o f 
one fund , . . Not one word i s  s a id  in  the  book in  fav o r o f  such 
a sdxeme, and th e re  i s  no reason to  th in k  i t  t r u e .  Assurances o f 
th a t  s o r t  a re  e a s i ly  given and as e a s i ly  fo rg o tte n .^2
A conso lida ted  government, such as proposed by th e  C o n s titu tio n , 
argued Agrippa,
i s  in ap p lica b le  to  a g re a t  e x te n t o f country ; i s  u n fr ien d ly  to  
th e  r ig h ts  o f  both persons and p ro p e rty , which r ig h ts  always 
adhere to g e th e r ; and th a t  being c o n tra ry  to  the  i n te r e s t  of th e  
extreme o f  an empire, such a  government can be supported only  
by power, and „ , . commerce i s  the  tru e  bond o f  union fo r  a 
f r e e  s t a t e . ^3
The C o n stitu tio n  i s  c le a r ly  a co n so lid a ted  government. Agrippa continued:
^°Ib id . ,  pp. ^ I b id o, pp. 76-77.
^^Ibid ., pp. 77-78. ^3 ib id . , pp. 82-83.
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By A r t ic le  3 , se c tio n  2, Congress a re  empowered to  appoin t 
c o u rts  w ith  a u th o r i ty  to  t r y  c i v i l  causes o f  every k ind , and 
even o ffences a g a in s t p a r t i c u la r  s ta te s»  By th e  l a s t  c lause  
o f A r t ic le  1 , se c tio n  8, which d e fin e s  t h e i r  l e g i s la t iv e  powers, 
th ey  a re  au th o rized  to  make laws c a rry in g  in to  execution  a l l  
th e  "powers v ested  by th i s  c o n s t i tu t io n  in  th e  government o f 
th e  D hited S ta te s , o r  in  any departm ent o r o f f i c e r  th e re o f ;"  
and by A r t ic le  6 , th e  judges in  every s t a te  a re  to  be bound by 
th e  laws o f C ongress,5a
Agrippa employed a t o t a l  o f  twelve L e tte r s  in  h is  a n a ly s is  o f 
th e  C o n stitu tio n ; he concluded h is  s e r ie s  o f L e tte r s  w ith an a n a ly s is  
o f man as a p o l i t i c a l  being in  r e la t io n  to  th e  new a r t i c l e  of govern­
ment, inc lud ing  w ith in  those  l a s t  L e t te r s  a number o f  charges which, 
fo r  h is  suppo rt o f  th e  C o n s titu tio n , would have to  be adopted, p re fe r ­
ab ly  by a second convention . The o b je c t o f every j u s t  government, he 
wrote is
to  render the  people  happy by securing  t h e i r  persons and pos­
se ss io n s  from wrong. To th is  end, i t  i s  necessary  th a t  th e re  
should be lo c a l  laws and in s t i tu t io n s ;  f o r  a people in h ab itin g  
v a rio u s c lim ates w i l l  unavoidably have lo c a l  h a b its  and d i f ­
f e r e n t  modes o f l i f e ,  and th ese  must be consu lted  in  making 
th e  law s, » . , I t  i s  p la in ,  th e re fo re , th a t  we re q u ire  fo r  
our re g u la tio n  laws which w i l l  n o t s u i t  th e  circum stances o f 
our sou thern  b re th e m , and th a t  laws made f o r  them would no t 
apply to  u s . Unhappiness would be the uniform  produce o f such
la w s ,55
Agrippa continued , "We may go f u r th e r ,  and say th a t  i t  i s  im possible 
fo r  any s in g le  le g i s la tu r e  so f u l ly  to  comprehend the  circum stances o f 
th e  d i f f e r e n t  p a r ts  o f  a very  ex ten siv e  dominion as to  make laws adapted 
to  th ese  c ircum stances,
Of th e  choices o f  government o ffe re d  to  the  people o f the U nited 
S ta te s , inc lud ing  th e  C o n s titu tio n , a "Federal Republick" i s  b e s t adap­
ted  to  the  o b je c t and purpose o f  secu ring  th e i r  persons and p o ssess io n s .
5^ Ib id , , p .  83 . 5S ib id . ,  pp , 91- 92 . 5 6 ib id ,,  p . 92 ,
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th is  k ind o f  government each s t a te  r e ta in s  to  i t s e l f  th e  r ig h t  o f 
making and a l te r in g  i t s  laws f o r  in te rn a l  re g u la tio n , and the  r ig h t  o f  
executing  th ese  laws w ithou t any e x te rn a l r e s t r a i n t . ”"̂ This i s  th e  
form o f  the  C onfederation; th e  advantages, s e c u r i t ie s ,  and freedoms 
o ffe re d  by i t  to th e  people o f th e  U nited S ta te s ,  Agrippa u rged , ought 
n o t be surrendered  re a d i ly  w ithout c lo se  reasoning  o f  and adequate s a fe ­
guards over th a t  system o f  government "vriiich i t  i s  proposed be accepted 
nowo^
Agrippa qp^iplu^d.edju^residg^^ 
and idien they  appoin t some o f t h e i r  number to  ad m in is te r th e  government 
fo r  them, they  d e leg a te  a l l  th e  powers o f government n o t ex p ress ly  r e ­
served .
A con s t i t u t io n does no t in  i t s e l f  imply any more than  a d e c la r­
a tio n  o f the  r e la t io n  which th e  d i f f e r e n t  p a r ts  o f the  government 
bear to  each o th e r , but does no t in  any degree imply s e c u r i ty  to  
tJh9.jr,ight.s o f in d iv id u a ls  . . . in  doub tfu l cases th e  d ec is io n  i s  
to  fa y p r .o f  the  g o v ,™ e n t,S 9   ̂ '
The b i l l  o f r ig h ts  to  th e  C o n stitu tio n  o f M assachusetts in co rp o ra te s
t h i r t y  a r t i c l e s ;  y e t i t  i s  proposed and advocated s tro n g ly  th a t  the
people o f the  S ta te  o f  M assachusetts consent to  give f a r  g re a te r  powers
than those  of th e i r  s t a t e 's  c o n s t i tu t io n  to  a new a r t i c l e  of government
upon which is  ex erc ised  f a r  few er c o n tro ls .
The com plaints a g a in s t th e  sep ara te  governments, even by the  
f r ie n d s  o f th e  new p lan , a re  n o t th a t  they  have n o t power
enough, bu t t h a t  t h ^  a re  disposed to  make a bad use o f what
power Jbhey have. Surely  [the advocates o f the  C o n stitu tio n ] 
'^ a s o n .J a d ly j  .whm they  propose to  ..se t , up a goyernm m tjppsseaaad. 
[s i c ] ^ fjm ch -Jm re . earbens than  the p re s e n t ,  and sub­
j e c t  to  much sm alle r checks.
^7I b id . ,  p . 93. ^^ Ib id . ,  pp . 121-122.
^^ Ib id o, p . 112. ^ °Ib id . ,  p . 113.
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New Hampshire and Rhode Is la n d , too^ 
a l l s t . s uppor t .  I to fo rtu n a te ly  f o r  American h is to ry ,  A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  
l i t e r a t u r e  from the  form er s t a te  i s  sc a rc e , # i i l e  th e  reco rds o f  the  
debates a re  only  very  fragm entary , Hhode Is la n d , h i s to r i c a l l y  a  g o - i t  
-a lo n e  colony and s t a t e ,  p resen ted  no A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  l i t e r a t u r e  f o r  
exam ination; indeed, th e  s ta te  le g i s la tu r e  d id  n o t even c a l l  a  conven­
t io n ,  bu t r a th e r ,  subm itted  th e  C o n stitu tio n  d i r e c t ly  to  the  people  f o r
N e ith e r s t a te ,  consequently , w i l l  be d iscu ssed  in  
t h i s  th e s is .  The scene s h i f t s ,  th e re fo re , in  th e  n ex t ch ap te r to th e  
Middle A tla n tic  S ta te s .
k _
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CHAPTER I I I
THE MIDDLE ATLANTIC STATES
This ch ap ter w i l l  examine A nti-Federalism  o f th e  Middle A tla n tic  
s t a t e s ,  i . e . ,  Delaware, New Je rse y , New York, and Pennsylvania. As 
w ith a l l  s ta te s  in  th e  l a t e  e ig h teen th  cen tu ry  America, thsg® .s ta te s  
were la rg e ly  r u r a l .  A few la rg e  urban a re a s . New York and P h ila d e lp h ia , 
were p re se n t o f co u rse , and t h e i r  growth was q u ite  ra p id , but they  con­
ta in e d  on ly  a  r e la t iv e ly  sm all segment o f the p opu la tion  in  t h e i r  r e ­
sp e c tiv e  s t a t e s . These urban a re a s , and in  general term s the  e a s te rn  
a reas o f the s ta te  in  which they  were lo c a te d , were th e  p r in c ip a l  
sources o f support fo r  the  C o n stitu tio n  in  the  s t a t e s ,  and c e r ta in ly  
in  New York and Pennsylvania, The s tru g g le  over r a t i f i c a t i o n  in  these  
two s t a t e s ,  th en , was waged between the e a s te rn  commercial, banking and 
m arket in te r e s ts  in  support o f  th e  C o n stitu tio n  and th e  w estern a g r i ­
c u l tu r i s t s  in  o p p o sitio n ,^
Delaware^a^d New Je rse y  w ere, re s p e c t iv e ly , tiie  f i r s t  and th i r d  
s ta te s  to  r a t i ^  the  C o n s titu tio n , N e ith e r o f  th e  s ta te s  showed any
Since C harles A, Beard pub lished  h is  in f lu e n t ia l  work, to  Eco­
nomic In te rp re ta tio n  o f the  C o n stitu tio n  o f  th e  United S ta te s  (New York, 
1913) ,  and w ith in  th e  l a s t  two decades e s p e c ia l ly , th e re  has been an 
in c re a s in g ly  concen tra ted  study in  th e  h is to ry  o f  th e  events and con­
d i t io n s  o f  the  l a t e  C onfederation and e a r ly  C o n s titu tio n a l p e rio d s o f 
American h is to ry .  As p a r t  o f th i s  concen tra ted  s tu d y , th e re  has been 
much h is to r ig ra p h ic a l  d isp u te  o f the  sources o f F e d e ra l is t  and A n ti-  
F e d e ra l is t  support in  the  se v e ra l s ta te s  o f  th e  tftiion. Sees Jackson 
T urner Main, The A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts : C r i t ic s  o f the  C o n s titu tio n , 1781- 
1788 (Chapel H i l l ,  1961); F o rre s t MacDonald, We th e  People (Chicago. 
19^9 ) î  and Robert A llen R utland, % e Ordeal o f  th e  C o n s ti tu tio n s The 
R a ti f ic a t io n  S tru g g le  o f 1787-1788 (Norman. 1966), fo r  some in d ic a tio n  
o f th e  n a tu re  o f  th is  d isp u te .
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A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  o p p o sitio n  a t  a l l ,  f o r  th e  conventions o f  both s ta te s
2
r a t i f i e d  unanim ously.
Pennsylvania was t he f i r s t  s t a te  o f th e  C onfederation to  c a l l  . 
i t s  r a t i f y ing  convention# The circum stances surrounding th e  c a l l in g  o f 
th a t  convention cannot in  any way be c a l le d  hono rab le ,^  The events 
lead in g  to  th e  c o n v a itio n , and th e  speed w ith which i t  d e lib e ra te d , 
accounts in  g re a t p a r t  fo r  th e  s c a rc i ty  o f  A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  l i t e r a t u r e  
from Pennsylvania, I t  ex p la in s a ls o , in  p a r t ,  th e  la c k  o f A nti-F eder­
a l i s t  o p p o sitio n  in  th e  convention . The e a r ly  d a te , November 20, 178?, 
allow ed s u f f ic ie n t  time fo r  th e  canvass o f  only  th e  p ro -C o n s titu tio n  
e a s te rn  a re a  o f  th e  s t a te ,  bu t n o t o f  th e  c e n tra l  and y e s te m  a reas  
which were dominated by a n ti-C o n s t i tu t io n  a g r i c u l t u r i s t s . ^
Because o f th is  lack  o f  A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  o p p o sitio n  in  the  r a t i ­
fy ing  convention , and the  s c a r c i ty  o f  A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  l i t e r a t u r e  which 
appeared in  the s t a t e ,  any in v e s tig a tio n  o f  Pennsylvania A nti-Federalism  
i s  n e c e s s a r ily  handicapped from the o u ts e t .  Indeed, th e  n a tu re  o f th e  
A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  opp o sitio n  in  th e  convention can only  be a rr iv e d  a t  from 
an e x tra p o la tio n  o f  the  counter-argum ents o f  the  F e d e ra l is ts  in  the  
convention . That i s ,  only from what James Wilson and h is  co lleagues
^The Delaware r a t i f y in g  convention f i r s t  met on December 3, I 787 . 
I t s  f in a l  vo te  came on December 7, I 787 . The debates o f th e  New Je rsey  
r a t i f y in g  convention were December 11 to  December 18, The conventions 
o f  both s ta te s  gave unanimous approval to  the  C o n s titu tio n .
% hose members o f the Pennsylvania Assembly who opposed th e  Con­
s t i t u t i o n  walked ou t o f th e  Assembly, thereby p reven ting  th e  quorum 
n ecessa ry  fo r  th e  vo te  on the s t a t e 's  r a t i f y in g  convention . That n ig h t  
a mob s to m e d  th e  residences o f two o f th e  A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  d e le g a te s , 
c a r r ie d  them to  th e  Assembly's m eeting p la c e , and convinced one to  s ta n d  
fo r  the  ro le  c a l l ,  th ereby  c o n s t i tu t in g  the n ecessa ry  quorum fo r  th e  
vo te  on th e  r a t i f y in g  convention to  be tak en . Main, o£. c U . ,  p . I 78 .
^R utland, 0£ . c i t . , p . $1.
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s a id  in  r e fu ta t io n  o f t h e i r  opponents* o b jec tio n s  can th e  n a tu re  o f  
those  o b jec tio n s  expressed  in  th e  convention, e sp e c ia l ly  th e  f e a r  o f 
th e  c e n tra l  government proposed in  the  C o n s titu tio n , be deduced. The 
no tes  o f  the  debates o f  th e  r a t i f y in g  convention include  only th e  Fed­
e ra l is ts *  speeches. Furtherm ore, such Pennsylvania A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  
l i t e r a t u r e  as d id  appear was la rg e ly  pub lished  o u t o f the s t a t e ,  so 
com pletely F ed era lis t-d o m in ated  were th e  s t a t e 's  newspapers. The r e a l  
n a tu re  o f  Pennsylvania A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  o b jec tio n s  can be drawn, conse­
q u en tly , only ve ry  im p e rfec tly , and only in  q u ite  sketchy foim .
The form is  f e d e ra l ,  th e  e f f e c t  c le a r ly  n a tio n a l ,  contended A 
Farmer, who, to  prove h is  co n te n tio n , p resen ted  q u ite  a  so p h is t ic a te d  
argument. The F e d e ra l is ts argued th a t  th e  s t a te  l e g is la tu r e s  chose 
th e i r  re sp e c tiv e  s e n a to rs , and could  n ev er, th e re fo re , be a n n ih ila te d . 
To A Farmer, however, 1imtu.power, .of ,jse le c tio n  was . m erely ..a m i n i s t e r ^  
one. For those same s ta te  le g is la tu r e s  had no power to  d i r e c t  o r  even 
in s t r u c t  th e i r  s e n a to rs , o r  "üie power to  censure o r  rep lace  them fo r  
m isconduct. The e x e rc ise  o f  the  power o f  s e le c tio n  i s  n o t , th e re fo re ,  
in d ic a t iv e  of th e  s t a t e 's  so vere ign ty ; only  in  the power of choosing 
and d ire c tin g  those  to  lAom a u th o r i ty  i s  d e lega ted  i s  th a t  sovere ign ty  
p reserv ed . In  f a c t ,  A Farmer con tinued , the  sen a to rs  do n o t even v o te  
as s t a t e s ,  but as in d iv id u a ls , no r do idie s ta te s  pay t h e i r  s a l a r i e s .  
The e f f e c t  i s ,  then  in d isp u ta b ly  n a t io n a l .^  Furtherm ore, tiie power o f 
th e  s t a te s  in  o f f ic e r in g  and tr a in in g  th e  m i l i t i a ,  and in  handling 
s t a te  a f f a i r s ,  does n o t in  any way c o n s t i tu te  sovereign  powers; l ik e
N o r to n  Borden, The A n t i f e d e r a l is t  Papers (Ann Arbor, 1961).
pp . 105-106.
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th e  power o f appo in ting  th e  s t a t e 's  s e n a to rs , th ey  a re  m erely m in is te r ­
i a l  powers, w hether they  be taken to g e th e r  o r  s e p a ra te ly . F u rth e r , the  
s t a t e  governments a re  d e s t i tu te  o f  a l l  sovereign  command o f and c o n tro l 
over th e  sources o f  revenue, and o f p ro te c tin g  t h e i r  c i t iz e n s  and t h e i r  
p ro p e rty  from th e  n a tio n a l  law . The powers o f making laws o f trea so n  
a re  l e f t  s o le ly  in  the  hands o f  th e  c e n tr a l  government, 3n a l l  th ese  
re s p e c ts , the e f f e c t  contem plated by the  C o n s titu tio n  i s ,  argued A 
Farmer, th e  co n so lid a tio n  o f  the  se v e ra l s ta te s  under a n a tio n a l gov­
ernm ent,^
What w il l  be th e  e f f e c t  o f  th a t  n a tio n a l ,  co n so lid a ted  govern­
ment? M  Old Whig in s i s te d :
I t  i s  beyond a doubt th a t  th e  new C o n s titu tio n , I f  adopted, 
w i l l  in  a g re a t  measure d e s tro y , i f  i t  does n o t t o t a l l y  ann i­
h i l a t e ,  the  se p a ra te  governments o f the se v e ra l s t a t e s .  W  ̂
s h a l l  in  e f f e c t  become one g re a t re p u b lic . Every measure of  
any impm^^tahce w il l  be c o n tin e n ta l . What w i l l  be th e  conse­
quence of th is ?  One th in g  i s  ev id en t—th a t  no rep u b lic  o f  so 
g re a t ..jaagnitude ever d id  o r ..c .a n ..g v e r ,^ is t  . . .  A confederacy 
o f rep u b lic s  must be th e  estab lishm en t in  America, o r  we must 
cease a lto g e th e r  to  r e ta in  the rep u b lican  form o f  government. 
EroDLJbhejmmmt we became one g re a t re p u b lic , e i th e r  in  form 
o r in  substance , th e  p e rio d "^Is 
s h a l l  s ink Xi r s t J j n t p  m d  Ih e ii  in ta  d
A fte r some h i s to r ic a l  study  o f  a n c ie n t and contemporary re p u b lic s . An
Old Whig concluded:
Before we e s ta b l is h  a  government, whose a c ts  w il l  be the 
supreme law o f  th e  lan d , and whose power w i l l  extend to  
alm ost every case  w ithout excep tion , ye ough t  c a re fu l ly  to  
guard ou rse lves by a  b i l l  o f  r ig h ts ,  a g a in s t th e  invasion  of 
th ose l ib e r t ie s  which i t  i s  e s s e n t ia l  fo r  us to  r e t a in ,  which 
i t  i s  o f no r e a l  use fo r  g^ovemment to  deprive  u s ; but which,— mil     ~ ~    — - —I - - ■-  —  ^  «V.» ». J •*<- • . ' “ • ■ f  ■■ f
in  th e  course o f  human e v en ts , have been too o ften  in su lte d  
w ith  a l l  th e  wantoness o f an id le  barbarity ,®
^ Ib ld . ,  p .  106. ^ I b id . ,  pp . k6 -h7^
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James Wilson rep e a te d ly  contended during  th e  debates th a t  in  view
o f th e  n a tu re  o f man as a s o c ia l  being , and th e  n a tu re  o f  human s o c ie ty ,
government must be so designed as to  bind the  in te r e s t  and a u th o r ity  o f
th e  whole community upon every p a r t  o f  th a t  community. In  forming the
system , i t  i s  im portan t to  g ive m inute a t te n t io n  to  the  in te r e s ts  o f a l l
p a r t s .  But a duty o f  s t i l l  h ig h e r importance i s  to  f e e l  and dem onstrate
predom inant regard  to  th e  in te r e s t s  o f  th e  w hole.^
But John deW itt had o th e r  thoughts on the m a tte r , and argued them
w ith  equa lly  cogent s k i l l .  Under se c tio n  8 o f A r t ic le  I  o f  the  C onsti- 
10
tu t io n .  Congress was given the power o f o rg an iz in g , arming, and d is ­
c ip lin in g  th e  m i l i t i a  o f th e  se v e ra l s t a te s ,  and o f governing them when 
in  the  se rv ic e  o f  the U nited S ta te s . The..-states__theniselves..reser7.ad
t he r ig h t  to  appo in t th e  m i l i t i a  o f f i c e r s ,  but th e  a u th o r i ty  ofL tra ln .T .
11ing^ the  m i l l t i a  was according  to. the  d is c ip l in e  p re sc rib e d  by Qopgress . 
The t o t a l  e f f e c t ,  re g a rd le ss  o f what W ilson argued in  th e  convention, 
deW itt in s i s te d ,  was c e r ta in ly  n o t to  g ive r e s p e c ta b i l i ty  to  th e  p ro ­
posed c e n tra l  government, n o r to  e s ta b l is h  m il i ta r y  f o r t i f i c a t io n s  on 
the  f r o n t ie r  in  view o f the  presence o f  fo re ig n  governments elsew here 
in  th e  North American c o n tin e n t. R ather, th e  upsho t o f  th e  p ro v is io n  
could  only be a f u r th e r  in su rance  f o r  the  su b tle  in te n tio n  o f c o n so li­
d a tio n ; the  fram ers o f th e  C o n s titu tio n  recognized  the  h i s to r ic a l  value
9Jonathan E l l i o t ,  The Debates in  the S everal S ta te  Conventions 
on th e  R a tif ic a tio n  o f the  F ederal C o n s titu tio n  v o ls . ,  1W 6- I 89I ;  
P h ila d e lp h ia , 1 8 7 6 IlT% 2l-2:2S.
^^James Madison, The Debates in  the  F edera l Convention Which 
Framed th e  C o n stitu tio n  o f  ^ e  IM ited S ta te s o f America, G a illa rd  Hunt 
and James Brown S c o tt ( e d s .y  (New York, 1920),
^^Borden, c i t . , pp. 7^-77«
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o f  a m i l i t i a  o f  f r e e  men in  p reserv ing  th e  freedom o f  a  f r e e  peop le .
C e rta in ly  th e  fram ers could n o t a ffo rd , deW itt contended, to  a llow  such
p o te n t ia l ly  "dangerous" power and a u th o r i ty  to  remain so le ly  in  th e
hands o f  the  s t a t e s .  But the  r e a l  s ig n if ic a n c e  o f  deW itt' s essay  comes
in  th e  f i n a l  paragraphs
I f  th e  people a re  n o t in  genera l d isposed  to  execute the powers 
o f  government, i t  i s  tim e to  su sp ec t th e re  i s  something wrong 
in  th a t  government; and . , , they  had b e t te r  have an o th er.
For, in  my humble op in ion , i t  i s  much too e a r ly  to  s e t  i t  down 
f o r  a f a c t ,  th a t  mankind cannot be governed bu t by f o r c e ,
The im p lica tio n  o f  deW itt*s s in g le  paragraph m ight w e ll summarize the 
essence of A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  opp o sitio n  to  th e  powers o f the  proposed 
fe d e ra l  governments should the  people o f  the U nited S ta te s  f a i l  o r r e ­
fu se  to  acknowledge the supremacy o f th e  fe d e ra l  government, as they  
m ight w ell do, th e re  may be some d r a s t ic  m isunderstanding o f the 
p eo p le ' s d e s ire s  o r needs in  the  fe d e ra l  government; the  people o f th e  
U nited .p l a t es a re  q u ite  capable o f _^pyeniing_ th  ems_^ye_s, ry
of..the  country. shpHftA, and th e  coercive
in  which t h e i r  ro le  i s  l im ite d .
Another p o in t o f  strong  A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  o p p o sitio n , to  which 
t h e i r  opponents were fo rced  again  and again  to  re tu rn , was the proper  
d is t in c t io n  o f power to  be drawn between th e  fe d e ra l  and s ta te  govern­
m ents. Although a res ta tem en t o f  th e  'A n tis '*  argument a g a in s t the  
co n so lid a tin g  n a tu re  o f  the C o n s titu tio n , i t  was an argument rep ea ted ly  
a s s e r te d . C e rta in ly , judging from the  number o f  times Wilson was 
fo rced  to  re tu rn  to  the  s u b je c t ,  i t  was an argument s tre s s e d  again  and 
again  by the 'A n tis ' in  the  Pennsylvania convention .
l^ ib ido
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In  the  course o f  h is  counter argum ents, W ilson re p e a te d ly  covered 
th e  same ground. Whereas, th e  A r t ic le s  o f C onfederation moved to a r r iv e  
a t  some p roper l im i t  o f  a u th o r i ty  between th e  n a tio n a l  and s ta te  gov­
ernm ents, th e  re la t io n s h ip  i t  e s ta b lis h e d  was f a r  too lo p sid ed  in  fa v o r 
o f the  l a t t e r ?
Whatever o b je c t o f  government i s  confined , in  i t s  o p e ra tio n , and 
e f f e c ts ,  w ith in  th e  bounds o f a p a r t i c u la r  s t a t e ,  should be con­
s id e re d  as belonging to  th e  government o f  t h a t  s t a te ;  w hatever 
o b je c t o f government ex tends, in  i t s  o p e ra tio n  o r e f f e c ts ,  beyond 
th e  bounds o f a p a r t i c u la r  s t a t e ,  should be considered  as belong­
ing to  the  government o f  th e  U nited S ta te s ,  But though th is  
p r in c ip le  be sound and s a t i s f a c to r y ,  i t s  a p p lic a tio n  to  p a r t ic u la r  
cases would be accompanied w ith  much d i f f i c u l ty ,  because, in  i t s  
a p p lic a tio n , room must be allow ed fo r  g re a t  d is c re tio n a ry  l a t i tu d e  
o f c o n s tru c tio n  o f  th e  p r i n c i p l e  A 3
L a te r  in  th e  same speech before  the  convention, Wilson a rr iv e d  a t  the
f ^ d ^ e n t a l  F e d e ra l is t  p o s itio n  on governments
[T]he powers o f th e  fe d e ra l  government and those o f the s ta te  
governments a re  drawn from sources equally  p u re . I f  a d iffe re n c e  
can be d iscovered  between them, i t  i s  in  fav o r o f the fe d e ra l 
government, because th a t  government is  founded on th e  re p re se n ta ­
t io n  o f  the  whole Union, whereas the  government of any p a r t ic u la r  
s t a te  i s  founded only on the  re p re se n ta tio n  o f  a p a r t ;  in co n s id e r­
ab le  when compared w ith th e  whole. I s  i t  no t more reasonable  to  
suppose th a t  the  counsels o f  the  whole w il l  embrace th e  in te r e s t  
of every p a r t ,  thgin th a t  the counsels of any p a r t  w il l  embrace 
the in te r e s t s  o f  th e  whole
The essence o f W ilson 's argument, and the  b asis  o f the  C o n s titu tio n , was 
th a t  a c e n tra l  government req u ired  genuine n a tio n a l  powers. I t  was the  
question  o f  the  e x te n t and n a tu re  o f  those powers in  the  C o n s titu tio n  
th a t  sep ara ted  the F e d e ra l is ts  and th e  A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts ,
C ritic ism  and f e a r  o f th e  fe d e ra l  government expressed by Penn­
sy lv a n ia  A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  was by no means l im ite d  to  the powers o f
^ % l l i o t .  D ebates, I I ,  k 2 h .  
^ ^ Ib id ,
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Congress a lo n e . W illiam  Penn, f o r  example, r e f le c te d  a t  some le n g th  on 
th e  proposed e x e c u tiv e 's  veto  power, one o f the  very  few men to  co n sid er 
th a t  a sp e c t o f th e  execu tive  branch o f the  fe d e ra l  government. I t  i s  
e s s e n t ia l ,  Penn argued, always to  d iv ide  th e  powers o f a f r e e  govern­
ments
The f i r s t  and most n a tu ra l  d iv is io n  o f the  powers o f  govern­
ment a re  in to  th e  l e g i s l a t i v e  and execu tive  branches. These 
two should n ever be su ffe re d  to  have th e  l e a s t  share  o f  each 
o th e r 's  j u r i s d ic t io n ,  o r to  in term eddle w ith  i t  in  any manner.
For idiichever o f  th e  two d iv id es  i t s  powers w ith the  o th e r , 
w i l l  c e r ta in ly  be subord ina te  to  i t ;  and i f  they  both have a 
sh a re  o f  each o th e r 's  a u th o r i ty ,  they  w i l l  be in  f a c t  but one 
body. T heir i n t e r e s t ,  a s  w e ll as t h e i r  powers w il l  be same, 
and they  w il l  combine a g a in s t  th e  peop le .
I t  i s ,  th e re fo re , a p o l i t i c a l  e rro r  o f th e  g re a te s t  magni­
tu d e , to  allow  th e  execu tive  power a n e g a tiv e , o r in  f a c t  any 
k ind  o f  c o n tro l over th e  proceedings o f the  l e g i s l a t u r e .^5
This ab so lu te  se p a ra tio n  o f l e g i s l a t iv e  and executive  has been th e  ru le ,
continued Penn, in  England s in c e  W illiam  I I I ,  and in  alm ost every s t a te
of America.
G incinnatus chose th e  proposed Senate as the  o b je c t o f b i t t e r  
rem arks. The s ix -y e a r  term s o f the S e n a te 's  members, i t s  powers o f 
impeachment, the n e c e s s ity  f o r  i t s  approval o f a l l  p r e s id e n t ia l  ap­
p o in te e s , the  union th a t  would l ik e ly  be e s ta b lish e d  between th a t  body 
and the  executive  v ia  th e  v ic e -p re s id e n t 's  p o s it io n  as the  p res id in g  
o f f i c e r ,  a l l  c o n s t i tu te d  se rio u s  breaches o f  accep ted  p r in c ip le s  o f 
repub lican  goyeipment. The r e s u l t ,  he in s i s te d ,  would undoubtedly be 
th e  estab lish m en t o f  an a r i s to c r a t i c  c lu b  "by which the  dem ocratic 
r ig h ts  o f th e  people w il l  be overwhelmed.
^^Borden, c i t . , p . 210.
^ ^ Ib id . , pp. 210-211.
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D espite  a l l  the e f f o r t s  o f th e  Pennsylvania A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts ,  
t h e i r  cause was a lo s in g  one, and th e i r  e f f o r ts  came to  no th ing  bu t 
delay  in  the  debates
I f  the  F e d e ra l is ts  in  Pennsylvania achieved r a t i f i c a t i o n  w ith  
l i t t l e  r e a l  o p p o sitio n , t h e i r  c o u n te rp a rts  in  ne ighboring  New York 
faced  a much d arker p ro sp e c t. For in  New York, th e  F e d e ra lis ts  were 
opposed by a w ell developed and w ell d is c ip lin e d  A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  o r ­
g a n iz a tio n . The o rg a n iz a tio n , c o o rd in a tio n , and d is c ip l in e  of the 
A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  fo rce s  o f the  Etapire s t a te  were equalled  only by the  
A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  o f V irg in ia , where r a t i f i c a t i o n  came only a f t e r  a  
most b i t t e r  s tru g g le  in s id e  and o u ts id e  th e  convention, and o f North 
C aro lina , lA ich re je c te d  th e  C o n stitu tio n  in  the f i r s t  r a t i fy in g  con­
v en tio n , and d id  n o t r a t i f y  u n t i l  1789.
The New York A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  d e leg a tio n  to  th e  r a t i fy in g  conven­
tio n  was a very  d is tin g u ish e d  and very  capable one. I t  included Gov­
ernor George C lin to n , around whose s ta te -w id e  p o l i t i c a l  p a rty  the 
A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  o rg an iz a tio n  was la rg e ly  based, h is  l ie u te n a n ts  Robert 
Yates and John Lansing, J r . ,  and Melancton Sm ith, w ithou t a doubt the  
most capable A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  d eb a te r and one o f the  very  few men on 
both s id e s  of the  C o n s titu tio n  s tru g g le  r e a l ly  d is in te r e s te d  in  the  
sjbrogglfiu The New York = A n tis » were g re a t ly  ^ded^^b^^^ PMbWR
th e  b e s t fu n c tio n in g  committee o f correspondents in  th e  United S ta te s .  
Newspaper support was a determ ining f a c to r  in  th e i r  ex tensive support 
th roughout the r u r a l ,  a g r ic u l tu r a l  a re a s . Most s ig n i f ic a n t  o f  a l l .
^ T h e  f in a l  v o te  on r a t i f i c a t i o n ,  taken  on December 12, 178?, 
gave approval to  the  C o n s titu tio n  by a vo te  o f  1̂ 6 f o r ,  23 a g a in s t 
r a t i f i c a t i o n .  R utland, 0£ . c i t . , pp . 135-159»
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however, was th e  e f f i c ie n t  n a tu re  o f the  s ta te  government.
The c o n te s t f o r  c o n tro l o f  th e  s t a t e 's  p o l i t i c a l  and governm ental
machinery had been fough t o u t, f o r  many y e a rs , between th e  C lin ton ians
and th e  A n ti-C lin to n ia n s . % e form er group, c o n s t i tu t in g  the  bulk o f
th e  A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  in  the  convention , had c o n tro lle d  New York alm ost
com pletely s in ce  independence. The s t a t e 's  government, under C lin ton ,
18was an enormously popu lar and h ig h ly  su c ce ss fu l one, a t  l e a s t  to  those
in  the  ru ra l  a reas who c o n s titu te d  i t s  m ajor su p p o rt. The o p p o sitio n ,
le d  a t  the  time o f  the  r a t i f i c a t i o n  s tru g g le  by Gener a l  P h ilip  Schuyl e r
and h i s  son-in-law ^ Alexander Hamilton, g leaned both i t s  le a d e rs  and
i t s  c h ie f  support_from  the_lar& # m t^ ^ a r e a s  o f  the^ , p a r t ic u la r ly
19New York C ity  and th e  surrounding c o u n tie s . These l in e s  o f  p o l i t i c a l  
d iv is io n , popular su p p o rt, and le a d e rsh ip  w ith in  the s t a t e  were c a r r ie d  
down to  the  r a t i fy in g  convention, w ith  l i t t l e  r e a l  s ig n i f ic a n t  a l t e r a ­
t io n .
S pec ta to rs a t  the  convention, which began i t s  sessions on June 
17 , 1788, came in  the  ex p ec ta tio n  th a t  they  would see the g re a te s t  d is ­
p lay  o f o r a to r ic a l  t a l e n t ,  and the  most im portan t and w ide ly -respec ted  
group o f lead e rs  o f  both s id e s ,  ever assembled in  the  s t a t e 's  h is to ry .  
The promise o f much excitem ent was f u l f i l l e d  e a r ly .
The d isp lay  o f  i n te l l e c tu a l  t a l e n t  was n o t l im ite d  to  the  a c tu a l 
deba tes . Essays and pamphlets from both s id e s  were more w idely  read 
and d is t r ib u te d  than in  any o th e r  s t a t e .  The F e d e ra l is t  Papers o f
^^MacDonald, c i t . « g ives one exp lanation  fo r  C lin to n 's  popu­
l a r i t y  and success in  c o n tro llin g  the s t a t e 's  government.
^^Main, o£. c i t . ,  pp. iil-71<
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Alexander Ham ilton, John Ja y , and James Madison on the F e d e ra l is t  s id e
had no p e e rs ; th e  L e tte rs  o f  B ratus and th e  pamphlets and essays o f
M elancton Smith from A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  pens v ied  on ly  w ith  R ichard Henry
L ee 's  "The L e tte rs  o f  a F edera l Farm er," as the  most a n a ly tic a l  o f  Anti-
F e d e ra lis t  l i t e r a t u r e  to  appear.
In  th e  most g en era l o f term s, the  essence o f A n ti-F e d e ra lis t
o p p o sitio n  to  th e  C o n s titu tio n  in  New York was th a t  the  new central,
government would u l t im a te ly  prove d e s tru c tiv e  o f  the p o l i t i c a l  freedom
and in d iv id u a l l i b e r t i e s  enjoyed by M e ^ jja n s  everywhere. This was the
argument most o ften  advanced f o r  th e  re je c t io n  o f the  C o n s titu tio n .
But i t  i s  n o t a t  a l l  s u rp r is in g , considering  th e  p r iv ile g e d  p o l i t i c a l
p o s itio n  enjoyed by th e  C lin ton ians w ith in  th e  s t a t e ,  to  f in d  a g re a t
deal o f what must be c a lle d  s t a te s - r ig h ts  p o l i t i c s  creep ing  in to  both
debates and essays o f p a r t i c u la r  New York 'A n t i s ' . This d u a li ty  o f
20purpose i s  q u ite  ap p aren t, f o r  example, in  th e  L e tte rs  o f S idney.
More o f te n , however, one can on ly  surm ise th e  purpose f o r  opposition
to  th e  C o n s titu tio n , t h i s  being e s p e c ia lly  th e  case w ith  the L e tte rs
21o f Cato, the pen-name o f  George C lin to n , and th e  speeches during th e  
debates o f  C linton^^ and John Lansing, J r .^ ^  Indeed, th e  opening A n ti- 
F e d e ra l is t  speech in  th e  r a t i f y in g  convention, by Lansing, included 
th is  r a th e r  in d ic a t iv e  paragraphs
^®Paul L e ic e s te r  Ford, Essays on the  C o n s titu tio n  (Brooklyn, 
1892), pp. 297-313o
^^I b id . , pp. 2U5-278.
^ ^ E ll io t ,  D ebates, I I ,  359= 
^ ^ Ib id .,  p . 217.
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I t  has been observed, t h a t ,  as th e  people m ust, o f  n e c e s s i ty , 
d e le g a te  e s s e n t ia l  powers e i th e r  to  the  in d iv id u a l o r  general 
s o v e re ig n tie s , i t  i s  p e r f e c t ly  im m aterial where they  a re  lodged; 
b u t, as th e  s t a te  governments w i l l  always possess a b e t t e r  
re p re se n ta tio n  o f  th e  f e e lin g s  and in te r e s t s  o f th e  people a t  
l a r g e ,~ i t“l3  obvious th a t  those  powers can be d ep o sited  w ith  
much g re a te r  s e c u r i ty  w ith the  s t a t e  than w ith  the general
government o 2d
This a t t i tu d e  must be c o n tra s te d  w ith  th a t  expressed by Melancton Smith
in  h is  f i r s t  speech on the  convention f lo o rs
[Smith] was as s tro n g ly  im pressed w ith  the  n e c e ss ity  o f  a union 
as any one could be. He would seek i t  w ith  as much a rd o r . In  
th e  d iscu ss io n  o f t h i s  q u estio n  [the  n e c e s s i ty  o f a union re q u ir ­
ing a stro n g  c e n tra l  governm ent], he was d isposed to  make every 
concession , and indeed, to  s a c r i f ic e  every th ing  f o r  a union , 
except th e  l i b e r t i e s  o f  h is  co un try , than  which he could  n o t 
contem plate a g re a te r  m isfo rtu n e . But he hoped we were no t 
reduced to  th e  n e c e s s i ty  o f  s a c r i f ic in g ,  o r even endangering our 
l i b e r t i e s ,  to  p rese rv e  th e  Union. I f  th a t  was th e  case , th e  a l ­
te rn a tiv e  was d re a d fu l. But, he would n o t now say th a t  the 
adoption  o f th e  C o n s titu tio n  would endanger our l i b e r t i e s ,  be­
cause th a t  was the  p o in t to  be debated . . . .25
C h a ra c te r is tic  o f  h is  l a t e r  speeches in  a t t i tu d e  was S m ith 's lack  o f 
concern f o r  the  s t a te  governments p e r  s e . üa, dw elt p r im a rily  upon the  
need to  p reserve  those  l i b e r t i e s  and freedoms enjoyed by Americans.
This exam ination o f New York A nti-Federalism  w i l l  draw from A nti-Feder­
a l i s t s  o f both p o s i t io n s ,  and w il l  c o r re la te  th e  arguments o f both in to  
a coherent p ic tu re  o f  New York A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts ' fe a rs  o f  th e  proposed 
fe d e ra l government.
John L ansing, in  th e  speech p rev io u s ly  quoted, p re c is e ly  summed 
up the argument o f s t a te s - r ig h t s  A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts s  " I f  th e  o p e ra tio n  
o f th e  genera l government w i l l  su b v ert those  o f  the  in d iv id u a l s t a te s ,
26
th e  i n t e r e s t  o f  th e  s t a te  o f f ic e r s  [w il l]  be a ffe c te d  in  some m easure," 
The two g re a te s t  spokesmen f o r  t h i s  p o s i t io n ,  and the  two who had th e
^^ Ib id . ^^ Ib id . . p . 223. . p . 220,
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most to  f e a r  from th e  o p e ra tio n  o f a  s tro n g  c e n tra l  government, were 
Governor George C lin ton  and Robert T a tes , member o f  th e  New York S ta te  
Supreme Court» Both were extrem ely vocal in  td ie ir a tta c k s  on the Con­
s t i t u t i o n ,  though C lin ton  took l i t t l e  r e a l  p a r t  in  th e  debates and
Yates none a t  a l l»  Both men w ere, however, a c t iv e  e s s a y is ts  on the
27C o n s titu tio n , and Y ates, under th e  pseudonym o f  Sidney, made l i t t l e  
e f f o r t  to  h ide th e  e x te n t o f  h is  f e e l in g s .
In  h is  L e t te r s ,  Sidney compared the  fe d e ra l  C o n s titu tio n  w ith  
th e  c o n s t i tu t io n  .of J h e  s W b  o f  lew„York» He dem onstrated how the  
powers o f % e sta ite  goyernmmt wpu%d b e . e i th e r  to  t a l l y  o r  p a r t ia l ly ^  
absorbed, and asked w hether th e  rem aining powers would be s u f f ic ie n t  to  
support th e  s t a te  governments » Though h is  L e t te r s  lacked th e  l i t e r a r y  
and in te l l e c tu a l  q u a li ty  o f  those  o f  Smith o r  B ru tus, Sidney achieved 
h is  d e s ire d  end q u ite  w e ll.
Sidney contended t h a t g
The powers v e s ted  in  th e  l e g i s la tu r e  o f t h i s  s t a te  [by the  New 
York s ta te  c o n s t i tu t io n ]  w i l l  be weakened, fo r  the  proposed 
government d e c la re s  th a t  " a l l  l e g i s l a t iv e  powers h e re in  g ran ted  
s h a l l  be v e s ted  in  a  congress o f th e  United S ta te s ,  which s h a l l  
c o n s is t  o f a  Senate and a house o f r e p re s e n ta t iv e s ,"  and i t  
f u r th e r  p re s c r ib e s , t h a t  " th is  c o n s t i tu t io n  and th e  laws o f  th e  
U nited S ta te s ,  which s h a l l  be made under the  a u th o r i ty  o f the  
U nited S ta te s ,  s h a l l  be th e  supreme law o f th e  lan d , and the  
judges in  every s t a te  s h a l l  be bound th ereb y , anything in  the 
c o n s t itu t io n  o r laws o f  any s ta te  to  th e  co n tra ry  n o tw ith stan d ­
in g . . . »"28
This o b jec tio n  was a fa m ilia r  one, though F e d e ra l is ts  everywhere con­
tended th a t  th e  powers o f  the  n a tio n a l  l e g i s la tu r e  were q u ite  r e s t r i c te d  
in  th e  scope o f t h e i r  o p e ra tio n s . But, i s  th i s  reaso n ab le , Sidney asked, 
and concluded*
^7pord, E ssays, p . 29$» ^^Ib id . , p . 301̂ .
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
so
I t  appears to  me as im possible th a t  th ese  powers in  th e  s t a te  
c o n s t i tu t io n  and those  in  the g en era l government can e x is t  and 
o p e ra te  to g e th e r  . , « Can th e re  a t  th e  same time and p lace  be 
and o p e ra te  two supreme l e g i s l a tu r e s ,  e x ecu tiv es , and ju d ic ia ls ?  
W ill a “guaran tee  o f  a rep u b lican  form o f  government to  every 
s t a te  in  th e  union" be o f any a v a i l ,  o r  secure  th e  estab lish m en t 
and re te n tio n  o f s t a te  r ig h ts
In a l a t e r  L e t te r ,  Sidney answered h is  own questions
I t  appears t h a t  the  g en era l government, when com pletely organ­
ize d , w i l l  absorb a l l  those  powers of  fee  s ta te s  which the  
framer's o f  th e  M n â tT w tlœ T h âd  d ec la red  should be only ex er­
c ise d  by th e  re p re se n ta tiv e s  o f  th e  people o f  the  s ta te  . , . 
bu t [the s t a t e '  s ] o p e ra tio n s  to  ensure o r  c o n tr ib u te  to  any 
e s s e n t ia l  measures prom otive o f th e  happiness o f  th e  people 
may be t o t a l l y  p ro s tr a te d ,  j^ _ g en era ]L  g9%8rnm w t-aizoga± ing  
liol i t s e l f  ̂ th a^ rig h .l.o f .^ te r fp r i i^ g  S  the mos
o f in te rn a l  p o l ic y , and the  most t r i f l i n g  dom estic concerns o f
- - —       . . . . . . . . .  - . . . . . .  , - . - - ,  . . . .  . .
every s t a t e .  . .
Cato went f u r th e r  in to  th is  m a tte r , though h is  i n i t i a l  prem ise
o f the  co n so lid a tin g  n a tu re  o f th e  C o n stitu tio n  was th e  same. Was i t
p o s s ib le , he asked, to  expect a rep u b lican  form o f government to  e x is t
in  th e  United S ta te s ,  given i t s  d iv e rse  in te r e s t s ,  c u ltu re s ,  and needs?
R e fle c tin g  on M ontesquieu 's famous aphorism r e la t in g  th e  s iz e  o f  a
country  to  i t s  form o f  government, Cato continued?
W ill t h i s  co n so lid a ted  r epubl i c ,  i f  e s ta b lis h e d , in  i t s  e x e rc ise  
beget~sucH~conficl&ice and' c ^ p l l a n c e ,  among th e  c i t iz e n s  o f 
th e se  s t a te s ,  as to  dq.$ritho%t the  a id  o f  a s tand ing  army? . . .
9  — ,1 . 1-1 full Ib.w ^ o r inu.1.1 1.1 . f . . » .,..1
The m alcontents in  each s t a t e ,  who w il l  n o t be a few, nor the  
l e a s t  im portan t, w i l l  be e x c itin g  fa c t io n s  a g a in s t i t —the  f e a r  
o f a dismemberment o f some o f i t s  p a r t s ,  and the  n e c e s s i ty  to  
en fo rce  the  execu tion  o f  revenue laws [a co n tin u a l source o f 
apprehension] on th e  extrem es and in  the  o th e r  d i s t r i c t s  o f th e  
government, w i l l  in c id e n ta ll;^  and n e c e s s a r i ly  re q u ire  a permanent
fo rc e  to  be k ep t fo o t 
The e f f e c t  o f t h a t  stand ing  army would be d e trim en ta l to  th e  freedoms 
o f th e  people?
^ ^ Ib id ..  pp . 30li-30^o 30 ib ido , pp . 3I3-31U.
3 ^ Ib id ., p . 258.
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will n o t p o l i t i c a l  s e c u r i ty ,  and even th e  opinion o f  i t ,  be 
extinguished'? Can m ildness and m oderation e x is t  in  a govern­
ment where the  prim ary in c id e n t in  i t s  e x e rc ise  must be fo rce?
W ill n o t v io len ce  d estro y  confidence , and can e q u a lity  su b s is t  
where th e  e x te n t, p o lic y , and p ra c t ic e  o f  i t  w i l l  n a tu ra l ly  
le a d  to  make odious d is t in c t io n s  among c i t iz e n s ? 32
Cato fu r th e r  suggested  th a t  th e  sou thern  s t a t e s ,  whose c it iz e n s  were
u n fa m ilia r  w ith f r u g a l i ty  and in d iv id u a l e f f o r t  and achievem ent, and
whose economy was based on s la v e ry , would be le s s  ten ac io u s in  defense
33of t h e i r  freedoms and independence than  th e  n o rth e rn  s t a t e s ,  C ato 's  
appeal in  the l a t t e r  argument was to  th e  em otions, to o n e 's  p rid e  in  
being a "freedom -loving, hard-w orking, en e rg e tic  Yankee," C e rta in ly , 
the  argument had l i t t l e  b a s is  in  h is to ry ,  f o r  the South had shown i t ­
s e l f  as ded icated  to  the  cause o f  independence as had th e  North,
But t h i s  was c e r ta in ly  n o t th e  only  means by which th e  ex is ten ce
o f the  s ta te s  was th re a te n e d . To Sidney» the  d u a li ty  o f  p ro v is io n s in  
the  s t a t e 's  c o n s t i tu t io n  and th e  f e d e ra l  C o n s titu tio n  f o r  th e  re g u la tio n  
o f the  mode, tim e, and p lace  o f n a tio n a l  e le c t io n s , and the  f a c t  th a t  
th e  l a t t e r  a r t i c l e  o f government was considered  in  a l l  cases as the  
supreme law o f th e  lan d , v i r tu a l l y  made th e  s t a t e 's  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  p ro ­
v is io n s  on the  m a tte r  in e f f e c t iv e ,  i f  n o t indeed n u l l i f i e d .  The fe d e ra l  
C o n stitu tio n  could , in  a d d it io n , vo id  th e  s t a t e 's  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  p ro v i­
sion  th a t  no c i t iz e n  could be deprived  o f h is  v o te , o r the  p r iv ile g e s
3iiand r ig h ts  confirmed to  th a t  in d iv id u a l by h is  s t a te  c it iz e n s h ip .
A r tic le  17, s e c tio n  i;, o f  th e  fe d e ra l  C o n stitu tio n  guaranteed  
to  every s t a te  a repub lican  fonri o f government, T his, Sidney charged, 
was a guarantee in  name on ly , f o r g
Ib id , 33i b id , ,  pp. 2S8-2S9. 3l i b i d . , pp. 208, 311,
3% adlson , og, c l t ,» p . 636 ,
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
$2
I f  th e  Ito ited  S ta te s  guaran teed  " to  every s t a t e  in  the  union 
a  repub lican  form o f  government, " we may be allow ed the  form 
and n o t th e  substance , and th a t  i t  was so in tended  w i l l  appear 
from th e  changing o f th e  word c o n s t i tu t io n  to  th e  word form 
and th e  om ission o f  th e  words, and i t s  e x is tin g  law s .36
Moreover, Sidney continued?
And I  do not even think i t  uncharitable to  suppose that i t  was 
designedly done; but whether i t  was so or n o t, by leaving out 
these words the jurisprudence o f  each s ta te  i s  l e f t  to the 
mercy o f  the new government « , « [by] 1s t  a r t . ,  8th s e c . ,  1 s t  
clause o o o by the 9th clause o f  the same sectio n  . . .  by 
the I8th clause . . .T b y ]  the 3rd a irt., 1s t  sec . . . .  by sec .
2nd. . . .  by the 3d a r t . ,  3d s e c .37
The im p lica tio n  o f Sidney's  co n ten tio n  i s  obvious—th e C o n s t i tu t ion
*  m m e iæ m iM g æ a m o  . ....................... » , i . .  — ■ ■ ■
could n o t e i th e r  guaran tee  the  s ta te s  a republic#;^ government o r main- 
t a in  th e  fo rce  o f  th e i r  e x is tin g  law s, fo r  by doing so th e  fe d e ra l 
government could n o t assume the p o s it io n  o f supremacy w ith in  the 
country  i t s  fram ers so obviously  in tended . Omissions o f  t h i s  n a tu re  
were s u b tle  indeed, bu t they  were more than  s u f f ic ie n t  and more than 
apparen t f o r  Sidney to  ca tch  t h e i r  probable consequences.
Sidney a lso  p o in ted  ou t t h a t  under^ the  C o n s titu tio n  the s ta te s  
would lo se  command o f  % e ir  when drawn in to  the use o f the.
fe d e ra l  g o v e i^ ^ n t .  The s t a te  governo r's  power o f pardon, h is  execution  
o f s t a te  laws, h is  c o n tro l o f  appointm ent, and the  l ie u te n a n t  governo r's  
a u th o r i ty  to  assume th e  power o f h is  su p e r io r , would a l l  be " e i th e r  a l l  
enervated  or a n n ih ila te d ."
F in a lly , the  s t a te  c o n s t i tu t io n ,  u n lik e  i t s  fe d e ra l c o u n te rp a rt, 
f l a t l y  in su red  th e  s a n c t i ty  o f any and a l l  r e l ig io u s  p ra c t ic e s ,  except 
as they  were in c o n s is te n t  w ith th e  peace and s a fe ty  o f the  s t a t e .  The
3^Ford, E ssays, p . 309.
^^I b id . 38xb id . .  p . 310.
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f e d e ra l  C o n s titu tio n  made no such g u a ran tees , nor d id  i t  p ro h ib it  those 
in  the  m in is try  from sim ultaneously  occupying c iv i l  o r  m il i ta ry  p o s i­
t io n s  o S epara tion  o f church and s t a t e  was a p ro v is io n  inco rpo ra ted  
in to  v i r tu a l ly  every s t a te  c o n s t i tu t io n ,_ jn d . the  If^çlç o f  in s is te n c e  upon 
th is  in  th e  C o n s titu tio n  made F e d e ra l is ts  and A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  a lik e  
uneae jo
Cato and John Lansing were more sp e c if ic  and le s s  inflam m atory
in  th e i r  observations on th e  C o n s titu tio n  than S idney. The fo rm er's
L e t te r s ,  which la rg e ly  covered the  same ground as d id  the L e tte rs  o f
Sidney, and which were only m arg ina lly  su p e rio r in  q u a li ty  to those  o f
Sidney, d id  n o t so g re a t ly  r e f l e c t  p reoccupation  w ith s ta te  in te r e s ts
as d id  th e  L e tte rs  o f Sidney. L an sin g 's  speeches likew ise  a re  only
very  seldom concerned w ith  any s t a t e s - r i g h t s .  On read ing  the  speeches
o r  L e tte rs  o f th ese  men, however, one s u b s e t s  t h e i r  p o s itio n  was no t
e n t i r e ly  d is in te r e s te d . Yet Lansing very  ab ly  summarizes th e  problem
o f a sse ss in g  th ese  m en's p o s itio n s
I f  th e  o p e ra tio n  of the  g en e ra l government w i l l  subvert those 
o f  th e  in d iv id u a l s t a t e s ,  the  in te r e s t s  o f the  s ta te  o f f ic e rs  
may be a ffe c te d  in  some m easure, o therw ise  th e i r  emoluments 
w i l l  remain undim inished—t h e i r  consequences n o t so much im­
p a ire d  as n o t to  compensate men o f  in te r e s te d  p u rs u its  by the 
p ro sp ec t o f sh arin g  the  o f f ic e s  o f the  g en era l government.
Does th is  im putation  only  apply  to  th e  o f f ic e r s  o f  th is  s ta te ?
Are they more d isc e rn in g  in  d is tin g u ish in g  th e i r  in te r e s t s ,  o r  . 
a re  they  only  capable o f  being warped by apprehensions o f lo ss? ^
The problem is  a d i f f i c u l t  one f o r  a modem h is to r ia n  to  deal w ith
o b je c tiv e ly . Indeed, any com pletely o b je c tiv e  a n a ly s is  o f Cato and
Lansing could be on ly  concerned w ith  t h e i r  o b je c tio n s . Only by
39lb id . , p . 313o
^ ° E l l io t ,  D ebates. I I ,  220-221,
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in je c t in g  one’s su b je c tiv e  f e e lin g s  in to  th e  a n a ly s is  can one a r r iv e  a t  
any conclusions o f  th e  underly ing  m otives o f two such men.
This th e s is  i s  concerned more w ith  th e  observa tions on th e  Con­
s t i t u t i o n  o f  those  who saw in  i t  genuine th re a ts  to  the  l i b e r t i e s ,  
freedom s, and p r iv ile g e s  enjoyed by Americans» A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  l ^ e  
Melancton Smith and Brutus devotedly  b e liev ed  in  a d e c e n tra liz e d  gov­
ernment « Though they  re a l iz e d  th a t  th e  C onfederation was too weak to  
accom plish th e  needs o f  and meet th e  problems faced  by the young n a tio n , 
th ey  fe a re d  the  C o n s titu tio n  to  be too f a r  in  the  o th e r  extreme» T heir 
p o s it io n  in  the  con troversy  was a  moderate one—>îlth. .c e r ta in  amendments 
to  the  C o n s titu tio n  in su r ln  freedoms o f  th e  Americans, th e  C onsti­
tu t io n  would be accep tab le  to  them» But they  added a g re a t d ea l o f 
r e s p e c ta b i l i ty  and in te l l e c tu a l  q u a li ty  to  the  New York A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  
o rg a n iz a tio n , which o therw ise  would have been q u ite  drab» Smith, how­
ev er, and o th e r  moderates l ik e  him, proved to  be the  weak l in k  in  the 
o therw ise q u ite  s o l id  New York A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  o rgan ization»^^
^ U n til very  l a t e  in  th e  deb a tes . Smith remained firm  to  th e  
A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  PQslM.5a . 0f  no r a t i f i c a t i o n  w ithou t p r io r  amendments »
At th e  same tim e, however, he expressed p r iv a te  thoughts th a t  he would 
vo te  fo r  recommendatory amendments i f  s u b s ta n t ia l  enough» As th e  con­
ven tio n  continued , and as the  s p l i t  between the two s id es  in  th e  con­
tro v e rsy  widened. Smith came to  r e a l iz e  th a t  should New York re fu se  
r a t i f i c a t i o n  w ithout p r io r  amendment, th e  s ta te  would l ik e ly  be is o la te d  
in  th e  Union» Then to o . Smith was the  only  A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  d e leg a te  
from Duchess County, and he knew from New York’s re b e llio u s  s t a te  of 
mind th a t  th e  p o s s ib i l i ty  o f  secess io n  o f th e  c i ty  and th e  surrounding 
co u n ties  was rea l»  though perhaps u n lik e ly »  Smith decided a f t e r  much 
co n s id e ra tio n  th a t  i t  was b e t te r  to  v o te  f o r  r a t i f i c a t i o n  w ith, recOJir 
mandatory amendments than r i s k  a d iv is io n  o f  the  s t a te  by v o tin g  a g a in s t 
r a t i f icatiggup He d id  e x ac tly  t h a t ,  though he must have re a liz e d  th a t  
h is  a c tio n  would v i r tu a l ly  amount to  h is  p o l i t i c a l  death  in  the  s ta te »  
Robin Brooks, "Alexander Hamilton, Melancton Smith, and th e  R a ti f ic a tio n  
o f  the  C o n stitu tio n  in  New York," W illiam  and Mary Q u arte rly . (1962),
A lso, Linda Grant DePauw, The S e v e n th  P i l l a r s  New York and the F edera l 
C o n s titu tio n  ( I th a c a , 196671
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The proposed House o f R ep resen ta tiv es  p a r t i c u la r ly  concerned 
Stalltho The House alone was th e  source o f  th e  p e o p le ’s d i r e c t  rep resen ­
ta t io n  In  th e  fe d e ra l  government, and as such was considered  th e  source 
o f  much o f the  p eo p le ’s s e c u r i ty  In  government» The proposed House was 
o b jec tio n a b le  on th re e  p a r t i c u la r  counts »
Sm ith’s f i r s t  o b je c tio n  to  th e  House was th a t  I t s  ru le  o f  appor­
tionm ent was u n ju s t .  S ec tion  2, A r t ic le  I I  o f  the  CSonstltutlon^^ p ro ­
vided  th a t  a l l  w h ites and th r e e - f i f th s  o f the  s lav es In  each s t a te  
were th e  basis f o r  rep re se n ta tio n »  Ttils p ro v is io n  was th e  r e s u l t  o f  a 
North-South con^romlse between th e  d e leg a tes  In  the F edera l Convention, 
and Stailth c le a r ly  understood th a t ,  as such, I t  was a compromise which 
n one the less disp le a se d  h ^ »
He could n o t see any ru le  by which s lav es  were to  be Included
^ÊRr88@Rtytlon. The p r in c ip le  o f re p re se n ta tio n  
being th a t  every f r e e  agen t should be concerned In  governing 
h im self, i t  was absurd In  g iv ing  th a t  power to  a man who could 
n o t e x e rc ise  I t»  Slaves have no w i l l  o f  t h e i r  own» The very  
o p e ra tio n  o f I t  was to  g ive c e r ta in  p r iv ile g e s  to  those  people 
who were so wicked as to  keep slaves»^^
Secondly, the  C o n s titu tio n , by A r t ic le  I ,  se c tio n  2, f ix ed  the  
re p re se n ta tio n  a t  one re p re se n ta tiv e  p e r t h i r t y  thousand In h a b ita n ts  » ̂  
This was u n sa tis fac tp iy ^ t^ ^  f o r  w hile th e  maximum number o f
re p re se n ta tiv e s  was f ix e d , th e Gonst l t a t l g n d l d  no t f i x  a minimum 
number below which th e  House m ight be reduced» The House might con­
ce ivab ly  reduce th e  number o f  re p re se n ta tiv e s  b ^ p w ,th e  s lx ty - f lv o  
provided  f o r  by the  C o n stitu tio n  u n t i l  th e  census o f  1790» The only
^^Madlson, ^ »  c l t »» p» 627» 
^ % l l l o t ,  Debates» I I ,  226-227< 
^S îad lson , o£» c i t .» p» 627»
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s e c u r i ty  in  th e  p ro v is io n  f o r  the  number o f re p re se n ta tiv e s  was th e
in te g r i ty  o f th e  r u le r s ,  a  very  s le n d e r th read  o f p ro te c tio n  indeed.
The power to  determ ine th e  number o f re p re se n ta tiv e s  in  a repub lican
government being l e f t  to  the  d is c re t io n  o f th e  l e g i s l a to r s  was a poten-
li5t i a l  th r e a t  to  th e  peop le .
The th i r d  e rro r  in  th e  proposed House, and the o b je c tio n  most 
o f te n  rev e rted  to  by A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  throughout th e  coun try , was th a t  
the  re p re se n ta tio n  o f  th e  House vras inadequate f o r  the  s iz e  and popula­
t io n  o f  th e  country .
I t  was, [Smith] s a id , th e  fundam ental p r in c ip le  o f f r e e  govern­
ment, th a t  the people should make the  laws by which they were 
to  be governed. He who i s  c o n tro lle d  by an o th er is  a s lav e ; 
and th a t  government which is  d ire c te d  by th e  w il l  o f  any one, 
o r a few, o r  any number le s s  than i s  the  w il l  o f the  community, 
i s  a  government f o r  s la v e s , , . , The view point was, how was 
th e  w i l l  o f the community to  be expressed? I t  was no t p o ss ib le  
f o r  them to  come to g e th e r ; th e  m u ltitude  would be too g re a t;  in  
o rd e r , th e re fo re , to  provide a g a in s t th i s  inconvenience, the  
scheme o f re p re se n ta tio n  had been adopted, by which th e  people 
denoted o th e rs  to  rep re se n t them. In d iv id u a ls  e n te r in g  in tot  - ■ — ...............—'-J- - — -•
s o c ie ty  became one^body, and th a t  body ought to  be anim ated by 
one mind , , , we may approach a g re a t way toward p e rfe c tio n  by 
in c re a s in g  th e  re p re se n ta tio n ,^ ^
Given th e  n a tu ra l  u rge o f  men once in  power to  r e ta in  as much power as
p o ss ib le , i t  was n o t w ise to  expect th e  House to  en large i t s  numbers,
thereby  decreasing  th e  power each re p re s e n ta tiv e  possessed . The same
m otives would a lso  o p e ra te  upon the Senate and the ex ecu tiv e , to  whose
advantage i t  would be to  m ain ta in  a  sm all body o f re p re se n ta tiv e s . I t
was very  im portan t, th e re fo re , to  e s ta b l is h  from the o u tse t a s u i ta b le
number o f  r e p re s e n ta t iv e s , enforced  by a c o n s t i tu t io n a l ly -e s ta b l is h e d
J 7
minimum number o f r e p re s e n ta tiv e s .
^ P E llio t, Debates, I I ,  227.
^^I b id , , pp, 227- 228 , ^ “̂I b id , ,  pp, 228, 2l|2- 2ii3o
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Smith continued to  hammer a t  s e c tio n  2, A r tic le  I ;
There was an o th e r o b jec tio n  to  th e  c lauses i f  g re a t  a f f a i r s  o f 
government were t ru s te d  to  few men, they  would be more l ia b le  
to  corruptiono C orrup tion , he knew, was un fash ionab le  amongst 
u s ;  bu t he supposed th a t  Americans were l ik e  o th e r  men; and 
though they  had h i th e r to  d isp lay ed  g re a t v i r tu e ,  s t i l l  they 
were men; and th e re fo re  such s te p s  should be taken as to p re ­
ven t the  p o s s ib i l i ty  o f  c o rru p tio n .^ "
With t h i s  o bserva tion  and demand, Cato staunch ly  agreeds
I t  i s  a  very  im portan t o b jec tio n  to  th is  government, th a t  the  
re p re se n ta tio n  c o n s is ts  o f so few; too few to  r e s i s t  the  in f lu ­
ence o f  c o rru p tio n , and the  tem ptation  of tre a c h e ry , a g a in s t 
which a l l  governments ought to  tak e  p re c a u tio n s .
As a c o ro lla ry  to  h is  th i r d  o b se rv a tio n , Smith a s se r te d  th a t  a 
repub lican  government must depend, fo r  i t s  f a i t h f u l  execu tion , upon 
the  p e o p le 's  good op in ion  and confidence. The Confederation had been 
somewhat i n e f f i c i e n t ,  p re c is e ly  because i t  lacked  th i s  confidence. 
R epresen tatives should resem ble those  whom they  re p re se n t, and should 
possess a knowledge o f th e i r  circum stances and w ants. Such knowledge 
should comprehend p o l i t i c s  and commerce, as th a t  he ld  by men o f re f in e d  
education . But men o f  th e  'm iddling  class* were more competent to  
comprehend th e  concerns and preoccupation  o f the  common p e o p l e . T h e  
government proposed by the  C o n s titu tio n , Smith charged, would be com­
posed o f  men o f th e  h ig h er c la s s ,  s in ce  i t  was co nstruc ted  to  admit 
but a few to th e  e x e rc ise  o f  i t s  powers. The w ell-bo rn , w ith  su p e rio r  
re sp e c t from th e  common people , and w ith t h e i r  ta le n t  f o r  e a s i ly  formed 
p o l i t i c a l  a s so c ia tio n s , would tend  to  be chosen fo r  p u b lic  o f f ic e  be­
fo re  those  of the  m iddling c la s s .  The r e s u l t  m ight very w ell be. Smith
^^ib id . , pp. 228- 229.
^^Ford, E ssays, p . 268. 
^ ° E l l io t ,  D ebates. I I ,  22*5-21*6,
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concluded, a government o f l im ite d  p u b lic  exp ression j indeed a govern­
ment o f o pp ression . The e f f e c t  upon l i b e r ty  would be d isa s tro u s
The duty  o f  c i t iz e n s  a t  t h i s  c ru c ia l  tim e. Smith v igo rously  
argued, was to  frame a government f r ie n d ly  to  th e  l ib e r ty  and r ig h ts  
o f mankind.
We were now in  th a t  s tag e  o f s o c ie ty  in  which we could d e lib ­
e ra te  w ith freedom; how long i t  m ight con tinue , God only kneswl 
Twenty years hence, perhaps, th ese  m otives [of honesty  in  
government] m ight become u n fash io n ab le . We a lre ad y  have . . . 
in  some p a r ts  o f  th e  coun try , gentlemen r id ic u lin g  th a t  s p i r i t  
o f  p a tr io t is m , and love o f  l ib e r ty ,  which c a r r ie d  us through 
a l l  our d i f f i c u l t i e s  in  tim es o f  danger.52
Government must a lso  c u l t iv a te  a love o f l ib e r ty  among i t s  c i t i ­
zens. Should i t  become op p ressiv e , i t  would do so by degrees and would 
proceed to  the  s tep  by s te p  d e p riv a tio n  o f p o l i t i c a l  freedoms and p e r­
sonal l i b e r t i e s Cato he ld  s im ila r  b e lie f s  g
[ I ] t  may be remarked th a t  a w e ll-d ig es te d  democracy has th is  
advantage over a l l  liie  o th e rs , to  w it, th a t  i t  a ffo rd s  to many 
the opp o rtu n ity  to  be advanced to  th e  supreme command, and the  
honors they  thereby  enjoy f i l l  them w ith  a d e s ire  o f rendering  
them selves worthy o f  them; hence th is  d e s ire  becomes p a r t  o f 
t h e i r  education , i s  m atured in  manhood, and produces an a rden t 
a f fe c tio n  f o r  t h e i r  country  . . . th e  more complete [the rep re ­
s e n ta tiv e  branch] i s ,  the b e t te r  your in te r e s t s  w il l  be p reserv ed , 
and th e  g re a te r  th e  o p p o rtu n ity  you w il l  have to  p a r t ic ip a te  ^  
government, one o f  the  p r in c ip a l  s e c u r i t ie s  o f a f r e e  p eop le .5u
The d e leg a tes  to  the  New York r a t i f y in g  convention spen t a f u l l
week on the proposed House o f R e p re se n ta tiv e s . They a lso  spen t over a
week on th e  proposed Senate, the  re p o s ito ry  o f those whom Smith termed
the  n a tu ra l  a r is to c ra c y  o f th e  coun try .
^ I b i d . , pp. 216-217.
^^Ib id . , p . 229. ^^ Ib id . , p . 2U6 <
5^Ford, E ssays, pp. 268-269.
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G ilb e r t  L iv ingston , an A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  who seldom spoke on the
convention f lo o r ,  but who was n e v e r th e le s s  a capable o ra to r , opened the
debates on the  upper house o f th e  n a tio n a l  le g is la tu re o  His summary o f
A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  o b jec tio n s  to  th e  Senate was very  w ell developed?
F i r s t ,  [the S enate] would possess l e g i s l a t i v e  powers coextensive 
w ith those  o f th e  House o f R ep resen ta tiv es  except w ith re sp ec t 
to  o r ig in a tin g  revenue law s; which, however, they  would have 
power to  r e j e c t  o r  amend, as in  th e  case  o f  o th e r  b i l l s □ Sec­
ondly , they would have an im portance, even exceeding th a t  o f  th e  
r e p re se n ta tiv e  house, as th ey  would be composed o f  a sm aller 
number, and possess  more firm ness and system . T h ird ly , t h e i r  
consequence and d ig n ity  would s t i l l  f u r th e r  transcend  those  o f  
the  o th e r  branch, from th e i r  longer continuance in  o f f ic e .
These powers * . . rendered  the  Senate a dangerous body.^^
As Brutus so a c c u ra te ly  observed,^ the. 5 $ m te  was design ed to  
represen-^-^e^ a r is to c ra c y  o f  the. country  This was necessary  i f  the  
Senate were to  balance th e  House. But, the  Senate was a lso  designed 
as a k ind  o f bulwark o f  the s t a t e s ,  a  check on encroachments by the  
g enera l g o v e r n m e n t .G iv e n  th e  n a tu re , and the  r e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s  o f 
the  S enate , John Lansing thought i t s  d ig n ity  and re sp e c t to  be g re a te r  
than th a t  o f  the  House.
L iv ingston  continued h is  o b se rv a tio n s on the Senate?
He went on, in  the  second p la c e , to  enumerate and anim advert 
on th e  powers w ith  which they  were c lo th ed  in  t h e i r  ju d ic ia l  
c ap a c ity , and in  t h e i r  c ap a c ity  o f  counsel to  the  P re s id e n t, 
and in  th e  forming o f  t r e a t i e s .  In  th e  l a s t  p la c e , i f  too 
much power could n o t be given to  t h i s  body, they  were made, 
he s a id , a co u n cil o f  appointm ent, by whom ambassadors and 
o th e r  o f f ic e r s  o f s t a t e  were to  be appo in ted . These a re  the  
powers . o o which a re  v e s te d  in  t h i s  sm all body o f tw en ty -s ix ; 
in  some e a se s , to  be ex erc ised  by a bare quorum, which i s  fo u r­
tee n ; a m a jo rity  o f which number, ag a in , i s  e ig h t . What a re  
th e  checks provided to  balance t h i s  g re a t  mass o f power?59
^ ^ B llio t ,  Debates^ I I ,  286
^6
Borden, o£. c i t . ,  p . l 8l .
5’̂ E l l io t ,  D ebates. I I ,  28? .
^ ^ I b id . .  p . 293. ^ ^ Ib ido , p . 28?.
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The Senate was 9 as B ratus observed, a mixed le g is la t lv e ° e x e c u tlv e -
ju d le ia l  bodyg
lo  They a re  one b ra n c h ^ ^ ^ h e  l^ g i^   ̂ and in  th is  
re sp e c t w il l  possess equal powerj ‘în  a l l  cases w ith  the  house 
o f re p re se n ta tiv e s?  fo r  I  consider the c lause  which gives the  
house of re p re se n ta tiv e s  th e  r ig h t  o f o r ig in a tin g  b i l l s  fo r  
r a is in g  revenue as m erely nom inal, see ing  the  Senate [has the  
power] to  propose o r  concur w ith  amendments,
2o They a re  a branch o f  th e  execu tive  in  th e  appointm ent o f 
ambassadors and pub lic  m in is te rs ,_ a n d  in  th e  appointm ent o f 
i n  o th e r  o f f ic e rsj, no t o therw ise  provided fo r?  whether th e  
forming o f  t r e a t i e s  g in  which they  a re  jo in ed  w ith  th e -P re s i­
d e n t, ap p e rta in s  to  the  l e g i s l a t iv e  o r  execu tive  p a r t  o f the  
government, o r  to  n e i th e r ,  i s  no t m a te r ia l ,
3o o f _ th e  ju d ic i a l ,  fo r  they  form the  c o u rt
This arrangem ent, to  B ru tus, was n o t s a t is f a c to r y :
I t  has been a long e s ta b lis h e d  maxim, th a t  th e  l e g i s l a t iv e ,  
ex ecu tiv e , and ju d ic ia l  departm ents in  the  government should 
be kep t d i s t in c t  , , , I  adm it th a t  t h i s  d is t in c t io n  cannot 
be p e r f e c t ly  p rese rv ed . In  a duly balanced government, i t  is  
perhaps a b so lu te ly  n ecessa ry  to  g ive the execu tive  q u a lif ie d  
l e g i s la t iv e  powers, and th e  le g i s la tu r e  o r  a  branch o f them 
ju d ic ia l  powers in  th e  l a s t  r e s o r t .  I t  may p o ss ib ly , a ls o , 
in  some sp e c ia l  cases be ad v isab le  to  a sso c ia te  th e  le g i s la tu r e ,  
o r  a branch o f  i t ,  w ith  the  ex ec u tiv e , in  th e  e x e rc ise  o f a c ts  
o f g re a t n a tio n a l  im portance. But s t i l l  th e  maxim i s  a good 
one, and a se p a ra tio n  o f th ese  powers should be sought as f a r  
as i s  p ra c t ic a b le ,  I  can sc a rc e ly  imagine th a t  any of the  
advocates o f th e  system  w i l l  p re ten d  th a t  i t  was necessary  to  
accumulate a l l  th ese  powers in  th e  s e n a te ,^ !
A r tic le  I ,  s e c tio n  3, o f th e  f e d e ra l  C o n stitu tio n ^^  provided th a t
th e  se n a to rs , two from each s t a t e ,  be appoin ted  by th e  s t a te  le g i s la to r s
fo r  a term of s ix  y e a rs . Of t h i s  B ratus sa id :
The apportionm ent o f  members o f the  Senate among the  s ta te s  i s  
no t according to  numbers, o r th e  im portance o f the s t a te s ,  but
i s  eq u a l. T his, on th e  p lan  o f a c o n so lid a ted  government is
^^Borden, o£, c i t , ,  pp , 182=183, 
^^I b id o
^^Madison, og, c l t , , p , 628 ,
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unequal and im proper; bu t i s  p roper on th e  system o f confeder­
a tio n  o o o I t  i s  indeed th e  only fe a tu re  o f  any importance 
In  th e  c o n s t i tu t io n  o f  a con federa ted  government o
The term fo r  which th e  sen a te  a re  to  be chosen i s ,  in  my 
judgment, too lo n g , and no p ro v is io n  being made fo r  a ro ta t io n  
w i l l ,  I  conceive, be o f  dangerous consequence.
I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  f i x  th e  p re c ise  p e rio d  fo r  which the  
Senate should be chosen . . . Some o f  th e  d u tie s  which a re  to  
be perform ed by the Senate , seem e v id e n tly  to  p o in t ou t the  
p ro p r ie ty  o f t h e i r  term o f  se rv ic e  being extended beyond the  
p e rio d  o f t h a t  o f  th e  assem bly . . . They a re  designed to  
re p re se n t th e  a r is to c ra c y  o f  the  coun try , i t  seems f i t  they 
should  possess more s t a b i l i t y ,  and so continue a lo n g er p eriod  
then  [s i c ] th a t  branch who re p re se n t the  democracy. The b u s i­
ness o f  making t r e a t i e s  and some o th e rs  which i t  w i l l  be p roper 
to  commit to  th e  S enate , re q u ire s  th a t  they  should have ex p eri­
ence, and th e re fo re  th a t  they  should remain some time in  o f f ic e  
to  acqu ire  i t . ° 3
Those A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts ,  l ik e  Brutus and Sm ith, who, w hile no t e n t i r e ly
s a t i s f i e d  w ith the  d i s t r ib u t io n  o f  power in  the  f e d e ra l  government,
acknowledged th e  n e c e s s i ty  o f  a Senate o f  lo n g er d u ra tio n  o f o f f ic e  and
of some power, n e v e rth e le ss  g re a t ly  fe a re d  the  len g th  o f  time f o r  which
the Senate would e x e rc ise  th e se  powers. Brutus continued:
But s t i l l  i t  i s  o f  equal im portance t h a t  they  should  n o t be so 
long in  o f f ic e  as to  be l ik e ly  to  fo rg e t  the  hand th a t  formed 
them, or be in se n s ib le  to  t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s . Men long in  o f f ic e  
a re  very a p t to  f e e l  them selves independent; to  form and pursue 
in te r e s ts  se p a ra te  from th o se  who appoin ted  them. And th is  i s  
more l ik e ly  to  be the case  w ith  the  se n a te , as they  w il l  f o r  
th e  most p a r t  o f  th e  tim e be absen t from the s ta te  they  re p re se n t, 
and a s so c ia te  w ith  such company as w il l  possess very  l i t t l e  f e e l ­
ings o f th e  m iddling c la s s  o f  peop le .
To th e se  o b se rv a tio n s , Smith added a few o f  h is  own?
I  concur . . . th a t  th e re  i s  a  n e c e s s i ty  fo r  g iv ing  th is  branch 
a  g re a te r  s t a b i l i t y  than  th e  House o f  R e p re se n ta tiv es . But, 
s i r ,  i t  does no t fo llow  from th is  p o s i t io n ,  th a t  the  senato rs 
ought to  hold  t h e i r  p laces  during  l i f e  . . .  As the c lause  now
^^Borden, c i t . .  p„ l 8l<
6 k Ib id .
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s ta n d s , th e re  i s  no doubt t h a t  th e  se n a to rs  w i l l  ho ld  t h e i r  
o f f ic e  p e rp e tu a lly , and in  t h i s  s i tu a t io n  they  must o f neces­
s i t y  lo se  t h e i r  dependence, and attachm ents to  the peop le . I t  
i s  c e r ta in ly  in c o n s is te n t  w ith  the  e s ta b lis h e d  p r in c ip le s  o f  
republican ism  th a t  th e  sen a te  should be a f ix e d  and unchange­
ab le  body o f  m en.°^
G ilb e r t  L iv ingston  a ls o  spoke on the m a tte r . A se n a to r , l ik e  
a l l  men, would have p erso n a l m a tte rs  to  a tte n d  to ,  and so might forego 
h is  o f f i c i a l  d u t ie s .  Furtherm ore, given th e  a r i s to c r a t i c  n a tu re  o f  the  
se n a to rs , the d u ra tio n  o f  o f f i c e ,  and t h e i r  d is tan c e  from the  p e o p le 's  
ob se rv a tio n , " fa c tio n s  a re  a p t  to  be f ormed i f  the  body becomes perman­
e n t. The sen a to rs  w il l  a s s o c ia te  only w ith  men o f t h e i r  own c la s s ,  and 
thus become s tra n g e rs  to  th e  c o n d itio n  o f  th e  common people .
Alexander Baralltgrij a F e d e ra lis t , o f  some no te  and consequence, 
thought , th a t  th e  fe d e ra l  government ought to  be v i r tu a l ly  independent. 
The s t a t e s ,  he acknowledged, were necessary  and fundam ental p a r ts  o f 
the  p o l i t i c a l  system o f  th e  co un try . But they  should be so p o s itio n e d  
w ith in  the  governmental o rg an iz a tio n  o f  th e  U nited S ta te s  as to  reduce 
th e i r  in flu en ce  upon the  c e n tra l  government. But, Lansing asked, were 
the C o n stitu tio n  to  be adopted unamended, and were the  fe d e ra l govern­
ment to  be e s ta b lis h e d  v i r tu a l l y  as Hamilton w ished, where was th e  
check upon i t  to  be lodged? C e r ta in ly , checks could n o t be found 
w ith in  the s ta te s ,  f o r  they  lacked  any e f f e c t iv e  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  powers 
o f th is  n a tu re  a g a in s t the c e n tr a l  government. Hamilton contended th a t  
the s t a te s  re ta in e d  th e i r  so v e re ig n ty , and th ereb y  c o n s titu te d  a de 
fa c to  check. But, Lansing asked , d id  they  in  f a c t  r e ta in  t h e i r  so v er­
e ign ty?  They could n o t m ain tain  arm ies; they  d id  n o t have the  u n lim ited
^ ^ E l l io t ,  D ebates. I I ,  309-310. 
^^I b id . , pp. 287- 288.
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powers o f  ta x a tio n  which c h a ra c te r iz e d  th e  c e n tra l  government. In  
r e a l i t y g th e  s t a te s  would soon be found u se le s s  and unnecessary . Upon 
th e  g radual bu t inexorab le  e ro s io n  o f  s t a t e  and lo c a l  governments, the 
r ig h ts  and l i b e r t i e s  o f th e  people would lik ew ise  erode, u n t i l  they 
became n o t c i t iz e n s  bu t su b je c ts  o f  th e  f e d e ra l  government.
Forced ro ta t io n  o f  th e  s e n a to rs , Snith  argued, would be a s te p  
in  th e  r ig h t  d ire c tio n  o f  an e f f e c t iv e  check a g a in s t the  c e n tra l  gov­
ernment. R o ta tion  would in su re  th e  senators*  continued understand ing  
of the p e o p le 's  needs and f e e l in g s .  I t  would p rev en t, o r  a t  l e a s t  
h in d e r, th e  beginning o f  p lo ts  a g a in s t the  l i b e r t i e s  and a u th o r ity  o f 
the s t a te  governments. F in a lly , ro ta t io n  would be the  b est means o f 
ex tin g u ish in g  f a c t io n s ,  which had so o f te n  p re v a ile d  in  repub lican  
governments. The hi s to r y  o f l e g i s l a t iv e  bodies in  repub lican  s t a te s .  
Smith p o in ted  o u t. showed th a t  p e rp e tu a l bodies tended to  e i th e r  com­
bine J n ^ 8ok^es__pf o r were to m  a p a r t  by,, pabal»^®
S im ila r reason ing  suggested  the  advantage o f  g ran ting  to  the  
s ta te  le g is la tu r e s  the  power o f  r e c a l l  over t h e i r  s e n a to rs . Smith 
argueds
That the  se n a to rs  a re  th e  re p re se n ta tiv e s  o f th e  s ta te  l e g i s ­
l a tu r e s ,  i t  i s  reasonab le  and p roper th a t  they  should  be under 
t h e i r  c o n tro l. When a s t a t e  sends an agent commissioned to  
tra n s a c t  any b u s in e ss , o r  perform  any s e ^ i c e ,  i t  c e r ta in ly  
ought to have the  power o f r e c a l l .
Smith continued by s t re s s in g  th a t  th e  r e c a l l  should n o t be ex erc ised  by 
th e  people a t  la r g e ,  f o r  th a t  would d e fe a t the purpose fo r  which the  
sen a te  was e s ta b lis h e d . He concludeds
67Ib id . ,  p . 308. I b id . ,  p . 311.
69 Ib id .
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Form th is  government as you p le a se , you must, a t a l l  events, 
lodge in  i t  very important powers, Biese powers must be in  
the hands o f  a few men, so s itu a ted  as to  procure a small 
degree o f  r e sp o n s ib ility . These circumstances ought to put 
us on our guard, and the inconvenience o f th is  necessary d e le ­
gation o f power should be corrected , by providing some su itab le
checks,70
Both Smith^^ and Lansing7^ feared that the s ta te  governments, 
e ith er  through lack  o f ju r isd ic tio n  or in s u ff ic ie n t  power to e f fe c t  
what areas o f  ju r isd ic tio n  were l e f t  them, would dwindle in  public  
resp ect. Eventually, they argued, the s ta te s  would be considered only  
as a u se le ss  and expensive burden upon the people. Though the two men's 
arguments c lo s e ly  p a ra lle led  each other, one note o f  in te r e s t  does ap­
pear in  the former's reasoning: " I  conceive th at the true in te r e s t  o f
every s ta te  i s  the in te r e s t  o f  the whole; and that i f  we should have a 
w ell-regu lated  government, the idea w i l l  p rev a il,
The F ed era list argument that as the w ell-regu lated  central gov­
ernment developed, so a lso  would the in te r e s ts  and w ell-being o f the 
s ta te s , was judged erroneous. The error la y , Snith contended, in  the 
premise o f the F ed era list argument:
We s h a ll ,  indeed, have a few lo c a l in te r e s ts  to pursue, under 
the new C onstitu tion , because i t  l im its  the claims o f  the s ta te s  
by so c lo se  a l in e ,  th at on th e ir  part there can be but l i t t l e  
dispute, and l i t t l e  worth disputing about. But, s i r ,  I  conceive 
that p a r tia l in te r e s ts  w i l l  grow continu ally  weaker, because 
there are not those fundamental d ifferen ces between the rea l 
in te r e sts  o f  the severa l s ta te s ,  which w i l l  long prevent th e ir  
coming together and becomii^ uniform, 74
I t  was a w idely repeated p ostu la te  o f  p o l i t ic s  in  the United 
States in  the la t e  eighteenth century, that the c lo ser  the people were 
to  th e ir  government, the more secure th e ir  r ig h ts . I t  was an argument
70lb id , 71ib id , ,  p , 313, 72 ib id , ,  p, 311-
7 3 lb id ., p , 31^0 7liib id ,
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w ith  Wiioh Smith was in  t o t a l  agreements
I  have fre q u e n tly  observed a  r e s t r a i n t  upon -üie s t a te  govern­
m ent, which CSongress never can be under, c o n s tru c t th a t  body 
as you p le a s e . I t  i s  a  t r u th  capable o f demon s t r a t io n ,  t h ^  
th e  n e a re r  th e  re p re se n ta tiv e  i s  to  h is  const"ituents '." 'tE i 
msre _ a t t ^ e ^ a R l4 a p ^ ^  In  th e  s t a te s ,  lEhe
e le c tio n s  a re  f re q u e n t, and th e  re p re se n ta tiv e s  numerousj 
they  t r a n s a c t  business in  th e  m idst o f  th e i r  c o n s titu e n ts , 
and every man must be c a lle d  upon to  account fo r  h is  conduct.
. . .  Ih  th i s  s t a t e ,  the  council o f  appointm ent a re  e le c te d
fo r  one y e a r . The proposed C o n s titu tio n  e s ta b lis h e s  a council 
o f  appointm ent ■Hho w i l l  be p e r p e t u a l . 73
Nor was i t  a ccu ra te  to  observe , as d id  Hamilton on occasion , th a t  fa c ­
tio n s  could no t e x is t  in  th e  Senate w ithout th e  knowledge o f the  s t a te
le g i s la tu r e s .  Indeed, th e  h is to ry  o f th e  C onfederation Congress proved 
76th e  o p p o site .
The d e leg a tes  to  the  r a t i f y in g  convention spen t over a week on
the S enate . The execu tive  and ju d ic ia l  branches o f  the  proposed fe d e ra l
government rece ived  on ly  passing  re fe re n c e . Indeed, Cato was the  only
New York “Anti* to  g ive  the execu tive  branch any a t te n t io n  a t  a l l .  In
h is  fo u r th  L e t te r ,  Cato observed th a t  th e  c o n s tru c tio n  o f  A rtic le  I I ,
77se c tio n  1 , o f  the  C o n s titu tio n  was vague and in e x p l ic i t  as to  the  mode 
o f e le c t io n  o f th e  P re s id e n t and V ice-P re s id en t fo llow ing  t h e i r  f i r s t  
fo u r-y e a r  term o f o f f i c e .  Indeed, th e re  was no in d ic a tio n  th a t  the  two 
o f f ic e s  would become vacan t upon the  e x p ira tio n  o f  t h e i r  t e r m s . Cato 
continued?
I t  i s  remarked by M ontesquieu, in  t r e a t in g  of re p u b lic s , th a t
"in a l l  m agistraces. the grealaiess o f the power must be contpen
the brevity  o f  the duration, andsa ted  fo r
"^^Ibid.. p . 315» 7^ Ib ld . ,  p . 312 .
^^Madison, o£. c i t . .  pp. 632-633.
^®Ford, E ssays, f p .  260-261.
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th an  a year would be dangerous,'* I t  i s ,  th e re fo re , obvious . . . 
to  account why g re a t power in  th e  hands o f  a m a g is tra te , and 
t h a t  power connected w ith  co n sid erab le  d u ra tion  may be dangerous 
to  th e  l i b e r t i e s  o f  a re p u b lic . The d ep o sit o f  v a s t  t r u s t s  in  
th e  hands o f  a s in g le  m a g is tra te , enables him in  t h e i r  ex erc ises  
to  c re a te  a numerous t r a i n  o f  dependents; t h i s  tem pts h is  ambi­
t io n ,  . . . and th e  d u ra tio n  of h is  o f f ic e  f o r  any considerab le  
tim e favors h is  view s, g ives him th e  means and tim e to  p e rfe c t  
and execute h is  desig n s, he th e re fo re  fan c ie s  th a t  he may be 
g re a t and g lo rio u s  by oppressing  h is  fe l lo w -c it iz e n s  and ra is in g  
h im self to  permanent grandeur on the  ru in s  o f  h is  co u n try .7^
Furtherm ore, Cato observed, the  P re s id e n t was w ithou t a c o n s t itu t io n a l
council fo r  advice during th e  recess o f  the  S ena te . He would most
finl ik e ly  come under the  in flu e n ce  o f f a v o r i te s .  F in a lly , th e  PTeatdent
might by no means be the  choice o f  the  p lu r a l i t y  of the people , fo r  he
need have only th e  g r e a te s t  number o f vo tes o f the  top f iv e  can d id a te s .
Yet, the  P re s id e n t was capable o f  e x e rc is in g  powers which l ik e ly  might
"tend e i th e r  to  th e  estab lish m en t o f an a rb i t r a r y  a r is to c ra c y  o r  mon- 
fila rchy ."  Cato concluded w ith an o b se rv a tio n  on th e  n a tu re  o f repub­
lic a n  governments
The s a fe ty  o f  the  people in  a re p u b lic  depends on th e  share  o r  
p ro p o rtio n  they have in  the  government; but experience ought to  
teach  you th a t  when a man i s  a t  th e  head o f  an e le c tiv e  govern­
m ent, in v es ted  w ith  g re a t powers, and in te re s te d  in  h is  r e -  
e le c tio n , in  what c i r c le  appointm ents w il l  be made; by which 
means an im perfec t a r is to c ra c y  bordering  on monarchy may be 
e s t a b l i s h e d . -
The ju d ic ia l  branch o f  th e  fe d e ra l  government would be v i r tu a l ly
independent o f a l l  o th e r  branches o f  th e  government, and o f  the peop le .
The C o n s titu tio n , by A r t ic le  I I I ,  se c tio n  1 ,^ ^  provided th a t  one supreme
c o u rt, and such in f e r io r  fe d e ra l  c o u rts  as thought necessary  would be
'^^I b id , .  p . 261. ^°I b id .
^^I b id . , p . 261. ^^I b id .
®3Madison, 0£ . c i t , , p . 63^ .
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e s ta b lis h e d . (Mce e s ta b lis h e d  and s ta f f e d ,  B ratus n o ted , the ju s t ic e s  
could be removed only by th e  in s tan c e  o f tre a so n , b r ib e ry , o r h igh  
crim es and misdemeanorsj o th e rw ise , t h e i r  tenu re  in  o f f ic e  was f o r  
l i f e .  Nor could  the  Supreme C o u rt 's  d ec is io n s  be reviewed by any o th e r  
ju d ic ia l  body; i t  was th e  supreme ju d ic ia l  o rg an iz a tio n  o f the  coun try ,
81iand i t s  word was f i n a l .
A r t ic le  in, s e c tio n  2 ,^^  o f  the  C o n s titu tio n  provided th a t  g
"The ju d ic ia l  power s h a l l  extend to  a l l  cases in  law and eq u ity  a r is in g
under th is  c o n s t i tu t io n ,  th e  laws o f  th e  United S ta te s ,  and t r e a t i e s  
made, o r which s h a l l  be made, under t h e i r  a u th o r i ty .  . . . "  The con­
s t ru c t io n  o f th is  p ro v is io n , Brutus argued in  two consecutive L e t te r s ,  
was n o t easy  to  d e f in e . F o r, on th e  one hand, the  fe d e ra l c o u rts  were 
au th o rized  to  determ ine any and a l l  questions th a t  might a r i s e  upon th e
meaning o f  th e  C o n s titu tio n  in  law , th a t  i s :
Tfeis"~article v e s ts  the  c o u rts  w ith a u th o r i ty  to  give the C onsti­
tu t io n  a le g a l  c o n s tru c tio n , o r to  exp la in  i t  according to  the 
ru le s  l a id  down f o r  c o n stru in g  a law . These ru le s  give a c e r ta in  
degree o f l a t i tu d e  o f  ex p lan a tio n  . . . The co u rts  a re  to  give 
such meaning to  th e  c o n s t i tu t io n  as compares b e s t w ith  the  common, 
and g e n e ra lly  received  acceptance o f  the  words in  which i t  i s  
expressed . . . Where words a re  dubious, th ey  w il l  be explained 
by the  c o n te x t.
On the other hand, the courts are empowered to decide questions 
arisin g  out o f equity: "By th is  they are empowered, to explain the
con stitu tion  according to the reasoning s p ir i t  o f  i t ,  without being 
confined to the words or l e t t e r s .
®^Borden, op.. c i t . ,  p . 227. 
^ ^ a d is o n , c i t . , p . 63^ . 
G^Borden, o£. c i t . .  p . 227.
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Becattse there was no superior ju d ic ia l body and because there  
could be no appeal from th e ir  d ec is io n s, these decision s w il l  have v ir ­
tu a lly  the force  o f law. Though Brutus nowhere e x p l ic i t ly  said  so , h is  
im plication  was th at the fed era l jud iciary , un like the le g is la t iv e  or 
executive branches, would in  e f fe c t  control the C onstitution . Far 
worse, however, was h is  b e l ie f  that the fed eral jud iciary  would operate 
to  e f fe c t  the subversion o f  the s ta te  governments. Every adjudication  
o f the Supreme Court on questions a r is in g  from and a ffec tin g  the nature 
and extent o f the general government would lik ew ise  a f fe c t  the lim its  
o f s ta te  ju r isd ic t io n . As the fed era l jud iciary  enlarged i t s  powers, 
to that extent would the sphere o f the l e t t e r ' s  powers be restricted.®®  
Brutus saw more than enough evidence in  the C onstitution to sug­
gest th at the powers o f the fed era l jud iciazy  would opgr^ e_strongly i n 
favor o f  the fed era l government. F ir s t ,  he charged, the Constitution  
i t s e l f  countenanced such construction; not only did i t  ju s t ify  the 
courts in  in c lin in g  to th is  mode of explanation, but the courts them­
se lves would be in terested  in  extending th e ir  powers. Moreover, every 
extension o f  the powers o f  the general le g is la tu r e  would lik ew ise  act 
as an extension o f  the power o f  the cou rts. F in a lly , he concluded, the 
courts had a precedent to plead and ju s t ify  the extension o f th e ir  
powers—the Court o f  Exchequer o f  Great B r ita in , With th is  precedent,
would i t  not be l ik e ly ,  Brutus asked, fo r  the federal courts lik ew ise
89to attempt to extend th e ir  own powers?
\  Them ost p o te n t ia lly  dangerous feature o f the proposed federal
A
ju d ic iary , Brutus argued, was % at th® te^ ic iary  could v ir tu a lly  mold
®®Ib id . , p . 228. ®9 lb id . .  pp. 228-230,
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the genera l government in to  w hatever shape i t  desired»  In rendering  
i t s  d e c is io n s , th e  c o u rt m ust, and would, a s s e r t  c e r ta in  p r in c ip le s  
which, from r e p e t i t io n ,  would become fixed» These p r in c ip le s ,  in  tu rn , 
would be adopted by th e  Congress, and would become th e  ru le  by which 
i t  would f i x  th e  e x te n t o f  i t s  own powers. Though th e  le g is la tu r e  
would n o t extend i t s  a u th o r i ty  beyond th a t  e s ta b lish e d  by the  c o u rts , 
i t  was most l ik e ly  th a t  i t  would approach those  l im its  as o f te n  as th e  
occasion p e rm itted . The purpose o f  the  fe d e ra l  government was s ta te d  
in  the  Preamble to  the  C o n s titu tio n . The c o u rt would understand  i t s  
ends to  be p re c is e ly  the  same and would give l a t i tu d e  to  every d e p a rt­
ment. Thus, fo r  example, from the f i r s t  object».Of govaiMimAnt daftlarod 
in  the  Preamble, "To form a more p e r f e c t  UnipPf” th e  co u rts  would give 
such c o n s tru c tio n  to  th a t  p ro v is io n  as would tend  to  d isparage the  
lo c a l and s t a te  governm ents. C lea rly , the  Union in tended and s ta te d  
was to  be a union no t o f the s t a t e s ,  but o f  th e  people , and to e s tab ­
l i s h  i t  would re q u ire  the  disparagem ent o f any in f e r io r  governments.^® 
I t  was im portan t, B rutus concluded in  ano ther essay , th a t  a 
check be e s ta b lish e d  upon any body given e x tra o rd in a ry  powers, in  o rder 
no t to  abuse those  powers. He d id  n o t in ten d  popu lar e le c tio n  o f  the  
.ju s tic es  o f the c o u r ts , f o r  t h a t  would e lim in a te  the  indepandance o f 
th o ae . men. Yet, in  o rd e r to  avoid  t o t a l  and complete independence, a 
fe a tu re  repugnant to  the  p r in c ip le s  o f f r e e  government, the  ju s t ic e s  
should be in  some manner c o n tro lle d . This he proposed as "some supreme.
 ̂ r    - ... k*- -•  ̂ v-«—' ' - . .
o v ^  whom i s  no powar. to  p m tfo l . W t the  .people them selves. This su-
91preme c o n tro llin g  power should be in  the  choice o f  the peop le . . . . "
90Ib id . . pp. 230- 233. ^^Ib id .o  p . 22$.
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The p a r ts  o f th e  C o n s titu tio n  irtiich were o f  g re a te s t  concern to  
A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  everywhere were those  se c tio n s  o f  the  C o n stitu tio n  
g ran tin g  the  f e d e ra l  government i t s  f i e ld s  o f  powers. The in te n t  o f 
the f e d e ra l  government was ex p re ss iv e ly  provided fo rs  . . i n  o rder 
to  form a more p e r fe c t  Union, e s ta b l is h  J u s t ic e ,  in su re  domestic Tran­
q u i l i t y ,  p rov ide fo r  the  common de fen se , promote th e  general w e llfa re .
. . To achieve th e se  broad ends C ongrus was ^
s iv e  range o f powers enuraerated-JjouJucticle I ,  se c tio n  8,^ ^  culm inating 
in  the  powers to  " , . . make a l l  laws which s h a l l  be necessary  and 
proper f o r  ca rry in g  in to  Execution . . . a l l  . . . powers v e sted  by 
th i s  C o n s titu tio n  in  th e  Government o f  the  U nited S ta te s , o r  in  any 
Department o r O ff ic e r  th e re o f ."  In  s h o r t ,  as A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  John 
W illiams argued, th e re  was no l im i t  to  tW  p o ss ib lq  nimber o f job jacta  
to  which the  power o f  the  fe d e ra l  gover nment , ° Nor were 
the  means by which th e se  ends were to  be a tta in e d  c le a r ly  s e t  f o r th .
I t  was a  c o n d itio n , acknowledged and e a rn e s tly  he ld  by A n ti-  
F e d e ra lis ts  everywhere, t h a t  th e  s ta te s  were necessary  f o r  the purposes 
and m a tte rs  o f l o c a l concern. I t  was a lso  contended th a t  th e  general 
government was necessa ry  fo r  those m atte rs  and purposes n a tio n a l in  
scope. But even th e  more m oderate ^A ntis, * exem plified  by Smith, a lso  
conceived th a t  th e  s t a t e  c o n s t i tu t io n s  ought to  be both th e  support and 
the  check upon th e  n a tio n a l  C o n s titu tio n , th e  s t a te  governments l ik e -  
wise being the support and check upon the  n a tio n a l  government. But th e
^% adlson , 0£ . c i t . . p . 62?,
^^ Ib ld . ,  pp. 630- 631.
^ ^ E llio t ,  D ebates. I I ,  33I .
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s ta te  governments and s t a te  c o n s t i tu t io n s ,  n o t t h e i r  n a tio n a l  coun ter­
p a r t s ,  should be th e  guardians o f  the  dom estic r ig h ts  and in te r e s t s .  
T herefo re , the  genera l government ought to  r e s t  upon th e  s t a te  govern- 
raents, no t only in  i t s  form bu t a lso  in  i t s  o p e ra tio n .
In  view o f  th is  r e la t io n s h ip ,  i t  i s  necessa ry  to e s ta b l is h  
p roperly  and im m ediately, Smith argued, th e  l in e  o f  ju r is d ic t io n  be­
tween the s t a te  and g en era l governments. Only by such an arrangement 
could th e  harmony between th ese  governments be m aintained , and in te r ­
fe rence  between the  two, and consequently  se rio u s  d if fe re n c e s , be 
96p reven ted . The power g ran ted  to  the fe d e ra l government by A r t ic le  ly 
se c tio n  8, th e  g re a te s t  source o f most se rio u s  d isp u te  was, to  Smith, 
the  most v i t a l  p r in c ip le  o f  th e  rep u b lican  government.
A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  o b jec tio n s  to  th e  p rov isions inco rpo ra ted  in  
se c tio n  8 were numerous. Most, however, were re la te d  in  one way o r 
ano ther to  the one c h ie f  p ro v is io n —the r i ght o f the  general government
John W illiams argued th a t  the  p ro v is io n s  comprehended in  the  terms
98ta x e s , d u tie s , im posts, and ex c ise s  were exceedingly  vague.^ Indeed,
v i r tu a l ly  every source o f  revenue could be in co rpo ra ted  in to  one or 
ano ther o f  those t e r m s . ’An t i s ’ l ik e  Smith conceded th a t  th e  p r in ­
c ip a l d i f f i c u l ty  fa c in g  th e  C onfederation  was an inadequate means of 
r a is in g  r e v e n u e . Y e t ,  though th is  f a c t  was unden iab le , the C onsti­
tu t io n  went too f a r  in  the  o p p o site  extrem e. For the  power o f ta x a tio n  
g ran ted  Congress was most comprehensive a n ^  given the  s ta te d  in te n t  of
^^ Ib id . pp. 323,  331. ^ ^ Ib id ..  p . 332. ^ '^Ibid.
^ ^ Ib id ..  p . 330. 9 > Ib id .. pp. 330, 372. ^Q ^Ibid .. p . 330.
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the  C o n s titu tio n  and the  n ecessa ry  and p roper c la u se , th e  most e f f i c ie n t  
power delegated„Jb9.-th.e_general  governm ent. I t  would probably extend, 
aga in , to  v i r tu a l ly  a l l  p o ss ib le  sources o f  revenue, excepting export 
d u tie s
S n ith  cogen tly  a r a iad , a t  one p o in t  e a r ly  in  th e  debates on the  
p ro v is io n s  o f s e c tio n  8, ^ t ^ U  w ^  a gen̂ ^̂ ^̂
fin d , u s a I ndeed,  n o t in fre q u e n tly , the
102demand i s  f a r  more» The case would in  a l l  p ro b a b il i ty  be the  same 
fo r  the  f e d e ra l  government. Subsequently , i t  was argued by Hamilton 
th a t  th e  genera l government ought to  possess a l l  th e  resources o f the
n Q-5
coun try . H am ilton 's argument r e s te d  on the p r in c ip le  th a t  th e  power
o f the n a tio n a l government ought to  be n a tio n a l  and g en e ra l, m d  i t s  
reso u rces , th e re fo re , lik ew ise  g e n e ra l. Lansing answered th a t  th e  gen-
. I III 1 1  I I III ^
e r a l  government was bu t p a r t  o f  a system , th e  whole o f  which should 
possess the  means o f  su p p o rt.
But the  s t a t e s ,  to o , would have f in a n c ia l  requirem ents to  meet 
îdiich req u ired  th e  lev y in g  o f taxes o r  d u tie s  o f  some k ind . In  view of 
the  s t a te  and general governments levy ing  tax es o r d u tie s  on the same 
person , and /o r the  same a r t i c l e s ,  i t  was l ik e ly  th a t  th e  two would in ­
te r f e r e  and be h o s t i le  to  one a n o th e r . In  t h i s  c o n te s t f o r  ju r is d ic t io n ,  
a r is in g  from claim  and i n te r e s t s ,  what chance would the  s ta te s  have? 
Considering the  su p e rio r  p o s i t io n  o f  th e  genera l government, and the  
f a c t  th a t  a l l  ju d ic ia l  d isp u te s  b e tween^the two would  be c a r r ie d  to  the  
fe d e ra l  c o u rts , r e l a t i v e ly  l i t t l e  was l e f t  to  th e  s t a t e s .  The powers 
g ran ted  th e  g ^ e r a l  government by th e  C o n s titu tio n  a re  m ostly  expressed ,
p . 332. ^Qglbid.o p . 333. lO ^ Ib id ., p . 372.
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no th ing  o f  Im portance i s  l e f t  to  construction ,^® ^ For th e  s t a te s ,  
q u ite  th e  opposite  i s  th e  c a se . Though th e  F e d e ra lis ts  argued r e - 
p e a ted ly  th a t  th e  s t a te s  had co n cu rren t ju r is d ic t io n  w ith the  genera l 
government o f  ta x a tio n , y e t ,  as W illiam s po in ted  o u t,
th e  C o n s titu tio n  nowhere s ta te d  such . The C o n s titu tio n  gran ted  the  
power o f ta x a tio n  to  Congress; i t  was s i l e n t  w ith  regard  to  the  same 
power o f th e  s t a t e s .  Such would on ly  be a t  b e s t a whim o f c o n s tru c tio n , 
and i t  was a m a tte r  o f  too  much u n c e r ta in ty  y e t  o f  too much importance 
to  be l e f t  to  mere c o n s t r u c t i o n , The r ig h t  o f  the  s t a te s ,  argued 
Smith, to  lev y  taxes, f o r  t h e i r  own su p p o rt, a  1 e g is l a t i v e , n o t a 
c o n s t i tu t io n a l  r i g h t .  I t  was dependent and c o n tro l la b le .  No such 
im portant m a tte r , he s a id ,  should be l e f t  to  th e  doubt o f c o n s tru c tio n . 
The ju r is d ic t io n  and power o f  th e  s ta te s  and genera l government should 
be so formed as to  ren d er the  business o f l e g i s la t io n  as sim ple and as 
p la in  as p o s s ib le . I t  could  n o t always be expected th a t  members o f 
th e  fe d e ra l  l e g is la tu r e  would be d isposed  to  make n ice  d is t in c t io n s  
w ith  re sp e c t to  th a t  ju r isd ic tio n ,^ ® ^
John W illiam s, in  ca rry in g  the a tta c k  to  h is  opponents on th e  
convention f lo o r ,  argued th a t  even supposing th e  s ta te s  to  have con­
c u rre n t ju r is d ic t io n  w ith  Congress f o r  tax in g  purposes, y e t  the laws 
o f the  l a t t e r  a re  considered  as th e  supreme law o f the  lan d . Conse­
quen tly , when i t s  tax es  a re  d is ru p te d  by th e  taxes o f the  s ta te s ,  those  
o f th e  Congress must and w i l l  c laim  p r io r i t y  fo r  c o lle c t io n . Indeed, 
he charged, the Congress may c o n s t i tu t io n a l ly  ab o lish  th e  s ta te  ta x e s , 
and monopolize a l l  revenue so u rc e s . The end r e s u l t  o f  such a c tio n  i f
^Q^ Ib id o, pp , 333-1, 37L. ^®^I b id „  p , 338, ^®^I b id , ,  p ,337 .
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i t  should  come to  th a t j  would be th e  o vertu rn ing  o f the s ta te  govern­
ments o For how could  th e  s t a t e  governments e x is t  when th e i r  revenue 
sources were a t  th e  w i l l  and p lea su re  o f Congress
Smith advanced ano ther argument o f  danger to  the  s t a t e  govern­
ments h y  the  f e d e ra l  tax in g  pow ers. Hamilton contended th a t  the 
s e c u r i ty  o f  the  s t a t e  governments would be d e riv ed  from the r e la t iv e ly  
g re a t number o f s t a te  represen tatives.^® ®  T h is , Smith s a id , would 
only a c t ,  however, to  f u r th e r  encourage the  abolishm ent o f  th e  s t a te s .  
For th e  peop le , see ing  th e i r  g re a t  expense o f t h e i r  support and com­
paring  th a t  w ith th e i r  sm all im portance, would hence be discouraged 
w ith  t h e i r  upkeep and so would be l ik e ly  to  drop them.^®^
A few o th e r  c r i t ic is m s  o f  th e  powers o f  the  proposed fe d e ra l  
government were o ffe re d  p rev ious to  th e  convention . Both Smith and 
Cato asked how was i t  p o ss ib le  to  expect the  fe d e ra l government to  lower 
taxes as i t s  proponents promised? Smith contended th a t  the  simple b asis  
fo r  th e  expensive deb t f e l t  in  th e  coun try  was th e  r e s u l t  o f a wrong
balance o f tra d e , and th a t  as long as th a t  balance o f  tra d e  remained,
110cash would continue to  leave  th e  country  and debts would mount.
CatOo tak in g  a more a la rm is t  approach, urged th a t  the new government^ 
must be more expensive because i t  m ust be b ig g e r. He went on to  say 
th a t  as most members o f th e  Senate and probably  o f the House would be 
lan d h o ld ers , they  would n o t tend  to  lev y  tax es on lan d . R ather, t h e i r  
aim would be d u tie s  and imposts on commerce. B ut, as p r ic e s  on fo re ig n
^® 7lb id .. p . 339. ^®®I b id .« pp . 251-252. ^® ^Ibid ., p . 378.
^^®Paul L e ic e s te r  Ford. Pamphlets on th e  C o n s titu tio n  o f  the  
U nited S ta te s  (Brooklyn, 1891), p . 107.
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made goods went np, th e  volume consumed would go down u n t i l  th a t  source 
o f  revenue d ried  up . The n ex t source o f revenue would be much more 
odious—p o l l  taxes and th e  l ik e ,^ ^ ^
The A n ti-F ed era l i s  t s  o f  New York made a v a l i a n t  t r y  in  t h e i r  
e f f o r t  to  secure  recommendatory amendments to  th e  C o n s titu tio n , Had 
■üiey been w ill in g  to  take  advantage of t h e i r  su p e rio r numbers and p ress
v ic to ry .  Mere v ic to ry  by i t s e l f  was n o t t h e i r  c h ie f  d e s ire ,  however; 
they  sought to  convince a t  l e a s t  a  few F e d e ra l is ts  th a t  t h e i r  f e a r  o f  
th e  C o n s titu tio n  and i t s  proposed system of government was based on a  
genuine b e l ie f  th a t  th e  p o l i t i c a l  freedom and in d iv id u a l l i b e r t i e s  o f 
the  people were in  danger. And, had Melancton Smith n o t ac ted  on th e  
s tre n g th  o f  h i s  co n v ic tio n s  and decided to  rev e rse  h is  p o s itio n  on 
recommendatory amendments, perhaps the  New York convention would no t 
have r a t i f i e d  th e  C o n s ti tu tio n , In  any case , th e  scene o f th is  th e s is ' 
i n te r e s t  w i l l  s h i f t  to  th e  sou thern  s ta te s  in  th e  fo llow ing  c h ap te r .
^^^Ford, E ssays, pp , 222-223.
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
CHAPTER 17 
THE SOUTHERN STATES 
The r a t i f i c a t i o n  o f th e  C o n s titu tio n  by New York on Ju ly  26,
1788; p laced  th e  A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  o f th e  U nited S ta te s  in  a despera te  
s i tu a t io n .  New York was th e  te n th  s t a te  to  r a t i f y  the new a r t i c l e  o f 
government, and was th e  second o f  th e  ‘big th r e e ' s ta te s  o f the  Union 
to  g ive i t s  app rova l. Though th e  Consti tu t io n  had f o r  a l l  in te n ts  and 
purposes en te red  in to  o p e ra tio n  w ith  i t s  acceptance by New Hampshire 
on June 21, 1788. w ith o u t th e  approval o f  New York and V irg in ia , th e  
new government would be hamstrung a t  th e  s t a r t .  New Y ork's approval 
o f the  C o n s titu tio n , th en , threw  A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts ' hopes o f  securing  
amendments to  th e  C o n s titu tio n  upon th e  co n d itio n a l r a t i f i c a t i o n  by 
the  conventions o f  V irg in ia  and North C aro lin a .
Of th e  sou thern  s t a t e s ,  on ly  V irg in ia  and North C arolina r e -  
mained undecided on the  q u estio n  o f r a t i f i c a t i o n  by th e  summer o f I 788. 
Georgia had given i t s  unanimous approval to  the  C o n stitu tio n  e a r ly  in  
the w in te r o f I 787. The South C aro lina  r a t i fy in g  convention voted  11*0 
to  73 in  fav o r o f th e  C o n s titu tio n  in  January o f I 788, th e  F e d e ra lis ts  
a c tin g  (juite as they  wanted during  th e  d eb a tes | though the  A nti-Feder­
a l i s t  le a d e r o f  th e  s t a t e ,  Rawlins Lowndes, made a commendable e f f o r t ,  
the  outcome was never in  doubt. Maryland lik ew ise  gave i t s  approval 
to  th e  C o n s titu tio n  in  l a t e  A p ril, 1788.^ The hopes o f  the  A n ti-
^The r a t i f i c a t i o n  vo te  in  th e  Maryland convention came on A p ril 
26,  1788. The vo te  was 63 f o r  and 11 a g a in s t r a t i f i c a t i o n .
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F e d e ra l is ts 5 th en , and th e  a s p ira t io n s  o f  those  o f th e  South p a r t ic u ­
l a r l y ,  re s te d  upon th e  outcome o f  th e  conventions o f  V irg in ia  and North 
Carolinao
V irg in ia  scheduled i t s  convention during th e  f i r s t  week o f  June,
2
1788, and those  who planned to  a tte n d  th e  debates as sp e c ta to rs  came 
assu red  o f  a l iv e ly  show o f  fo re n s ic  t a l e n t .  North C aro lina , meanwhile, 
was choosing th e  d e le g a te s  f o r  i t s  convention, which opened in  Ju ly ,
1788o^ The c o n te s t  in  V irg in ia  prom ised to be c lo se . But the  'A n tis° 
o f North C aro lina  had th e  convention in  t h e i r  pocket, so com pletely d id  
W illie  Jones, th e  A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  le a d e r  o f the  s t a t e ,  c o n tro l th e  p o l­
i t i c s  o f  North C aro lin a . Jo n e s ' only  need in  th e  convention was to  
m ain tain  th e  u n i ty  o f h is  a s s o c ia te s  (ap p a ren tly  q u ite  e a s i ly  done), 
allow  h is  F e d e ra l is t  opponents to  t a lk  them selves h o a rse , and, when the  
time came f o r  a v o te , secure  an overwhelming vo te  o f no r a t i f i c a t i o n  
w ithout p r io r  amendments. His s tr a te g y  worked p e r f e c t ly ,  and on August 
1, Jones secured a v o te  o f  8ii ayes to  l8 ii nays on the questio n .
But a l l  th i s  i s  g e tt in g  ahead o f  the  s to ry .  And what i s  worse, 
i t  omits a  look a t  one o f  th e  most in te r e s t in g  o f  a l l  th e  s ta te s  o f the 
Union, South C aro lina , Though A nti-F edera lism  th e re  was never as strong  
as in  i t s  two more n o rth e rn  n e ighbo rs , and though th e  A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  
o b jec tio n s  were n o t as soundly based on reason  and lo g ic  as elsew here, 
y e t a few, a t  l e a s t ,  o f  th e  A n ti°F e d e ra lis t  o b jec tio n s  a re  o f cQ osidarr 
a b le in t e r e s t ,  p a r t i c u la r ly  because in  many ways they  c lo se ly  resemW ^  
l a t e r  South C aro lina  s t a te s - r ig h ts  argum ents,
^The V irg in ia  r a t i f y in g  convention began on June 2, 1788,
% he North C arolina r a t i f y in g  convention he ld  i t s  f i r s t  se ss io n  
on J u ly  21, 1788,
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The acknowledged A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  le a d e r  in  South narn ljna  vas 
Rawlins Lowndes o A p ro fe s s io n a l  p o l i t i c i a n ,  Lowndes had served during 
the  l a t e  c o lo n ia l and e a r ly  sta teh o o d  p e rio d s  in  l e g i s la t iv e  and ju d i­
c ia l  c a p a c itie s  » His s tro n g  s t a te s - r ig h t s  p o s it io n  appeared q u ite  
c le a r ly  in  h is  debates on th e  is su e s  o f  th e  s lav e  tra d e  and paper 
money, and h is  arguments on th ese  is su e s  mark him as unique among a l l  
th e  well-known sou thern  A n ti -F e d e ra lis ts , His speeches end o rs in g thA 
slav e  tra d e  as a  b e n e f ic ia l  good to  a l l  involved a re  o f p a r t ic u la r  
i n t e r e s t ,  f o r  he alone o f th e  sou thern  *A n tis ' took th is  p o s i t io n . He 
stands in  sharp c o n tra s t  to  th e  A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  o f V irg in ia  in  p a r t i c ­
u la r ,  though a s im ila r  p o s i t io n  would subsequently  a r is e  as the  c h ie f  
defense o f  s la v e ry  among p re -C iv i l  War South C arolina p o l i t i c a l  f ig u re s . 
Lowndes f e l t  e s p e c ia l ly  concerned f o r  th e  p re se rv a tio n  o f South Caro- 
1 in a  ' 8_ in te r e s ts  in  the  Ifaion» I t  might be expected th a t  he would 
consequently  develop h is  o b jec tio n s  to  th e  proposed House o f  Represen­
t a t iv e s  to  g re a t le n g th . S u rp ris in g ly , though, l i t t l e  o pposition  to  
th e  House appe33red from Lowndes and h is  co lleag u es .
E arly  in  the  debates in  the  s t a t e  l e g i s la tu r e ,^  Lowndes rose  to
s p e a k s
He be lieved  th e  gentlem en th a t  went from th is  s t a te ,  to  rep re sen t 
us in  the  Convention, possessed  as much in te g r i ty ,  and stood as 
h igh in  p o in t  o f c h a ra c te r , as any gentlemen th a t  could have been 
se le c te d ; and he a ls o  be lieved  th a t  they  had done every th ing  in  
t h e i r  power to  p rocure  f o r  us a p ro p o rtio n a te  share in  th is  new
^Debates on th e  C o n s titu tio n  in  South C arolina began f i r s t ,  cu r­
io u s ly , in  th e  South C aro lina  L e g is la tu re , in  m id-January, 1706, Fol­
lowing th e  read ing  o f th e  C o n s titu tio n  on th e  f lo o r  o f the  L e g is la tu re , 
th a t  body reso lved  i t s e l f  in to  a committee o f  the whole and debated the  
C o n s titu tio n  f o r  some days. The South C aro lina  r a t i f y in g  convention 
i t s e l f  opened on May 12, 1788, w ith  th e  f i n a l  vo te  o f  1L9 to  73 in  
fa v o r  o f  r a t i f i c a t i o n  coming on May 23,
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government; b a t th e  very  l i t t l e  they  had gained proved what we 
may expect in  th e  f a tu r e —th a t  the in t e r e s t  o f th e  N orthern 
Sjtatfls ■ would ba...30^n radQminant^aa^^tQ-_dlves t  us o f any p re ten - 
s io n s  to  th e  t i t l e  o f  a  re p u b lic
What, th e n , w i l l  s k i l l  and c h a ra c te r  a v a i l  in  a  body where most o f the  
men were o f  opposing and d i f f e r e n t  in t e r e s t s ,  and where the  re p re se n ta ­
t iv e s  from th e  s t a te  were so few in  number? Only s ix  o f  th e  e a s te rn  
s ta te s  were req u ired  f o r  a  m a jo r ity  in  the House, and th ese  s ix  could 
v i r tu a l ly  enac t any l e g i s l a t i o n  th ey  wished, which, he added, in  a l l  
p ro b a b il i ty  would be opposed to  th e  in te r e s t s  o f South C aro lina. Where 
was any s e c u r i ty  f o r  th e  in te r e s t s  o f  South C arolina in  the  proposed 
system?^
To what b e n e f i t ,  he continued l a t e r ,  would re p re se n ta tiv e s  o f 
c h a ra c te r  be when th e  P re s id e n t could in te r f e r e  o r in flu en ce  the  e le c -
7
tio n s  o f those men? He posed ano ther questio n ; How were the e le c tio n s  
of the  re p re se n ta tiv e s  to  be c a r r ie d  o u t, s in ce  th e  C o n stitu tio n  was
so vague on th i s  m atte r?  Would i t  n o t be p o ss ib le  f o r  some d i s t r i c t s
8o f th e  s t a te  to  have no re p re se n ta tio n  in  Congress?
Nor was Lowndes s a t i s f i e d  w ith  th e  proposed S enate . He d id  no t 
consider th e  n e c e s s i ty  o f only  tw o -th ird s  o f  th e  members f o r  the passage 
o f l e g i s la t io n  as s a t i s f a c to r y  a check as th e  approval o f nine s ta te s  
o f any le g i s la t io n  in  th e  Confederagion Congress. A r t ic le  I ,  s e c tio n  7
9
o f the  C o n s titu tio n  provided  th a t  only a quorum o f  the  Senate need be
^Jonathan E l l i o t ,  The Debates in  the Several S ta te  Conventions on 
the  R a ti f ic a t io n  o f th e  F edera l C o n s titu tio n  v o l s . ,  187^-1891; P h ila -
^ Ib id . 7I b id . .  IV, 28?. ^I b id . .  IV, 286,
9james Madison, The Debates in  th e  F edera l Convention o f  I 878 
Which Framed the  C o n stitu tio n  o f th e  U nited S ta te s  o f  America. G a illa rd  
Hunt and James Brown S c o tt ( e d s .)  (New York, 1920), p , 629.
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p re se n t fo r  th e  enactm ent o f  any le g i s l a t iv e  b u s in ess . Of th a t  quorum, 
he contended, only ten  se n a to rs  c o n s titu te d  a m a jo rity  fo r  the  passage 
o f  any l e g i s l a t iv e  b u s in e ss . What p ro p r ie ty  was t h i s ,  he asked, to  
v e s t  so few men w ith  such ex ten siv e  powers
But Lowndes reserv ed  h is  s tro n g e s t o b jec tio n s  fo r  the powers o f 
the c e n t r a l  government. Opposed to  independence, by h is  own adm ission, 
u n t i l  th e  day o f  reckoning, he lik ew ise  remained opposed to  th e  G onsti- 
tutioRc Only when th a t  new a r t i c l e  o f government was approved o f  by 
h is  c o n s titu e n ts  would he work in  support o f i t .  U n til then , as he 
rep ea ted ly  s tr e s s e d , he would remain in  o p p o sitio n .
^ t i c l e  71 , c lau se  2, o f  th e  C o n stitu tio n ^^  provided th a t  the 
C o n s titu tio n , th e  laws made in  pursuance o f i t ,  and a l l  t r e a t i e s  made 
under th e  a u th o r i ty  o f the  United S ta te s  were considered  as the  supreme 
law o f th e  lan d , and to  which a l l  judges were bound by law to  support. 
The e x te n t o f th e  powers gran ted  to  the  c e n tra l  government by th a t  
c lause  a lo n e , he charged, were thus g re a te r  than the  powers g ran ted  to  
any o f h i s to r y 's  most a r b i t r a r y  k in g s .
12
Lowndes was e s p e c ia lly  angered a t  A r t ic le  V o f the  C o n stitu tio n ,
p ro h ib it ing of  the  im porta tion  o f Negro s lav es a f t e r  l808s
[Wjhat cause was th e re  f o r  jea lo u sy  o f our im porting negroes?
Why confine us to  twenty y e a rs , o r  r a th e r  why l im i t  us a t  a l l ?
For h is  p a r t ,  thought % is  t % ^  c o % l d _ j u s t i f i e d  on the 
p r in c ip le s  o f  r e l ig io n ,  h u m ^ i ^ ,  ^ d  ju s t ic e  ; f o r  c e r ta in ly  
to  t r a n s la te  a  human being from a bad country  to  a  b e t te r ,  was 
f u l f i l l i n g  every  p a r t  o f those  p r in c ip le s .  But they  d p .n !t.lik e  
our s lav es because th ey  have none them selves and th e re fo re  want
^ ^ E ll io t ,  D ebates. 17, 310. 
^^Madison, o^. c i t . . p . 637.
^ ^ Ib id . . p . 636.
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to  exclude us from th i s  g re a t  advantage » Why should th e  Southern 
S ta te s  a llow  o f  t h i s ,  w ithou t th e  consent o f n ine  s ta te s ?  . . . 
we had a law p ro h ib it in g  th e  im porta tion  o f negroes fo r  th re e  
y e a rs , a  law he g re a t ly  approved o f; but th e re  was no reason 
o ffe re d  why th e  Southern S ta te s  m ight n o t f in d  i t  necessary  to  
a l t e r  t h e i r  conduct, and open th e i r  p o r ts .  W ithout negroes, th is  
s t a te  would degenera te  i n to  one o f th e  most contem ptible in  the  
Union; and he c i te d  an expression  ’tÊ k ç^ ïe ïtT P 'ro m ^en e^  'PincKney 
on a form er d eb a te , th a t  w h ils t  th e re  remained one acre  o f  swamp­
lan d  in  South C aro lina , he should r a i s e  h is  vo ice  in  r e s t r i c t in g  
th e  im porta tion  o f  n eg ro es. Even in  g ran ting  th e  im portation  fo r  
twenty y e a rs , care  had been taken  to  make us pay f o r  th is  in d u l­
gence, each negro being l i a b l e ,  on im p o rta tio n , to  pay a duty no t 
exceeding te n  d o l la r s ;  and in  a d d itio n  to  t h i s ,  they were l ia b le  
to  a c a p i ta t io n  ta x .
Negroes were our w ealth , our only n a tu ra l  resou rce ; y e t behold 
how our k ind  f r ie n d s  in  th e  n o rth  were determ ined soon to  t i e  up 
our hands, and d ra in  us o f what we have .^3
Where, he asked th e  members o f  th e  l e g i s la tu r e ,  was th e  o ften-m arvelled
a t  N orth-South compromise in  th e  C o n stitu tio n ?  The South agreed
Neg o  s la v e  tra d e  mig h t, continue f o r  twenty.jc&axsu- and then  be abo lished ;
^8_Nor t h ,  in  tu rn , agreed th a t  a ^ l v @_j]er_.ca]it_imDO&t_would be p.aid„Qii_
imported poofk. Where was the  compromise in  th i s  s in c e :
The E aste rn  S ta te s  drew t h e i r  means o f su b s is ten c e , in  a g rea t 
m easure, from t h e i r  sh ipp ing ; and, on th a t  head, they  had been 
p a r t ic u la r ly  c a re fu l no t to  a llow  any burdens; they  were no t to  
pay tonnage o r  d u t ie s ;  no, n o t even th e  form o f c le a r in g  o u t: 
a l l  p o r ts  were f r e e  and open to  themi Why th en , c a l l  th is  a 
re c ip ro c a l b a rg a in , which took a l l  from one p a r ty , to  bestow i t  
on th e  o ther?^^
In  rep ly  to  an in te r je c t io n  by P ie rc e  B u tle r  th a t  the n o rth e rn  s ta te s  
agreed to  a f iv e  per cen t impo&t, Lowndes continued^—'llhis.^_ m u st^  
f a l l  on thA r-nnmimflr. They a re  to  be the  c a r r ie r s ;  and, we being the  
consumers, th e re fo re  a l l  expenses would f a l l  on u s ."^ ^
This was only  one d isadvan tage  p laced  upon the southern s ta te s  
by th e  commerce powers g ran ted  to  Congress by the  C o n stitu tio n , Lowndes
l^ E l l i o t ,  D ebates. IV. 272-273» 
^^ Ib id . . p . 273. ^ ^ Ib id .
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s tre ssed »  By th e  C o n s titu tio n , Congress "was to  re g u la te  commerce ad 
in fin itu m ; and thus c a l le d  upon us to  pledge ou rse lves and p o s te r i ty  
fo re v e r , in  support o f  t h e i r  m e a s u r e s . F u r t h e r m o r e ,  Lowndes con­
tin u ed  in  a  l a t e r  speech:
[The C o n s titu tio n ]  threw  in to  t h e i r  [the e a s te rn  s ta te s ]  hands 
th e  ca rry in g  t r a d e ,  and pu t i t  in  t h e i r  power to  la y  us under 
payment o f  w hatever f re ig h ta g e  they  thought proper to  impose.
I t  was t h e i r  in t e r e s t  to  do so , and no person could doubt but 
they  would promote i t  by every means in  t h e i r  power. [Lowndes] 
wished our d e leg a te s  had been s u f f ic ie n t ly  a t te n t iv e  to  th is  
p o in t in  th e  Convention—had been more a t te n t iv e  to  t h i s  o b je c t, 
and taken  ca re  to  have i t  expressed  in  th i s  C o n s titu tio n , th a t  
a l l  our p o r ts  were open to  a l l  n a tio n s ; in s te a d  o f p u ttin g  us 
in  th e  power o f  a s e t  o f men who may f r i t t e r  away the value o f 
our produce to  a  l i t t l e  o r n o th ing , by compelling payment o f 
e x o rb ita n t f re ig h ta g e .^ ?
He s tre s s e d  a lso  th a t  th e jjea s te rn  s ta te s  were making l i t t l e  a ttem pt to
meet the  needs o f  the  so u thern  s ta te s  f o r  sh ip s : " I t  was, indeed, a
genera l way o f ta lk in g , th a t  the  E aste rn  S ta te s  had a g re a t number o f
seamen, a v a s t  number o f sh ip s ; bu t where were they? Why did they  no t
18come here  now, when sh ip s  a re  g re a t ly  wanted?"
Lowndes a lso  s tro n g ly  o b jec ted  to  the ta x a tio n  powers o f the
fe d e ra l  government » The s t a t e s ,  he contended, had given up the  power
o f s e l f - ta x a t io n ,  which even th e  B r i t i s h  government had no t taken  from
the c o l o n i e s A n d ,  to  f u r th e r  add to  th e  o b jec tio n ab le  na tu re  o f  the
C o n s titu tio n  in  t h i s  reg a rd , i t  was l ik e ly  th a t  taxes would in crease
20
under th e  demand o f  the  "pompous government" e s ta b lish e d  by th e  Con­
s t i t u t i o n .  A d d itio n a lly , Lowndes charged, th e  C o n stitu tio n  proposed to  
take  from the s t a te s  id ie lr r ig h t  to  pay t h e i r  own d e le g a te s . The same
l ^ I b id . . pp. 273-27li. ^'^I b id . ,  pp . 288-289.
^Q lbid. .  p . 289. ^^ Ib id . ^^ Ib id . .  p . 310.
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is s u e , he p o in ted  o u t to  th e  o th e r  l e g i s l a to r s ,  had been ra ise d  in  
c o lo n ia l  M assachusetts when i t  was proposed th a t  th e  judges be pa id  
ou t o f impost revenues r a th e r  than  by th e  l e g i s l a t u r e 's  a p p ro p ria tio n s . 
Everyone, he s a id ,  remembered th e  o u tc ry  throughout the  co lon ies when 
th a t  p roposal was advanced. Thus, the  C o n s titu tio n , l ik e  the  a c t  o f
the  B r i t i s h  P a rliam en t, s tru c k  d i r e c t ly  a t  th e  independence o f the
21s t a te s .
Moreover, South C aro lina  had met i t s  own lo c a l  expenses from
s ta te  imposed impost d u t ie s .  But "now th a t  th is  was given away, and
thrown in to  a genera l fund , fo r  th e  use  o f a l l  s t a te s  in d isc rim in a te ly ,
we should be ob liged  to  augment our taxes to  c a rry  on our lo c a l govern-
PPment, no tw ithstand ing  we were to  pay a p o l l  ta x  fo r  our negroes."
Lowndes had s tro n g  o b jec tio n s  a lso  .to  th e  re s tr ic tio n .p la p .e d
upon s ta te - is s u e d  paper monies by the  C o n stitu tio n s
Paper money, to o , was an o th e r a r t i c l e  o f  r e s t r a i n t ,  and a popu­
l a r  p o in t w ith  many; bu t what e v ils  had we ever experienced by 
issu in g  a l i t t l e  paper money to  r e l ie v e  ou rse lves from any 
exigency th a t  p ressed  us?  We had now a c ir c u la t in g  medium 
which everybody took . We used fo rm erly  to  is su e  paper b i l l s  
every y e a r, and r e c a l l  them every f iv e  w ith g re a t convenience 
and advantage. Had n o t paper money c a rr ie d  us trium phantly  
th ro u g h j^ e . w ar,' e x tr ic a te d  us from d i f f i c u l t i e s  g en e ra lly  
supposed to  be in su m o u n tab le , and f u l ly  e s ta b lish e d  us in  our 
independence? and now every th ing  i s  so changed th a t  an e n ti r e  
s to p  must be p u t to  any more paper em ission, however g re a t our 
d is t r e s s  may be.^^
Lowndes a lso  co n te s ted  th e  n a w  proposed by A rtic la_J[p s e c t io n .8 
o f  th e  C o n s titu tio n .^ ^  Because the  navy would be s ta f fe d , b u i l t ,  sup­
p l ie d ,  and run by men o f n o rth e rn  b i r th  and h e r i ta g e , i t  w o u ld ^
^^Ib id .o p . 289. ^^ Ib id . ^% b id . ,  pp . 289-290.
^% ad ison , o£. c i t . .  p . 231.
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or̂  more opportamij g i f o r  Nor th , to. _%s§vm. a jpositto.il .of^^snporioxity
J:L?f&s..oW,o%Sji he charged, why n o rthern  
F e d e ra l is ts so..yeiy o f te n  83q)p3ioâiâJàl9Jlsgâ„o;f^,af^ navy, s in ce  
i t  would be in  e f f e c t  t h e i r  navy» The e f f e c t  th e  estab lishm ent o f th a t  
navy would have upon th e  f i s c a l  co n d itio n  o f  toe  country  should be 
obvious to  a l l ,  he added.
Lowndes and those  of h is  co lleagues in  th e  le g is la tu r e  and con­
v en tio n  who spoke p resen ted  o th e r  o b je c tio n s  to  the  C o n s titu tio n .
These o th e r  o b jec tio n s  were rep ea ted ly  s tre s se d  elsew here—fe a r  o f the  
P re s id e n t’s ex ten siv e  powers, to e_ iack  o f s u f f ic ie n t  checks upon the  
e x erc ise  o f th o se  powers, and the  vagueness o f th e  method o f e le c tio n  
o f th e  P re s id e n t, among o th e r s .  The re p e t it iv e n e s s  o f  these  o b jec tio n s 
does no t make i t  worth our w hile  to  examine them h e re , and we s h a l l  no t 
spend fu r th e r  tim e exp lo ring  them.
The re a l  s ig n if ic a n c e , th en , o f  Lowndes’ p o s it io n  l i e s  in  h is  
e a r ly  s t a te s - r ig h ts  a t t i tu d e s  on government. His p o l i t i c a l  p o s it io n
throughout the  l a t e  c o lo n ia l and e a r ly  n a tio n a l  periods was cu rio u s .
For, as we have p rev io u s ly  s a id ,  he opposed the  movement towards inde­
pendence u n t i l  th e  break between th e  co lon ies and the  Mother Country 
was i r r e p a ra b le ,  a f t e r  which h is  support o f toe  United S ta te s  was s o l id  
and a c t iv e . His su p p o rt o f the  C onfederation  was lik ew ise  unequivocal 
and staunch u n t i l ,  ag a in , th e  d ie  was c a s t  and the  C o n stitu tio n  accepted 
by h is  s t a t e .  In  s h o r t ,  Lowndes* p o l i t i c a l  philosophy c o n tra s ts  c u r i ­
ously  w ith  th a t  o f George C lin ton , who from the s t a r t  was vocal in  sup­
p o r t  o f  independence, and th e  C onfederation , bu t vriio made th e  t r a n s i t io n
S^ E llio t, Debates. 17, 309-310,
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to  th e  C Jonstitution smoothly^ easily j, andj in  terras o f p o l i t i c a l  l i f e ,  
advantageously . C lin ton  was th e  p ro fe s s io n a l p o l i t i c i a n  who, as b e f i ts  
the  pragm atic p o l i t i c i a n ,  nsed  every tu rn  o f events o f h is  co u n try 's  
p o l i t i c a l  development to  enhance h is  own p o l i t i c a l  p o s it io n  w ith in  h is
26
a re a . In  t h i s  re s p e c t, C lin ton  resem bled more c lo se ly  c e r ta in  o th er
27
n o rth e rn  p o l i t i c i a n s ,  men l ik e  Robert Y ates, who made the t r a n s i t io n
of every change o f  government e a s i ly  and su c c e ss fu lly . But Lowndes
l ik e  P a tr ic k  Henry, o f V irg in ia , more c lo se ly  resem bled l a t e r  sou thern  
p o l i t ic ia n s  o f th e  , s t a j ) f _ ^ , M ^ C ^  For
Lowndes, l ik e  Henry, stood  in  o p p o sitio n  to  the  C o n stitu tio n  n o t be- ——- 'IT— r r r r  i M i H L L J iM i i r  I i  ........ ... ii-ii-r-r~ iT T -rrrfi....
cause o f  th e  th r e a t  i t  p re sen ted  to  h is  own p o l i t i c a l  ca ree r w ith in  h is  
s t a te ,  bu t r a th e r  because of the  th r e a t  i t  p resen ted  to h is  s t a t e “s
 ̂ wr f - r N - r M-rrmmw.f iNg n raM m     Mm 1 H aw
p o s i t io n  w ith in  the  framework of th e  c e n tra l  government. Lowndes* 
p o s i t io n  was more genuinely  s t a t e s - r i g h t s ,  as th a t  term  has come to  be
III « i n > i i u i i  i iiw  M i n i M i i n i w i W ^ i  I I  I I  iiM W  I I I I I  n  f   f r A « T n r m r - i i - m ' m f —
understood in  American p o l i t i c a l  th in k in g , than  th a t  o f C lin ton, who
M l i i i r m n r - m i i .  m i - . , . . ' .
assumed more o f the  p o s i t io n  o f  the  se lf-a g g ran d iz in g  p o l i t i c ia n .
The r a t i f y in g  convention f o r  th e  S ta te  o f V irg in ia  opened i t s  
f i r s t  business se s s io n  on th e  morning o f June 2.. 1788. Thus, w ith in  a 
p e rio d  o f two weeks, June 2 to  June 16, th e  two most in f lu e n t ia l  s ta te s  
in  th e  Union, V irg in ia  and New York, convened th e i r  re sp ec tiv e  r a t i fy in g
^G eorge  C lin ton  continued  as Governor o f New York u n t i l  179i+, 
and, a f t e r  spending f iv e  years in  p r iv a te  l i f e ,  was re e le c te d  Governor 
in  1800. In l80ii and aga in  in  I 8O8, he was e le c te d  V ice-P residen t of 
the  U nited S ta te s .  See E rn es t W illiam  Spaulding, His Excellency George 
C lin to n . C r i t i c  o f th e  C o n s titu tio n  (New York, 1938).
^^Robert Yates was appoin ted  to  the  p o s it io n  o f Chief J u s tic e  
o f the  New York Supreme Court in  1789= Robert A llen  R utland, The Or­
d ea l o f  th e  C o n s titu tio n s The A n ti f e d e ra l is ts  and th e  R a ti f ic a tio n  
S trugg le  o f 1787-1788 (Norman.
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conventions» R e jec tio n  o f the  C o n stitu tio n  by e i th e r  o f the two s ta te s  
would p lace  iJie new a r t i c l e  o f  government, even i f  i t  should be r a t i ­
f ie d  by th e  necessary  n ine s ta te s  needed f o r  i t s  o p e ra tio n  w ith in  the 
co un try , v i r tu a l l y  w ithou t a le g  to  s tan d  on. Both F e d e ra lis ts  and 
A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  a l ik e  in  th e  two s ta te s  re a liz e d  the  s ig n if ic an c e  o f 
t h e i r  p a r t i c u la r  s t a t e 's  d e c is io n , and none spared any e f f o r t  to  suc­
ceed, The F e d e ra l is ts  e s p e c ia l ly  in  th e  two s ta te s  re a liz e d  th e  need 
f o r  a l l - o u t  in d iv id u a l e f f o r t ,  fo r  they  were in  a m ino rity  in  both 
s t a t e s .
But though th e  V irg in ia  A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  re a liz e d  the  l ik e lih o o d  
o f t h e i r  su p e rio r  number in  th e  convention, they  were by no means com­
p la c e n t. Indeed, V irg in ia  A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  e s s a y is ts  were among the  
e a r l i e r ,  most a c t iv e ,  and most so p h is tic a te d  in  t h e i r  reason ing , o f any 
in  the  coun try , George Mason, fo r  example, s e n t h is  o b jec tio n s to  the  
C o n s titu tio n  to  George Washington in  the form o f  a te r s e  essay on Octo­
ber 7, 1787 , L ikew ise, V i ^ g j ^ i a o f  the  c a l ib e r  o f James 
Madison and EA m A . PeM l.eW , f a n d  extrem ely capable opposi­
t io n  during th e  debates from such 'A n tis ' a s Jl onj ama,  
V irg in ia , th en , had perhaps the f i n e s t  A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  personages o f 
any s ta te  in  th e  Union, and the  essays o f th e se , and the debates in  the
j  I j M i i u j u »  in jimi w i I III m  I n  1
r a t i fy in g  convention a re  extrem ely in te r e s t in g .
I t  i s  n o t in ac cu ra te  to  say  th a t  V irg in ia  probably had more 
t r u ly  d is in te re s te d  A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  as c i t iz e n s  than  d id  any o th e r  
s ta te  in  the  Union, Men such as George Mason and Richard Henry Lee, 
as rep u b lican s in  the  e ig h tee n th  cen tu ry  sense , were n a tu ra lly  concerned 
w ith  th e  ex ten t to  which the  common people would be rep resen ted  in  the 
fe d e ra l  government, and the degree to  which they  would e x is t  as the
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a u th o r i ty  behind the  government. They were, consequently , g re a tly  con­
cerned w ith  the s tre n g th  o f  th e  proposed House o f R ep resen ta tiv es , as 
th e  House o f Congress re p re se n tin g  the  peop le . The s tro n g e s t arguments 
p resen ted  a g a in s t the  House came in  th e  L e tte r s  o f  a F edera l Farmer by 
Richard Henry Lee.
The g re a t o b je c t o f a f r e e  people in  forming th e i r  government,
Lee contended, was to  c re a te  confidence in  and e s ta b l is h  re sp e c t fo r  
the  laws o f th a t  government. That confidence and re sp ec t would r e s u l t  
in  popu lar suppo rt o f  th e  government w ithout the need o f m il i ta iy  
coercion . C oercion, i f  a p p lied  in te r n a l ly  o ften  enough, would only  
d estro y  the  confidence o f th e  people in  t h e i r  government, destroy  the  
s p i r i t  o f the  peop le , and u l t im a te ly  b ring  d e s tru c tio n  upon th a t  peop le ’s 
f r e e  government.
Only w ith in  the  re p re s e n ta tiv e  branch o f  the  government, Lee 
con tinued , was i t  p o s s ib le  to  c o l le c t  the  confidence o f the  people , and 
in  i t  to  f in d  alm ost e n t i r e ly  the fo rce  o f p e rsu as io n . In  forming the  
branch, then , i t  was necessary  to  in co rp o ra te  se v e ra l d i s t in c t  q u a l i t ie s  
in  i t :
I t  must possess the  a b i l i t y  to  d isc e rn  the s i tu a t io n  o f the  
people and o f p u b lic  a f f a i r s ,  a d isp o s it io n  to  sympathize w ith 
th e  peop le , and a cap a c ity  and in c l in a t io n  to  make laws congen­
i a l  to  t h e i r  c ircum stances and co n d itio n : i t  must a ffo rd  s e c u r ity  
a g a in s t in te re s te d  com binations, co rru p tio n , and in flu en ce ; i t  
must possess th e  confidence and have the  v o lu n ta iy  support of
the  p eop le .29
And what o f  th e  proposed House o f R epresen ta tives?  On i t  Lee was 
q u ite  e x p l ic i t .  That body, as proposed, was to  c o n s is t  o f s ix ty - f iv e
^®Richard Henry Lee, ^  A d d itio n a l Number o f L e tte rs  from the 
Federa l Farmer to  the  Republican (Chicago, 1962), pp. ^6-^7.
2 9 ib id .
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members, o r  about one re p re s e n ta tiv e  fo r  every f i f t y  thousand in h ab i­
ta n t^ .  This nambflr miprht^ and Lee s tr e s s e d  the  p ro v is io n  "m ight", be 
in c reased  to  one re p re se n ta tiv e  f o r  every t h i r t y  thousand in h a b ita n ts . 
I t  was no t conce ivab le , he charged, to  expect th a t  s ix ty - f iv e  rep resen ­
t a t iv e s  could c o l le c t  the  i n te r e s t s ,  f e e l in g s ,  and opinions o f the 
th re e  o r fo u r m illio n s  o f in h a b ita n ts  o f the  coun try . This was espec­
i a l l y  t r u e ,  he s a id , and Mason agreed most h e a r t i l y , i n  m atte rs  o f 
in te rn a l  t a x a t i o n , L e e  continued:
A sm all re p re se n ta tio n  can never be w ell informed as to  the  
circum stances o f  th e  peop le , th e  members o f i t  must be too f a r  
removed from the p eo p le , in  g e n e ra l, to  sympathize w ith them, 
and too few to  communicate w ith  them: a re p re se n ta tio n  must be 
extrem ely im perfec t where the  re p re se n ta tiv e s  a re  no t circum­
stanced  to  make th e  p roper communications to  th e i r  c o n s titu e n ts , 
and where the  c o n s titu e n ts  in  tu rn  cannot, w ith  to le ra b le  con­
ven ience , make known th e i r  w ants, c ircum stances, and op in ions, 
to  t h e i r  r e p re s e n ta tiv e s :  where th e re  i s  bu t one re p re se n ta tiv e  
to  30,000 o r  1:0,000 in h a b ita n ts , i t  appears to  me, th a t  he can 
mix w ith  a  few re sp e c ta b le  c h a ra c te rs  among h is  c o n s titu e n ts , 
even double the  f e d e ra l  re p re se n ta tio n , and then  t h ^ e  must be 
a  very  g re a t d is ta n c e  between th e  re p re se n ta tiv e s  and 
in  g en era l r e p r e s e n te d .^
The p o p u la tio n  o f  th e  U nited S ta te s ,  Lee went to  g rea t leng th s 
to  ex p la in , c o n s is te d  o f  se v e ra l d i s t in c t  c la sse s  o f p eop le . There a re , 
f i r s t ,  the th re e  k inds o f a r is to c ra c y  (a  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  one, which he 
sa id  d id  no t e x is t  in  th e  U nited S ta te s  ; th e  a r i s to c r a t i c  fa c tio n  was 
the  second, c o n s t i tu te d  o f  men o f w ealth  who combined to  make th e i r  
o b je c t t h e i r  own p r iv a te  in te r e s t s  o r aggrandizem ent; and th i r d ly , the 
n a tu ra l  a r is to c ra c y , th e  c la s s  t r a d i t io n a l ly  the  lead ing  c la ss  in
3 ° E ll io t ,  D ebates. I l l ,  262-261:.
31paul L e ic e s te r  Ford, Essays on th e  Con s t i tu t io n  (Brooklyn,
1891) ,  p . 29$.
3^Lee. o£. c i t . ,  pp. 62-63«
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c o lo n ia l governm ent), th e  l a r g e s t  nundaer o f  c i t iz e n s  who formed what
Lee c a l le d  th e  " n a tu ra l democracy," and f i n a l ly ,  those o f  th e  lower 
33c la s s e s .  Each o f  the  se p a ra te  c la s se s  has i t s  own p a r t ic u la r  i n te r ­
e s t s ,  and each i s  n a tu ra l ly  concerned w ith  th e  g re a te s t  degree o f  ad­
vantage i t  can ach ieve . The need, th en , o f  re p re se n ta tiv e  government 
i s  to  "u n ite  and balance t h e i r  in t e r e s t s ,  f e e l in g s ,  view s, in  th e  
le g i s la tu r e ;  we may no t on ly  so u n ite  and balance th ese  as to  p revent 
a change in  the government by th e  g radual e x a l ta t io n  o f one p a r t  to  the  
dep ression  o f o t h e r e . I n  view o f  th e  sm all number o f re p re se n ta tiv e s , 
however, and th e  g re a t  d is ta n c e s  se p a ra tin g  th e  re p re se n ta tiv e s  from 
th e i r  c o n s t i tu e n ts ,  i t  i s  l ik e ly  th a t  a r a th e r  p e c u lia r  re p re se n ta tiv e  
House w i l l  be th e  consequence. Lee exp la ined :
I  w i l l  co n sid er the  d e sc r ip tio n s  o f  men commonly p resen ted  to  th e  
people as cand ida tes f o r  th e  o f f ic e s  o f re p re se n ta tiv e s—we may 
rank -üiera in  th re e  c la s s e s :  1 . The men who form the  n a tu ra l
a r is to c ra c y :  . . .  2 . Popular demagogues: th ese  men a lso  a re
o f te n  p o l i t i c a l l y  e le v a te d , so as to  be seen by the  people through 
the e x te n t o f la rg e  d i s t r i c t s ;  they  o f te n  have some a b i l i ty ,  w ith­
o u t p r in c ip le ,  and r i s e  in to  n o tic e  by th e i r  no ise  and a r t s .  3«
The s u b s ta n t ia l  and re sp e c ta b le  p a r t  o f  th e  democracy, they a re  a 
numerous and v a lu ab le  s e t  o f men, who d isc e rn  and judge w e ll, but 
being g e n e ra lly  s i l e n t  in  p u b lic  assem blies a re  o f te n  overlooked: 
they  a re  th e  most s u b s ta n t ia l  and b e s t  informed men in  th e  se v e ra l 
towns, who o c c a s io n a lly  f i l l  the  m iddle grades o f  o f f ic e , &c. who 
ho ld  n o t a  sp le n d id , bu t a  re sp ec tab le  rank in  p r iv a te  concerns: 
th ese  men a re  e x te n s iv e ly  d if fu se d  through a l l  th e  co u n tie s , 
towns, and sm all d i s t r i c t s  in  th e  un ion ; even th ey , and th e i r  
immediate connec tions, a re  ra is e d  above the  m a jo rity  o f th e  
peop le , and as re p re s e n ta tiv e s  a re  only brought to  a le v e l  w ith  
th e  more numerous p a r t  o f  the  community, the m iddle o rd e rs , and 
a degree n e a re r  th e  mass o f th e  people . . .  The tru e  idea  i s ,  
so to  open and en large  th e  re p re se n ta tio n  as to  l e t  in  a due 
p ro p o rtio n  o f  th e  th i r d  c la s s  w ith  those  o f th e  f i r s t .  Now, my 
op in ion  i s ,  t h a t  th e  re p re se n ta tio n  proposed i s  so sm all as th a t  
o rd in a r i ly  v e ry  few o r  none of them can be e le c te d ; and, th e re ­
fo r e ,  . . .  th e  government must possess th e  sou l o f a r is to c ra c y , 
o r  something w orse, th e  s p i r i t  o f  popu lar le a d e r s .35
^ ^ Ib id ..  pp . 60-61, 3 liib ido , p . 62. ^ % i d . .  pp. 72-73
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Lee was extrem ely s k e p t ic a l  o f th e  n a tu re  o f th e  proposed Houses
On the whole, i t  appears to  me to  be alm ost s e lf -e v id e n t 
p o s i t io n ,  th a t  when we c a l l  on t h i r t y  o r  fo u r ty  thousand 
in h a b ita n ts  to  u n i te  in  g iv ing  th e i r  v o tes  fo r  one man, i t  
w i l l  be u n ifo rm a lly  im p rac ticab le  f o r  them to  u n ite  in  any 
man, except those  few who have become eminent f o r  t h e i r  
c i v i l  o r  m il i ta ry  rank , o r t h e i r  popular le g a l  a b i l i t i e s s
W r ac^ioab l^
become conspicuous enough to  a t t r a c t  th e  n o tic e  o f  so many 
lÿLafttars and have t h e i r  e u f f r ^ ? ^ ) » —
The re p re s e n ta tiv e  House o f Congress must guard a g a in s t combin­
a tio n s  o f  i n t e r e s t s ,  a c c id e n ta l  o r  o th erw ise . The chances fo r  such
com binations a re  in c reased  as th e  number o f re p re se n ta tiv e s  a re  de- 
37creased,-^ ' I t  i s  a  c o n s id e ra tio n  of much m e rit, Lee in s is te d ,  to  
explore the  c o n s tan t l i a b i l i t y  o f  a sm all re p re se n ta tiv e  body to  f a l l  
prey  to  p r iv a te  com binations, to  " fa c tio n s  o f the  few. " The p o s s i­
b i l i t y  o f p r iv a te  ju n ta s , th e  in fluœ ice  which accompanies the p ro spec t 
o f appo in tive  o f f ic e s ,  th e  c o n tro l o f th e  re p re se n ta tiv e s  by the  
R e s id e n t  or th e  Senate were a l l  very  r e a l  and dahgexom ^.m §§,ifeilltles 
in  the  proposed House, and any and a l l  were l ik e ly  to  adverse ly  a f f e c t  
the  confidence o f the  people in  t h e i r  government
I t  had been s a id  many tim es, Lee Pointed o u t, th a t  the  people 
wiJJL... ale& t-goad«#m , .the
degrees mo%:m.ari8tQjcratlG_than j;hh,iC .P O h sti^  Nor was th e  con­
te n tio n  th a t  th e  F edera l Convention in  i t s  wisdom had found the id e a l 
medium number o f re p re se n ta tiv e s  v a l id ,  Lee a s se r te d , fo r  "the  Conven­
t io n  was d iv ided  on t h i s  p o in t o f numbers»" Indeed, i t  was n o t u n t i l  
September 17, 1787, t h a t  the  maximum r a t io  o f one re p re se n ta tiv e  p e r
36 ib id . .  p . 71. 37Ib id » , pp . $9-60. 38ib id . ,  p . 63 .
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every t h i r t y  thousand in h a b ita n ts  was s e t t l e d  upon, and then only a f t e r  
George Wash in g to n , making a  r a r e ly  expressed p r iv a te  opinion befo re  the 
Convention, agreed th a t  the  in creased  number o f  re p re se n ta tiv e s  would
30
e l im inate  one of  th e  s tro n g e s t  o b jec tio n s  to  the  C o n s titu tio n . The 
p r in c ip a l  o b jec tio n s  made a g a in s t  in c re as in g  the  re p re se n ta tio n , Lee 
s a id ,  were the  expense o f  the  in creased  re p re se n ta tio n  and th e  d i f f i ­
c u lty  in  g e tt in g  members to  a tte n d . But the  f i r s t  ought not be consid­
e red , and th e  second, i f  founded a t  a l l ,  was a g a in s t any fe d e ra l form 
iiO
o f government.
Lee s tro n g ly  o b jec ted  a lso  to  th e  lack  o f inducements upon the  
re p re se n ta tiv e s  to  a t te n d  th e  se ss io n s  o f Congress. Not only was an 
inadequate re p re se n ta tiv e  branch proposed, but what e ls e  but a sense of 
duty  would encourage th e  re p re se n ta tiv e s  to  a tten d ?  The lack  o f induce­
ments o f  th i s  n a tu re  had been made in  th e  A r t ic le s ,  and he hoped the 
same m istake would no t be repea ted  in  th e  C o n stitu tio n ,^ ^
F e d e ra l is ts  throughout th e  coun try  rep ea ted ly  s tre s se d  th a t  the 
re p re se n ta tiv e s  must re tu rn  home, th a t  th e  burdens they  might impose 
upon t h e i r  c o n s titu e n ts  would lik ew ise  be imposed upon them selves a t  
home, and th a t  th e re fo re  they  would n a tu ra l ly  be in c lin e d  to  make m ild 
law s, to  support l i b e r ty ,  and ease as w ell as p o ss ib le  the  burdens o f 
the  peo p le . B ut, Lee in s i s te d ,  i f  a  man w il l  gain  more by measures 
oppressive  to  o th e rs  th an  he w i l l  lo se  by them, he w il l  be in c lin ed  
towards t h e i r  adop tion . Though th a t  man in c rease  th e  p u b lic  burdens.
^^Madison, 0£ . c i t . , pp. ^ 8 1 - ^ 8 2 .  
^®Lee, 0£ . c i t . « p . 76.
^ ^ Ib id ..  p . 70.
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he w i l l  in  a l l  p ro b a b i l i ty  a lso  be in c re a s in g  h is  own. Such a man would 
a lso  ten d  to  secu re  an in c reased  sa la ry  and o th e r  b e n e f its  a t  th e  same 
tim e th a t  he worked a g a in s t th e  p u b lic . He would secure  an advantage 
over th e  p u b lic , however much he m ight be a ffe c te d  by p u b lic  law s.
Under th e  C o n s titu tio n , th e  s ta te s  would have the  power to  choose 
n inety -one members o f Congress. Of th i s  number, which was the  same 
number o f re p re s e n ta tiv e s  in  the  C onfederation Congress, only tw o-th ird s 
would be brought in to  th e  s p o t l ig h t  o f pu b lic  exam ination by re e le c tio n  
in  a te n -y e a r  p e rio d , as was th e  case w ith  Üie Confederation Congress. 
But under th e  C o n s titu tio n , th e re  would be f iv e  and probably te n  times 
the  number of app o in tiv e  o f f  ic e ? , open f o r  ex-members o f Congress as 
under th e  A r t ic le s .  The e f f e c t  o f th i s  la rg e r  number o f such appoin tive  
o f f ic e s  would be to  prov ide th ese  ex-congressmen w ith  enough lu c ra tiv e  
o f f ic e s  so th a t  th ey  would never have to  re tu rn  to  p r iv a te  l i f e .  More­
over, n o t only  would such o f f ic e s  be a v a ila b le  to  ex-congressmen, they 
would a lso  be opened f o r  t h e i r  f r ie n d s  and fam ily . 
e x is t  in  th e  g o y e m > ^  th en , she i3 L^o_ma^,,,9j _ ^  
would f e e l  them selves candM atea.,fW -Æh8^.offica&, co rru p tio n  asid e?
This q uestion  posed by Lee was a cha lleng ing  one, one th a t  no F e d e ra l is t  
ever attem pted to  answer.
The C o n s titu tio n  au th o rized  th e  Congress o f the  United S ta te s  to  
levy  taxes a t  p le a su re  fo r  th e  g en era l w e lfa re , Lee exp la ined . Should 
th a t  Congress
m is-judge o f the  g en era l w e lfa re , and la y  unnecessary oppressive 
ta x e s , the  c o n s t i tu t io n  w i l l  p rov ide . . .  no remedy fo r  the 
people o r s t a t e s —th e  people must bear them, o r have recou rse .
^^Madison, 0£ . c i t . .  p . 636 .
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n o t any c o n s t i tu t io n a l  checks o r  rem edies, bu t to  th a t  r e s i s t ­
ance which i s  the  l a s t  r e s o r t ,  and founded in  se lf-defense#
I t  i s  w ell s t ip u la te d ,  th a t  a l l  d u t ie s ,  im posts, and excises 
s h a l l  be equal and th a t  d i r e c t  taxes sha l l  be apportioned on the
mences a dangerous power in  m atte rs  o f ta x a tio n , lodged w ithout 
any regard  to  th e  balance o f in te r e s ts  o f  the d i f f e r e n t  o rders 
o f  men, and w ithou t apy regard  to  th e  in te rn a l  p o lic y  o f the  
s ta te s  . . . no th ing  to  p reven t a system o f tax
laws being made, unduly to  ease some d e sc r ip tio n s  o f men and 
burden o th e rs ;  though such a system may be u n ju s t and in ju d i­
c io u s , though we may com plain, the answer w i l l  be, congress 
have th e  power de legated  by th e  peop le , and probably , congress 
has done what i t  thought b e s t .^ ^
In  th e  fo llow ing  L e t te r ,  Lee continued  h is  exam ination o f  Congress's
power o f  ta x a tio n :
To p a l la te  f o r  the  sm allness o f the  re p re se n ta tio n , i t  is  
observed, th a t  th e  s ta te  governments in  which th e  people a re  
f u l l y  re p re se n te d , n e c e s sa r ily  form a p a r t  o f the  system . . .
tru e  they  may, but 
a im less and.JielDlea&. perhaps, w ith  th e  p r iv ile g e  o f making a 
n o ise  when h u r t—th is  i s  no more than  in d iv id u a ls  may do. Does 
th e  c o n s t i tu t io n  p rovide a s in g le  check f o r  a s in g le  measure, 
by which th e  s t a t e  governments can c o n s t i tu t io n a l ly  and regu­
l a r l y  check th e  a r b i t r a r y  measures o f  co i^ ress?  Congress may 
r a i s e  im m ediately . . . tw enty m illio n s  o f  d o lla rs  in  tax e s , 
b u ild  a navy, model th e  m i l i t i a ,  &c. and a l l  t h i s  c o n s titu ­
t io n a l ly .  Congress may arm on every p o in t,  and th e  s ta te  
governments can do no more than an in d iv id u a l, by p e t i t io n  to  
Congress, suggest t h e i r  measures a re  alarm ing and n o t r i g h t . ^
Elsewhere in  h is  L e t te r s ,  Lee made a number of in te re s t in g  observations
on the  proposed House. The branches of the  le g is la tu r e  were e s s e n t ia l
p a r ts  o f the  fundam ental compact, presumably between the  people and
th e i r  government, and ought to  be f ix e d  by th e  people . But by A r tic le
I ,  s e c tio n  U, o f  th e  C o n s titu tio n ,^ ^  th e  House might a l t e r  i t s e l f  by
^ ^ e e ,  ogi. c i t . , p . 79. 
^ I b i d . . p . 82.
^^Madison, o£. c i t . ,  p . 629.
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m odifying the  e le c tio n s  o f  i t s  own members, hy re g u la tin g  the  e le c tio n s  
so as to  secu re  th e  choice o f any p a r t i c u la r  d e sc r ip tio n  o f men. I t  
m ight make an e n t i r e  s t a t e  one d i s t r i c t ;  th e  r e s u l t  m ight very  w ell be 
th a t  the  people who l iv e d  in  th e  more concen tra ted  urban areas could 
u n i te  and p lac e  in  th e  House th e  e n t i r e  number of re p re se n ta tiv e s  appor­
tio n ed  to  th e  s t a t e ,  Why, Lee asked, leave  th e  door open to  improper 
re g u la tio n s?  Why no t in co rp o ra te  d i r e c t ly  in to  th e  C o n stitu tio n  p ro v i-  
3ions fo r  th e  d iv is io n  o f  each s t a te  in to  p roper d i s t r i c t s  and f o r  the 
confin ing  o f th e  e le c to rs  in  each d i s t r i c t  to  th e  choice o f some men
R e la tiv e ly  l i t t l e  tim e was sp en t on th e  House by th e  'A n tis ' 
during th e  course o f th e  debates in  the  V irg in ia  r a t i fy in g  convention. 
For th e  most p a r t ,  tho se  o b jec tio n s  "üiat were voiced  were the same th a t  
we have seen rep e a te d ly  s tr e s s e d , i . e . ,  th a t  th e  re p re se n ta tiv e s  were 
to o few to  secure  adequate knowledge o f th e  p e o p le 's  needs, a b i l i t i e s ,  
and c o n d itio n s , th a t  because o f  th e  sm all re p re se n ta tio n  co rru p tio n  was 
l ik e ly , and th a t  th e  House would soon become an a r i s to c r a t i c  c lu b . But 
th e re  were a few in te r e s t in g  observa tions made on the  House, and i t  
would be worthwhile to  examine th e s e .
The proponents o f th e  new p lan  o f  government contend, W illiam 
Grayson sa id , t h a t  th e  dem ocratic branch o f the  Congress, because i t  is  
e le c te d  by the  p eo p le , i s  a  panacea fo r  many o f the  d e fec ts  o f  the  Con­
s t i t u t i o n ,  But what s e c u r i ty  i s  th e re  in  a re p re se n ta tio n  th a t  i s  too 
sm a ll, he asked? H isto ry  showed th a t  th e  le s s  th e  re p re se n ta tio n , the  
g re a te r  th e  opening o f  c o rru p tio n . C onsider, he asked, some f i f ^ e n
^^Ford, E ssays,-~CT>, 29^-296.
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hundred re p re se n ta tiv e s  a re  considered  only adequate to  handle the  
amount o f bugims& resp o n sib le  f o r  in  th e  sta^fca le g is la tu re s ^  And y e t 
much more ex tensive  powers, over th e  e n ti r e  country  as a conso lida ted  
un ion , a re  Jio,Jbfl.,,hfmdlfld ■ bg. a t o t a l  o f  n inety -one  re p re se n ta tiv e s  and 
se n a to rs . Tiftiether i t  was l ik e ly  th a t  these  n inety-one men in  the  United 
S ta te s  Congress were equal in  t h e i r  knowledge and a b i l i t i e s  o f the  f a c ts  
o f th e  coun try  to  th e  f i f t e e n  hundred, he made no sp e cu la tio n . His 
g re a te s t  o b je c tio n , he s a id , was th a t  the  Congress as proposed would 
be unequal and o p p ress iv e . Such e ff ic a c y  as i t  would dem onstrate, and 
th is  g e ts  to  th e  h e a r t  o f Grayson’s o p p o sitio n  to  the  House, would come 
from th e  presence o f  fa c tio n s  o f one p a r t  o f the Union ag a in s t an o th e r. 
For th e  powers and ju r i s d ic t io n  o f th e  government might be c a lle d  in to  
a c tio n  by a  com bination of only  seven s t a t e s .  There a re , he s tre s s e d , 
g re a t d if fe re n c e s  o f  circum stances among the  s t a te s ,  and i t  is  only 
reasonable  th a t  those  s ta te s  o f s im ila r  in te r e s ts  would combine a g a in s t 
o th e rs . The e f f e c t  upon th e  country  would be ru inous.
At a  l a t e r  da te  in  th e  deb a tes , P a tr ic k  Henry rose  to  make a few 
remarks on th e  House. During th e  course o f h is  speech, he brought up 
th e  argument made by a F e d e ra l is t  opponent th a t  th e  House would a c t  to  
curb any t r e a t i e s  th a t  m ight adverse ly  a f f e c t  the  American r ig h t  of 
n av ig a tio n  on th e  M is s is s ip p i . But where, Henry asked, was th is  power 
o f th e  House to  be found in  th e  C onstitu tio n ?  I t  could  n o t, fo r  the  
House had no such power. A most u n fo rtu n a te  om ission o f power, indeed, 
Henry complained.
At a s t i l l  l a t e r  p o in t in  the d eb a tes , James Monroe brought up
^ M l i o t ,  D ebates. I l l ,
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a unique and th o u g h tfu l o b se rv a tio n  on the  House. What, he asked, was 
the  purpose o f the  c lau se  in  the  C o n s titu tio n , c lause  U. se c tio n  5» 
A r t ic le I ,  id iich p ro h ib i ts  e i th e r  House from r is in g  fo r  more than  th re e  
days w ithou t th e  consent o f  the  o th e r?  Was i t  p ro p er, he asked, th a t
  .......     f --------.  .. ..  r r' 7 J
th e  House should thus be dependent upon the Senate, and as such might
unduly in c re a se  th e  in flu e n ce  o f iiie  Upper House on th e  Lower?^®
In  view o f  i t s  im portance, and the  e x te n t o f i t s  powers w ith in
the framework o f  th e  proposed fe d e ra l  government, th e  Senate received
su rp r is in g ly  l i t t l e  a t te n t io n  from A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  w r ite rs  o f  V irg in ia .
R ichard Henry Lee, f o r  example, devoted only  a  very  few pages in  h is
L e tte rs  From a  F edera l Farmer to  th e  Senate, f a r  le s s  than  he d id  to
th e  House o f R e p re se n ta tiv e s . His an a ly s is  o f the Senate i s  o f such
e x c e lle n t q u a li ty  i t  i s  worthwhile to  quote ex ten siv e ly  from him:
The sen a te  i s  an assembly o f 26 members, two from each s ta te ,  
though th e  se n a to rs  a re  apportioned  on th e  fe d e ra l  p lan , they 
w i l l  v o te  in d iv id u a lly ; th ey  rep re se n t th e  s t a t e s ,  as bodies 
p o l i t i c ,  sovereign  to  c e r ta in  purposes; the s t a te s ,  being 
sovereign  and independent, a l l  a re  considered  equal, each o th er 
w ith  the  o th e r  in  th e  se n a te . In  th is  we a re  governed so le ly  
by th e  id e a l  e q u a l i t ie s  o f so v e re ig n tie s ;  the  fe d e ra l and s ta te  
governments form ing one whole, and the s t a te  governments an 
e s s e n t ia l  p a r t  . . .  I  f e e l  more d isposed . . .  to  acquiesce in  
making them th e  b a s is  o f  th e  se n a te , and thereby  to  make i t  the  
in te r e s t  and duty o f  th e  se n a to rs  to  p reserv e  d i s t in c t ,  and to  
p e rp e tu a te  th e  re sp e c tiv e  so v e re ig n tie s  they  re p re se n t. . . .
The se n a te , as a  l e g i s l a t i v e  branch, i s  no t la rg e , but as an 
execu tive  branch q u ite  too numerous. I t  i s  no t to  be presumed 
th a t  we can form a genuine s e n a to r ia l  branch in  the  United 
S ta te s ,  a  r e a l  re p re s e n ta tio n  o f  th e  a r is to c ra c y  and balance in  
th e  l e g i s l a tu r e ,  any more than  we can form a genuine rep re se n ta ­
t io n  o f th e  p eo p le . Could we se p a ra te  the a r i s to c r a t i c a l  and 
dffljiocratical in t e r e s t s ;  compose th e  senate  o f  th e  form er, and 
th e  house o f assem bly o f  th e  l a t t e r ,  they  a re  too unequal . . . 
to  form a b a lance . Form them on pure p r in c ip le s ,  and leave each 
to  be supported by i t s  r e a l  weight and connections, th e  senate  
would be f e e b le ,  and the  house p o w erfu l:— I  say , on pure
^Q lb id .. p . 367.
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p r in c ip le s j  because I  make a  d is t in c t io n  between a senate  th a t  
d e riv es  i t s  w eight and in flu en ce  from a pure source, i t s  numbers 
and wisdom, i t s  e x ten siv e  p ro p erty , i t s  ex tensive  and permanent 
connections? and a  sen a te  composed o f  u n s ta b le  connections, th a t  
d e riv es  i t s  w eight and in flu en ce  from a c o rru p t and p e rn ic io u s 
source • . . I  wish the  proposed sen a te  may n o t p a rtak e  too much 
o f  the  l a t t e r  d e s c r ip t io n .^9
By i t s  v e iy  n a tu re  as th e  re p re se n ta tiv e  body o f  th e  a r i s to c r a t i c
elem ents o f  th e  p o p u la tio n  the  Senate had an in h e re n t d e fe c t fo r  the
p roper n a tu re  o f  re p re s e n ta tiv e  government in  th e  U nited S ta te s .
To produce a  balance and checks, the  c o n s t i tu t io n  proposes two 
branches in  th g ^ ^ ^ is la tu r e  ? but they  a re  so formed, th a t  the 
members o f  both must g e n e ra lly  be th e  same k ind  o f men—men 
w ith  s im ila r  in te r e s t s  and view s—men o f th e  same grade in  
so c ie ty . Senators and re p re se n ta tiv e s  thus circum stanced . . .  
must be governed g e n e ra lly  by the  same m otives and view s, and 
th e re fo re  pursue th e  same system o f  p o l i t ic s ?  . . . th e re  w ill  
n o t be found in  them any o f  those  genuine balances and checks, 
among th e  r e a l  in t e r e s t s ,  and e f f o r t s  o f the  same c la sse s  of 
men in  the  community we aim at.^®
Lee had o th e r  o b je c tio n s  to  th e  Senate as i t  was o igan ized . The 
s e n a to rs , he contended, s a t  f o r  f a r  too long? h is to ry  showed th a t  men 
w ith  long terms o f o f f ic e  tended to  develop ca llo u s  h a b its ,  and cease 
to  f e e l  t h e i r  dependence upon and knowledge of t h e i r  c o n s titu e n ts .
T his, he p re d ic te d , would be e s p e c ia lly  t ru e  in  a body over which th e re  
e x is te d  no r e c a l l . The power o f  r e c a l l  was, he s a id , considered an 
e s s e n t ia l  a sp ec t o f  th e  Congress undeg-J M  JjlM gleg.. o f  CoM M grationj 
and th e re  was no rea so n , and c e r ta in ly  no s e c u r i ty , in  no t in co rp o ra t­
ing s im ila r  p ro v is io n s  in  th e  C o n s titu tio n . The sena to rs rep resen ted  
so v e re ig n tie s  which ought n e c e s s a r ily  r e ta in  th e  power of r e c a l l  over 
t h e i r  ag en ts , f o r  i t  was th e  n a tu re  o f a l l  de legated  power th a t  con­
s t i tu e n t s  should r e t a in  th e  r ig h t  to  judge o f the  conduct o f t h e i r
^^Lee, o£. c i t . .  pp. 89- 90 . 
^^ Ib id .g p . 90 .
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re p re s e n ta t iv e s . The c o n s t i tu e n ts ' approval o r d isapproval o f t h e i r  
r e p re s e n ta t iv e 's  conduct im plied  the  r ig h t  to  continue o r co n tro l th e  
r e p re s e n ta t iv e 's  p o s i t io n .  Indeed, he in s i s te d ,  the  n e ce ss ity  o f r e c a l l  
i s  g re a te r  fo r .  t he„^Qate.„thgüi_fûr-.t^^^ f o r  th e  l a t t e r  would be
more f re q u e n tly  e le c te d  and, th e re fo re , more l ik e ly  to  be sc ru tin iz e d  
c a re fu l ly  by th e  p u b lic . The power o f r e c a l l  over th e  senato rs would 
have th e  e f f e c t  o f  p reven ting  th e  form ation  o f any p o ss ib le  in te re s te d  
f a c t io n s ,  as w e ll as se rv ing  to  keep up the w atchfulness o f the  senato rs 
and th e i r  a t te n t io n  to  t h e i r  p o s i t io n 's  r e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s .^ ^
With th e  power o f r e c a l l  should a lso  come th e  p r in c ip le  o f ro ta ­
t io n  in  o f f ic e ,  Lee in s i s te d .  I t  was a p r in c ip le  found in  the  A r t ic le s ,  
and most o f te n  in  th e  s t a t e  l e g i s l a tu r e s .  In  a government co n sis tin g  
o f but a  few members, e le c te d  fo r  long p e rio d s , and f a r  removed from 
th e  o b se rv a tio n s o f  the  peo p le , as proposed by the  C o n s titu tio n , members 
a re  seldom changed, and government becomes f i l l e d  w ith men who c o n s ti­
tu te  a r e l a t iv e ly  f ix e d  body, who a re  o f te n  in a t te n t iv e  to  the pub lic  
good, a re  c a l lo u s ,  s e l f i s h ,  and prone to  co rru p tio n . The p r in c ip le  o f 
ro ta t io n  would rev e rse  a l l  such c h a ra c te r i& tlc a , and would have the  
a d d itio n a l e f f e c t  o f d is t r ib u t in g  more w idely throughout the  community 
knowledge o f th a t  community's government. R o tation  would serve to  
re tu rn  a  re p re se n ta tiv e  to  h is  c o n s t i tu e n ts ,  and to  r e in s ta te  him in
th e  i n t e r e s t s ,  f e e l in g s ,  and views o f  h is  c o n s titu e n ts , and thereby
92
confirm  him in  th e  e s s e n t ia l  q u a li f ic a tio n s  o f a l e g i s l a to r .
By A rtic le  I I ,  s e c tio n  2, th e  C onstitu tion^^  req u ired  th a t  two-
^ ^ Ib id . . pp. 92-91. ^^ Ib id .
^^Madison, op. c i t . « p . 63U«
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th i r d s  o f the  Senate confirm  p re s id e n t ia l  appointm ents f o r  fe d e ra l 
o f f i c e s .  In  L ee 's  e s tim a tio n  th is  was an improper power to  lodge in  
th e  Senate. The honor and emoluments o f  p u b lic  o f f ic e s  are  the  o b jec ts  
in  a l l  communities o f which am bitious men never lo se  s ig h t .  Honest 
men, those  who a re  in d u s tr io u s  and m odest, a re  more than  conten t to  
look a f t e r  th e i r  own p r iv a te  a f f a i r s ;  i t  i s  the  men o f  in tr ig u e  who
H    '  1 ,1 IHIIHINIW IT I I f  ............... I MHIimi HI 1 lltg lil f  I ,  "S •  •> ■N.'-.'
seek a f t e r  th e  o f f ic e s  o f pub lij5, ,^ n c e m . The o f f ic e s  necessary  fo r  
a n a tio n a l  system o f government as proposed by the  C o n stitu tio n  w il l  
be many, and those  men w ith the  power o f d isp o sa l o f those o ff ic e s  
w il l  have a ve ry  la rg e  in flu en ce  in  th e  government. The senato rs and 
re p re se n ta tiv e s  w i l l  n a tu ra l ly  consider them selves p o ss ib le  re c ip ie n ts  
o f app o in tiv e  o f f ic e s  which become vacant every y e a r. But every p re ­
c au tio n  must be tak en  to  ensure th a t  the  l e g is la to r s  do not become mere 
o f f ic e  men. This would be e ffe c te d , among o th e r  changes, by giv ing  
them as sm all a  share  in  th e  d isp o sa l o f those o f f ic e s  as p o ss ib le .
Furtherm ore, Lee con tinued , in  d iscussing  A rtic le  I I ,  se c tio n  2, 
th e  Senate has a major p a r t  in  try in g  fe d e ra l o f f ic e r s  fo r  m isconduct.
In  c re a tin g  o f f ic e s ,  i t  i s  too numerous fo r  a council o f appointm ent, 
o r  to  f e e l  any g re a t r e s p o n s ib i l i ty .  Added to  th is  must be th e  f a c t  
th a t  the  Senate has a n ecessa ry  share  in  the  concluding o f t r e a t i e s .
The e f f e c t  o f a l l  th ese  powers m ight very  l ik e ly  be th a t  t he Senate 
w i l l  no t only d ic ta te  to  th e  P re s id e n t, but w il l  manage t he House as 
w e ll, thereby  u p se ttin g  what balance o f government the C o n stitu tio n  
e s ta b l is h e s . A d d itio n a lly , the  Senate is  the  body to  t r y  impeachments 
o f fe d e ra l  o f f i c e r s ,  and must th e re fo re  be as d is in te re s te d  as p o ss ib le ,
51t-Lee, 0£ , c i t . ,  pp. 98, I l l - I l l ; .
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For a l l  th ese  reaso n s , Lee concluded, th e  Senate i s  a  p o te n t ia l ly  dan­
gerous body in  which to  lodge even a  share  in  the  power o f appointment 
o f fe d e ra l  o f f ic e r s
Elsewhere in  h is  L e t te r s ,  Lee made o th e r , r a th e r  random observa­
t io n s  on the  Senate t h a t  a re  worth examining fo r  a moment. A r t ic le  I ,  
s e c tio n  U, o f the  C o n s titu tio n ,^ ^  regard ing  the  e le c tio n s  o f fe d e ra l 
l e g i s l a to r s ,  empowered the  genera l l e g is la tu r e  to  re g u la te  the e le c tio n s  
o f s e n a to rs , "except as to  th e  p laces o f choosing se n a to rs ."  There i s ,  
th e re fo re , Lee argued, bu t l i t t l e  more s e c u r i ty  in  the  e le c tio n  o f  the  
sen a to rs  than  th e re  i s  f o r  th e  re p re se n ta tiv e s .
The Senate a ls o  came under A n ti-F e d e ra lis t a tta c k  during the 
course o f the  deb a tes , though the c r i t ic ism s  made were s im ila r  to  L ee 's  
in  h is  L e t te r s .  A few o th e r  observations were made here and th e re , 
however, th a t  a re  worth some time examining.
A g re a t d ea l o f  d isc u ss io n  during the  ea rly  days o f  the debates 
was given to  the American r ig h t  o f n av ig a tio n  o f  the  M iss iss ip p i R iver, 
As expected , V irg in ian s f e l t  v e ry  s tro n g ly  about the con tinua tion  of 
th a t  r ig h t .  But W illiam  Grayson po in ted  ou t th a t  the  senato rs o f only 
f iv e  s ta te s  and th e  P re s id e n t were n ecessa iy  f o r J ^ a t  r ig h t  to  be g i ^ n  
up. For, w ith tw o -th ird s  o f  th e  Senate p re se n t a quorum would be fo u r­
teen  se n a to rs , o f  which t m  would c o n s t i tu te  a m a jo r ity . What, then , 
he asked, i s  th e  s e c u r i ty  in  such a system , where sen a to rs  o f only f iv e  
s ta te s  and the P re s id e n t may conclude a t r e a ty  which a f fe c ts  v i r tu a l ly  
o n e -h a lf  o f the  s t a te s  o f  th e  Union?^^
^^Ibid.. pp. 115-116. 
^% adison , 0£ . c i t . , p . 62? . 
^^Ford, E ssays, p . 297.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
101
L a te r  in  th e  d e b a te s , Grayson ro se  to  o b je c t to  the S en a te 's  
power o f  concurrence and approval o f amendments to  money b i l l s ;  "He 
looked upon the  power o f  proposing amendments to  be equal, in  p r in c ip le ,  
to  th a t  o f  o r ig in a tin g , and th a t  they  w ere, in  f a c t  the  same . . . th is  
was, in  h is  o p in ion , a  d ep artu re  from th a t  g re a t p r in c ip le  which r e ­
q u ired  th a t  th e  immediate re p re se n ta tiv e s  o f the  people only should 
in te r f e r e  w ith  money b i l l s .
L ike Grayson, P a tr ic k  Henry fe a re d  the p o s s ib i l i ty ,  and e f fe c ts  
upon V irg in ia , o f  a c o llu s io n  between th e  Senate and the P re s id e n t.
The C o n s titu tio n  g re a t ly  dim inished th e  s e c u r i ty  a g a in s t c o llu s io n
S9which was p a r t  o f the  A r t ic le s .  Nor d id  Henry, l ik e  Lee, approve o f 
th e  lac k  o f  r e c a l l  over th e  se n a to rs , and he fea red  the w orst e f fe c t  o f 
th a t  lack,^®
The V irg in ia  A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  made few c r i t ic ism s  o r expressed 
l i t t l e  f e a r  o f th e  proposed E xecutive. Richard Henry Lee, fo r  example,
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devoted p a r ts  o f  only  twO L e tte r s  to  the  Presidency and V ice-Presidency. 
George Mason devoted some tim e to  h is  observations on the  Chief Execu­
t iv e ,  but as h is  e n t i r e  'o b je c t io n s ' occupied only fo u r pages, those 
o b se rv a tio n s , to o , were n e c e s s a r ily  summarized. L ikew ise, l i t t l e  time 
was spen t during  th e  debates on the  o f f ic e  o f the  P re s id e n t, and th a t  
which was s a id  was done so fo r  th e  most p a r t  only in  passin g . S t i l l ,  
i t  would be worthwhile to  tak e  some n o tic e  o f the  observations made.
The lack  o f a c o n s t i tu t io n a l  council f o r  the  P r e s id e n t  was, fo r  
George Mason, most o b je c tio n a b le :
^ % l i o t .  D ebates. I l l ,  351.
^^I b id . , pp. 375-376. ^^I b id . , pp. 353-355.
^^Lee, 0£ . c i t ; . pp. 118-119; a ls o . Ford, E ssays, p . 310,
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The P re s id e n t o f  the  U nited S ta te s  has no c o n s t i tu t io n a l  council 
(a  th in g  unknown in  any sa fe  and re g u la r  government) he w ill  
th e re fo re  be unsupported  by p roper in form ation  and adv ice; and 
w i l l  g e n e ra lly  be d ire c te d  by m inions and f a v o r i te s —o r he w il l  
become a to o l o f th e  Senate—o r  a council o f s t a te  w i l l  grow out 
o f  th e  p r in c ip a l  o f f ic e r s  o f  the  g re a t departm ents—the w orst 
and most dangerous in g re d ie n ts  f o r  such a c o u n c il, in  a f re e  
coun try ; fo r  they  may be induced to  jo in  in  any dangerous o r 
oppressive  m easures, to  s h e l te r  them selves, and p reven t an in ­
q u iry  in to  t h e i r  own m isconduct in  o f f ic e  . . . From th is  f a t a l  
d e fe c t o f  a c o n s t i tu t io n a l  c o u n c il, has a r is e n  the improper power 
o f th e  Senate , in  th e  appointm ent o f the  p u b lic  o f f ic e r s ,  and the  
alarm ing dependence and connexion between th a t  branch o f the  
l e g i s l a tu r e  and th e  supreme ex ecu tiv e . Hence, a ls o , sprung th a t  
unnecessary  ,o f f ic e r^ th e .l ie e -P E g s M  who, fo r  want o f o th e r '
employment, i s  made P re s id en t o f  the Senate; thereby dangerously 
blending th e  execu tive  and le g i s l a t iv e  powers; besides a lso  g iv­
ing to  some one o f th e  s ta te s  an u n ju s t and unnecessary p re ­
eminence over th e  o th e r ,
Mason o b jec te d  a lso  to  th e  power o f pardon gran ted  to  the P re s i­
d en t. The power o f  pardon m ight " sometimes be exerc ised  to  screen  from 
punishment those  idiom he may have s e c re t ly  in s t ig a te d  to  commit the 
crim e, and thereby  p rev en t a d iscovery  o f h is  own g u i l t .
Lee, as we have s a id ,  devoted space in  only two L e tte rs  to  the 
o f f ic e  and powers o f  th e  P re s id e n t. Like Mason, he ob jM ted  to ,  and 
fe a re d , the  connection  between the  Senate and the P re s id en t as an un­
necessary  mixing o f  l e g i s l a t i v e  and executive powers.
Though he approved on th e  whole o f  th e  method o f se le c tio n  of 
the  P re s id e n t, he d id  f e a r  t h a t  the  sm allness of the  number o f e le c to rs  
would in c rease  th e  p o s s ib i l i ty  o f co rru p tio n  o f  th o se e le c ;tors between 
the d a te  o f  t h e i r  s e le c tio n  and th e  date  o f  vo te  fo r  th e  P re s id e n t. He 
disapproved, f u r th e r ,  o f  th e  id ea  o f the r e - e l i g i b i l i t y  o f the P re s id en t.
62paul L e ic e s te r  Ford , Pamphlets on 1 ^  C o n stitu tio n  (Brooklyn, 
1891), p . 330.
^ ^ ib id o. pp . 330-331"
^^Fbrd, E ssays, p . 298.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
103
The o b je c t  In  rep u b lican  gOY-amment. he argued, was to  guard agains t  
p e rp e tu a tin g  any p o s i t io n  o f power. The executive  must remain in  o f f ic e  
long enough to  g ive h is  o f f ic e  s t a b i l i t y ,  but n o t long enough to  e s tab ­
l i s h  h im se lf . The p o s s ib i l i ty  o f  r e e le c tio n , he argued, might le a d  to  
in tr ig u e  fo r  r e e le c t io n .  The am bitious man would spare  nothing to  se ­
cure r e e le c t io n .  By re e le c t io n ,  the  man in  o f f ic e  would lo se  h is  
in te r e s t  in  h is  o f f ic e  and -ttie government beyond aggrandizem ent,^^
Obseirvations on th e  P re s id e n t 's  o f f ic e  made during the course o f 
th e  debates were m ostly  r e p e t i t io u s  o f  those we have examined b efo re , 
George Mason, fo r  example, expressed h is  fea rs  the  P residency might 
become a p e rp e tu a lly -o ccu p ied  p o s i t io n , th a t  t he Senate and P resid en t 
m ight a c t  to  support one ano ther a g a in s t the  peop le , and th a t  the P res­
id e n t ' sp o w e r o f  pardon and c o n tro l over the  m i l i t i a  were undesirab le  
and p o te n t ia l ly  dangerous powers.
James Monroe^^ and W illiam Grayson^® both covered o ld  ground in  
th e i r  c r i t ic is m s  o f the  P re s id e n t 's  and V ic e -P re s id e n t's  o f f ic e s .  Nei­
th e r  man was a t  a l l  s a t i s f i e d  w ith the broad e x ten t o f the P re s id e n t 's  
powers and th e  la c k  o f s e c u r i ty  p laced  on th ese  powers, and they fea red  
the  w orst should an am bitious man come to  occupy the o f f ic e .
S u rp ris in g ly  enough, in  view o f  the  r a th e r  l im ite d  a t te n t io n  
given the  execu tive  branch o f th e  government, the  proposed ju d ic ia l  
branch drew co n sid erab le  c r i t ic is m  from the V irg in ia  A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts . 
Lee, in  p a r t i c u la r ,  devoted much a t te n t io n  to  th e  proposed ju d ic ia ry , 
and h is  exam ination i s  c e r ta in ly  worth th e  space req u ired  to  review  i t .
^^Lee, ogi. c i t . , pp . 123-126.
^ ^ E ll io t ,  D ebates. I l l ,  I 83.
"̂̂ I b id , .  pp. U88-lt96. ^ ^ I b id . , pp. h 9 0 -h 9 2 .
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Lee had no o b je c tio n  to  th e  b asic  arrangem ent o f  the  fe d e ra l 
ju d ic ia ry —one supreme c o u rt  and a s e r ie s  o f in f e r io r  c o u r t s . I n d e e d ,  
i t  was necessa ry  f o r  th e  fu n c tio n s  o f  the  ju d ic ia ry  to  be c a r r ie d  out 
sm oothly. But he did not approve o f  th e  ju d ic ia l  departm en t's  powers 
to  handle q u estio n s  a r i s in g  from the  in te rn a l  laws o f th e  sev e ra l s t a te s ,  
though he conceded the n e c e s s ity  o f th e  departm ent's  power o f deciding 
f i n a l ly  on th e  law o f  th e  Union. A ^ ic le  I I I j ^ .^eetlon  2, o f the  C onsti­
tu t io n ,  a c tio n s  between c i t iz e n s  o f a p a r t ic u la r  s t a te  and fo re ig n e rs , 
between c i t iz e n s  o f d i f f e r e n t  s t a t e s ,  by s ta te  governments ag a in s t 
fo re ig n e rs ,  and by s t a t e  governments a g a in s t c i t iz e n s  o f o th e r  s ta te s  
were to  be h ;n ^ ^ p p w ] % @ n tlz _ k L J a a & ^ ^  ^
ef f e c t  o f  th a t  p ro v is io n , in  L ee 's  e s tim a tio n , would be to  open new 
ju r is d ic t io n s  ^ d  new scenes o f  le g a l  a c tio n s , to  which c i t iz e n s  and 
fo re ig n e rs  a l ik e  must be drawn, perhaps hundreds o f m ile s . Such p ro ­
cesses would involve th e  s t a t e s ,  and many defendan ts, to  ac tio n s not in
70contem plation when th e  c o n tra c t  was made. Furtherm ore, though tAe
fe d e ra l  c o u rts  m ight be so organized as to  ease the  ob tain ing  o f le g a l
71a c tio n , the  C o n s titu tio n  d id  not secure  th a t  b e n e f i t .  In  a d d itio n , 
he questioned  th e  wisdom o f  making a s t a te  answerable to  the s u i t s  o f 
a fo re ig n e r  o r c i t i z e n  o f some o th e r  s t a t e .  By any o r a l l  o f  these  
a c tio n s , s t a te  governments m ight be humbled to  a degree to  vrtiich they 
were no t su b je c t under th e  A r t ic le s .
Though Lee adm itted  th e  n e c e s s ity  o f securing  the independence 
o f the fe d e ra l  ju d ic ia ry ,  he questioned  the  wisdom o f m ain tain ing  the
^% ad ison , o£. c i t . ,  p . 63^. 
^^Ford, E ssays, p . 309,
^^I b id . . pp . 306- 307.
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judge’s s a la r ie s  under permanent and stand ing  law s. For to  e s ta b l is h  
the  s a la r ie s  o f  th e  judges as permanent would be to  ignore  th e  p o s s i­
b i l i t y  o f  change in  th e  co u n try ’s economic co n d itio n . Furtherm ore, he 
considered  i t  l i k e l y  th a t  the judges and th e i r  f r ie n d s  would consp ire  
to  in c re a se  th e  s a la r ie s  o f the  judges, as the  C o n s titu tio n  provided 
th a t  t h e i r  s a la r ie s  could be ra is e d  bu t no t lowered except by consent 
of a l l  th e  branches o f  th e  le g is la tu r e .^ ^
A r t ic le  I I I ,  s e c tio n  2, o f th e  fe d e ra l C o n stitu tio n  provid ing  
th a t  " th e  ju d ic ia l  power s h a l l  extend to  a l l  cases in  law and equ ity  
a r is in g  under th e  c o n s t i tu t io n ,  the  laws o f  the  U nited S ta te s , . . . "  
confused Lee. He asked:
What i s  h e re  meant by equ ity?  id iat i s  eq u ity  in  a case a r is in g  
under th e  c o n s titu t io n ?  p o ss ib ly  th e  c lause  might have the  same 
meaning, were the  words " in  law and equity" om itted . Cases in  
law must d i f f e r  w idely  from cases in  law and eq u ity . At f i r s t  
view , by th u s jo in in g  th e  word e q u ity  w ith th e  word law, i f  we 
mean any th ing , we seem to  mean to  give th e  judge a d isc re tio n a ry  
power. . . . Perhaps th e  c lause  would have the  same meaning 
were th e  words " th is  c o n s titu tio n "  om itted; th e re  i s  in  i t  e i th e r  
a  c a re le s s  complex m isuse o f words, in  them selves o f  ex tensive 
s ig n i f ic a t io n ,  o r  th e re  i s  some meaning no t e a s i ly  to  be compre­
hended, Suppose a  case a r is in g  under th is  c o n s titu t io n —suppose 
th e  q u estio n  ju d ic ia l ly  moved, w hether, by th e  c o n s titu t io n , 
congress can suppress a  s t a te  ta x  l a id  on p o l l s ,  lands , o r as an 
excise  d u ty , which may be supposed to  in te r f e r e  w ith  a fe d e ra l 
ta x . By th e  l e t t e r  o f  th e  c o n s t i tu t io n , congress w il l  appear 
to  have no power to  do i t ;  but then  the  judges may decide the  
question  on p r in c ip le s  o f  eq u ity  as w ell as law . Now, om itting  
th e  words " in  law and e q u ity ,"  they  may decide according to  the 
s p i r i t  and tru e  meaning o f th e  c o n s t i tu t io n , as c o lle c te d  from 
what must have been the  in te n tio n s  o f the people when they made 
i t .7 3
R eflec tin g  on t h i s  p ro v is io n  in  an e a r l i e r  L e t te r ,  Lee contended, " I t  
i s  a  very  dangerous th in g  to  v e s t  in  th e  same judge power to  decide on
^^Lee, 22 . c i t . .  pp . 135-136. 
73 lb ld . .  p . l l i l .
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th e  law , and a lso  g en e ra l powers in  eq u ity ; f o r  i f  th e  law r e s t r a in  him, 
he i s  on ly  to  s te p  in to  h is  shoes o f  e q u ity , and g ive  what judgment h is  
reason  o r  op in ion  may d ic t a t e .  R irtherm ore, Lee continued, th is  
p ro v is io n  ignores th e  p r in c ip le  o f th e  se p a ra tio n  o f powers o f  law and 
e q u ity  e s ta b lis h e d  in  the  B r i t i s h  ju d ic ia l  system . The importance o f 
th i s  p receden t cannot be too s tro n g ly  s tre s s e d , fo r  the  ^ e r i c a n s ,  
being o f p r in c ip a l ly  Ehglish h e r i ta g e , considered th e  English system of 
government th e  f i n e s t  in  the  w orld^ barring^ o f course, i^ ere  own gov- 
em m ental o rg a n iz a tio n . A reading  o f  the  debates in  th e  se v e ra l s ta te  
conventions w i l l  dem onstrate th e  a f fe c t io n  the  Americans had f o r ,  and 
th e  re sp e c t o f  th e  B r i t i s h  p o l i t i c a l  and goveimmental system.
Lee doubted w hether th e  C o n stitu tio n  e s ta b lish e d  in  unequivocal 
term s, ju ry  t r i a l  in  c i v i l  c a se s . Jury  t r i a l  in  common law cases, Lee 
contended, was w ell e s ta b lis h e d , and was in  f a c t  the fundamental law o f 
the  U nited S ta te s .  The ju r ie s  were empowered to  give a  genera l v e rd ic t  
and to  decide as to  law and to  f a c t ,  in  common law procedures. T r ia l  
by ju ry  was, p o l i t i c a l l y  considered , th e  most important  fe a tu re  in  the  
ju d ic ia l  departm ent o f  a f r e e  coun try , and ought to  be given up only in
tdie very  l a s t  r e s o r t .  Where, in  c iv i l  law p ro cesses , the  ju ry  t r i a l  
was unknown, th e  consequence was th a t  a  few judges and dependent o f f i ­
cers possessed  a l l  th e  power in  th e  ju d ic ia l  departm ent. Furtherm ore, 
by the  common law o f  England and th e  U nited S ta te s ,  th e re  was no appeal 
from the v e rd ic t  o f th e  ju ry  as to  th e  f a c t s .  The C o n stitu tio n , how­
ever, Lee contended, proposed to  e s ta b l is h  th e  very  opposite  p r in c ip le
^^Ford, E ssays, p .  308.
"^^E llio t, D ebates. I l l ,  262 f f  j a lso  Debates I I ,  228,
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o f t h i s ;  an appeal w i l l  l i e  in  a l l  a p p e lla te  cases from the  v e rd ic t  o f 
th e  ju ry , even as to  f a c t s ,  to  th e  ju s t ic e s  o f th e  Supreme C ourt. The 
e f f e c t  would be to  e s ta b l is h  c iv i l  law procedures by th is  p ro v is io n , 
f o r  i f  th e  ju r is d ic t io n  o f th e  ju ry  i s  n o t f i n a l ,  as to  f a c t  e sp e c ia lly , 
t h a t  body i s  o f  l i t t l e  o r  no im portance.
George Mason had much d i f f e r e n t  c r i t ic is m s  to  make o f the fe d e ra l  
ju d iciairy . I t  was, he complained to  George Washington, so constructed  
and extended as to  absorb and d estro y  th e  ju d ic ia r ie s  o f the  sev era l 
sta te rs . I t  would, as a consequence, render th e  laws as ted io u s , i n t r i ­
c a te ,  expensive, and as u n a tta in a b le  as i t  was fo r  a g re a t p a r t  o f the  
popu la tion  o f  Ehgland.^^ The in f e r io r  c o u rts  o f the  fe d e ra l government 
were, he complained to  th e  d e le g a tes  a t  the  convention, as numerous as 
Congress m ight th in k  p ro p e r . There i s  no l im ita t io n  whatsoever w ith 
re sp e c t to  th e  n a tu re  o r  ju r is d ic t io n  o f those  c o u rts  contained in  
A rtic le  I I I ,  se c tio n  2, Mason charged during th e  debates. R ather, i t  
was th e re  d ec la red  th a t  " the  ju d ic ia l  power s h a l l  extend to  a l l  cases 
in  law and eq u ity  a r is in g  under t h i s  C o n s titu tio n ."  What o b je c ts , he 
asked, w i l l  th i s  p ro v is io n  no t extend to?  They w il l  judge how f a r  
th e i r  laws may o p e ra te , they  w i l l  modify t h e i r  own c o u rts , and th e re  
w i l l  be no s ta te  law th a t  can co u n te rac t them. Thus, th e  d isc rim in a­
t i on between th e  ju d i c i a l  power o f .i t ie  fe d e m l court_3y5t@m_ahd ,t^ a t  of
78
th e ^ s ta tes ' cou r t  system s e x is tM . in  p n ly . Continuing on th is
theme, Mason sa id :
^ ^ e e ,  o£. c i t . ,  pp . 137-lLl« 
77pord, Pam phlets, p . 330. 
^ ^ E ll io t ,  D ebates. I l l ,  521-522.
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To what d is g ra c e fu l  and dangerous len g th s  does th e  p r in c ip le  o f 
t h i s  goi For i f  your s t a te  ju d ic ia r ie s  a re  no t to  be tru s te d  
w ith  th e  a d m in is tra tio n  o f  common ju s t i c e ,  and d ec is io n  o f d is ­
p u te s  re sp ec tin g  p ro p e rty  between man and man, much le s s  ought 
th e  s t a te  governments to  be t ru s te d  w ith th e  power o f  l e g is la t io n .  
The p r in c ip le  i t s e l f  goes to  the  d e s tru c tio n  o f th e  le g is la t io n  
o f the  s t a t e s ,  whether o r  no t i t  was i n t e n d e d , 79
Concluding th i s  m a tte r . Mason made a candid and ra lh e r  in d ic a tiv e  s t a t e ­
ments "As to  my own op in ion , I  most r e l ig io u s ly  and co nsc ien tiously  
b e liev e  th a t  i t  was in tended , though I  am no t a b so lu te ly  certain."® ®  
George Mason was, from a l l  in d ic a tio n s , a w ell educated, and 
w idely read  man, e s p e c ia l ly  on m a tte rs  o f p o l i t i c a l  Iheory . From the 
s t a r t  o f  the  F edera l Convention, he n o ticed  the  w idely p rev a len t d e s ire  
among those  supporting  th e  need fo r  a strong  c e n tra l  government fo r  a 
red u c tio n  in  th e  im portance and p o l i t i c a l  p o s it io n  w ith in  th e  framework 
o f th e  c e n tr a l  government, w hatever i t  was to  be, o f  the  se v e ra l s t a te s .  
In  a  l e t t e r  to  h is  son, George Mason, J r . ,  he sa id :
The most p re v a le n t id ea  in  th e  p r in c ip a l  S ta te s  [p resen t in  
P h ilad e lp h ia  a t  th a t  tim e, May 20, 178?] seems to  be to ta l  
a l t e r a t io n  o f  th e  p re s e n t  fe d e ra l system , and s u b s ti tu t in g  
a g re a t n a tio n a l  co u n cil o r  parliam en t , . . w ith  f u l l  l e g i s ­
l a t iv e  powers upon a l l  the  su b je c ts  o f the Union, and an 
ex ecu tiv e , and to  make the  se v e ra l S ta te  le g is la tu r e s  subor­
d in a te  to  the  n a tio n a l  . . .  I t  is  easy to  fo resee  th a t  th e re  
w i l l  be much d i f f i c u l t y  in  o rgan iz ing  a government upon th is  
g re a t s c a le ,  and a t  th e  same time reserv in g  to  the  S ta te  
le g is la tu r e s  a s u f f i c i e n t  p o r tio n  o f  power fo r  promoting and 
securing  th e  p ro s p e r ity  and happiness o f t h e i r  resp ec tiv e  
c i t i z e n s .81
The reasoning behind M ason's f e a r  o f the  e f fe c ts  of th e  proposed fe d e ra l 
government was, o f course , th a t  the  s t a te  governments, being c lo s e r  to 
the  peop le , were th e re fo re  more s e n s i t iv e  to  the  p e o p le 's  needs ^ d
7 9 lb id . . p . $ 2 2 . ®®Ibid.
®^Kate Mason Rowland, T j^  L ife  and Correspondence of George 
Mason (New York, 196U), p . 101.
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and could  be more c lo se ly  watched than could the fe d e ra l 
government lo c a te d  in  some d i s ta n t  c i ty .
L a te r ,  Mason observed th a t  the  a p p e lla te  ju r is d ic t io n  o f  th e  
Supreme Court would embrace every o b je c t o f m aritim e, chancery, and 
common law co n tro v ersy . Mason d id  no t question  th e  ju r is d ic t io n  over 
th e  f i r s t  two f i e l d s ,  bu t why n o t, he asked, d isc rim in a te  as to  mat­
te r s  o f  f a c t  w ith  re sp e c t to  common-law co n tro v ersies?  James Madison, 
he s a id , p rev io u s ly  agreed th a t  i t  was dangerous, but expressed hope 
th a t  reg u la tio n s  would be made to  s u i t  the  convenience o f the people.
But he was no t s a t i s f i e d  w ith  the p ro sp ec t o f mere hope, fo r  hope was
82not s u f f i c i e n t  s e c u r i ty .
Nor d id  Mason co n sid er th e  p ro v is io n s o f  the C o n stitu tio n  regard­
ing common-law t r i a l s  and t r i a l s  in  co u rts  o f equ ity  and adm iralty  su f­
f i c i e n t ly  explanatory.® ^ In  appeals on the  l a t t e r  two, the depositions 
a re  committed to  re c o rd , and th e re fo re  on appeal the whole f a c ts  go to  
the  a p p e lla te  c o u r t .  The eq u ity  o f the  whole case i s  considered , and 
no new evidence i s  r e q u is i t e .  But in  common-law c ases , evidence i s  
given v iv a  voce, and upon appeal new w itnesses may be in troduced . This 
in  i t s e l f  would c e r ta in ly  be an inconvenience. Moreover, c e r ta in  Fed­
e r a l i s t s  had s a id  t h a t  th e re  would be no occasion to  c a rry  up the 
evidence by v iv a  voce testim ony , because Congress may order i t  committed 
to  w ritin g  and tra n sm itte d  in  th a t  manner. Yet on the  o th e r  hand, i t  
must be as eq u a lly  tru e  th a t  Congress m ight no t so a c t .  Furtherm ore, 
Congress m ight e s ta b l is h  i t s  own reg u la tio n s  as to  how appeals in
8 2 E llio t,  D ebates, I I I ,  52^. 
^% adison , o£. c i t . , p . 635-
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m atte rs  o f  revenue and excise  co n tro v e rs ie s  be brought to  su p erio r 
c o u r ts , and th e re  would be no th ing  to  say what t h e i r  reg u la tio n s  might 
b . .%
Like Lee, Mason questioned  whether s t a te  cou rts  could no t be 
t ru s te d  to  handle cases between c i t iz e n s  o f d i f f e r e n t  s ta te s .  And, 
again  l ik e  Lee, he questioned  th e  wisdom o f humbling the s ta te  govern­
ments by b ring ing  them as p a r t ie s  in  cases concerning c i t iz e n s  o f 
d i f f e r e n t  s ta te s  befo re  fe d e ra l  c o u r ts .  The l a t t e r  power was e n t i r e ly  
unnecessary , he argued, and, moreover, what was to  be done i f  a judg­
ment were ob ta ined  a g a in s t a s ta te  government?®^
George M a s o n , P a t r i c k  H e n r y , a n d  James M o n r o e , a l l  con- 
tended th a t  t he c p e x is te n t ju r is d ic t io n  between the fe d e ra l and s ta te  
cou rts  would u l t im a te ly  lead  to  c o n f l ic t  between th e  two court systeifis. 
The r e s u l t  o f  such a c o n f l ic t  wou ld  be, they contended, the f in a l  des- 
tru c t io n  o f one system  or the  o th e r , though as Mason in s is te d ,  the 
l ik e lih o o d  was th a t  Congress would come to  the a id  o f the  former 
a g a in s t the la t te r .® ^  Moreover, and f a r  worse to  co n sid er, such a 
s i tu a t io n  would tend  to  oppress and g re a tly  inconvenience the people . 
On th is  l a t t e r  p o in t ,  ag a in , a l l  th re e  men were in  agreement.
W illiam G rayson 's g re a t  o b je c tio n  to  the fe d e ra l  ju d ic ia ry  was 
th a t  i t  would in te r f e r e  w ith th e  s t a te  ju d ic i a r i e s . There was no t 
superin tend ing  power to  m ain ta in  o rd e r between th e  two contending 
ju r is d ic t io n s ,  so th a t  rec u rren c e , he fe a re d , could only be had to  the
8* iE llio t, D ebates, I I I ,  $2$-S26.
® Îb id . .  pp. 526-527. Q̂ jb id . ,  p . 581.
Q7l b id . ,  p . 539. QQl b id . ,  p . 582. Q îb id . ,  p . $8L.
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sword. Those s t a te  c o u rts  were, Grayson argued, the  b est check the  
people o f  th e  s ta te s  and th e  s t a te  governments them selves had. They 
secured  th e  l a t t e r  a g a in s t  encroachments on t h e i r  p r iv i le g e s ; they were, 
in  s h o r t ,  th e  p r in c ip a l  defense o f  the s t a t e s .  How improper i t  would 
be to  dep rive  the  s t a te s  o f t h e i r  only source o f p o l i t i c a l  defense.^®
With Mason, Grayson considered  the powers of the  Supreme Court 
over chancery, a d m ira lty , common p le a s , exchequer, and c rim ina l j u r i s ­
d ic t io n  cases too  ex tensive  f o r  a  s in g le  body. The ex ten t of i t s  
ju r i s d ic t io n  was n o t expressed in  a d e f in i te  manner. I t  was so vaguely 
and in d e f in i te ly  expressed th a t  th e  la t i tu d e s  o f power could not be 
a sc e r ta in e d . Grayson o b jec ted  a lso  to  th e  lack  o f re c ip ro c ity  in  cases 
between s ta te s  and fo re ig n  governments. In  h is  unique argument he con­
tended th a t  though a s ta te  government might be sued by a fo re ig n  gov­
ernment w ithou t i t s  consen t, th e  rev e rse  would no t be p o ss ib le . The 
e f f e c t ,  he im p lied , would be to  give g re a te r  fav o ritism  to  fo re ig n  
governments th an  to  th e  s ta te  governments, and to  him the idea was 
m onstrous.
John M arshall, Grayson argued, sa id  th a t  t r i a l  by ju ry  i s  p re ­
served in  th e  C o n s titu tio n  by im p lica tio n . The ju r is d ic t io n  o f the 
Supreme C ourt, and by im p lica tio n  the in fe r io r  fe d e ra l c o u rts , i s  to  be 
reg u la ted  by Congress, which i t  was sa id  would be ample s e c u r ity . I t  
i s  t ru e ,  argued Grayson, th a t  Congress may indeed make these  re g u la tio n s , 
but on th e  o th e r  hand, i t  i s  j u s t  as tru e  th a t  they might n o t. This 
ap p lied  a lso  to  the  t r i a l  by ju ry , which is  given up to  the d isc re tio n  
o f Congress. I t  w i l l  no t be a v io la t io n  o f  the C onstitu tion  should
9^ Ib id . . p . 563. ^^I b id . . pp. $66-^67 .
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th a t  body decide to  tak e  the  r ig h t  away, fo r  i t  i s  the re g u la tin g  body. 
I t  was p o s s ib le  f o r  Congress to  re g u la te  i t  p ro p e rly , but i t  i s  none­
th e le s s  a t  t h e i r  mere d is c re t io n  to  do so o r n o t,^ ^
The C o n s titu tio n  proposed th e  estab lishm en t, contended Lee, o f 
a new sp ec ie s  o f E xecutive, a  sm all Senate, and a very  sm all House o f 
R ep re se n ta tiv e s . The s e a t  o f th a t  government would be up to  sev e ra l 
hundred m iles from a g re a t many of i t s  s u b je c ts , r e q u ir i i^  a g re a t many 
o f f ic e r s  i f  i t  i s  to  opera te  upon th e se . Though i t  provided fo r  the  
concurren t ju r is d ic t io n  and coextensive o p e ra tio n  o f the  s ta te  govern­
m ents, y e t  th e  g en era l government would possess a l l  the e s s e n t ia l  powers ;
93the  s t a te s  would be mere shadows. Lee was n o t, in  s h o r t ,  p leased  a t  
th e  ex ten siv e  n a tu re  o f  the powers o f the  general government, and sev­
e ra l  o f  h i s  L e tte r s  he devoted ex c lu siv e ly  to  an examination of those 
powers.
Lee was p a r t i c u la r ly  u p se t over the  p ro spec t o f empowering the 
fe d e ra l  government to  la y  and c o l le c t  in te rn a l  and ex te rn a l tax e s , to  
form the m i l i t i a ,  to  make bankruptcy law s, and to  decide on appeal 
questions a r is in g  on th e  in te rn a l  laws o f the  sev era l s t a te s .  These, 
he s a id , in  e f f e c t  comprehend a l l  the  e s s e n t ia l  powers in  the country , 
and those l e f t  to  th e  s ta te s  would be o f  l i t t l e  r e a l  im portance.
He conceded th a t  many of the  e s s e n t ia l  powers given the n a tio n a l 
government were no t ex c lu siv e , and reasoned th a t  the general government 
might have s u f f ic ie n t  prudence to  fo reb e a r th e  ex erc ise  o f those powers 
which m ight a lso  be ex erc ised  by th e  s t a te s .  But a t  the  same tim e.
9 2 lb id ..  p . 568.
93pord, Essays, p . 292.
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th e se  powers were open fo r  Imprudent men in  the  n a tio n a l government to  
e x e rc ise  i f  they  would. And i f  so e x e rc ised , they must adversely  a f f e c t  
th e  in te rn a l  a f f a i r s  o f th e  s t a t e . I n  view o f p rospects  o f th is  
n a tu re , h is  f e a r s  a re  th e re fo re  q u ite  understandab le .
The power to  la y  and c o l le c t  ta x e s , he argued, was in  i t s e l f  o f 
g re a t im portance:
By means o f  ta x e s , th e  government may command the  whole o r  any 
p a r t  o f  th e  s u b je c t 's  p ro p e rty . Taxes may be o f va rious k indsj 
bu t th e re  i s  a s tro n g  d is t in c t io n  between ex te rn a l and in te rn a l  
ta x e s .  E x ternal taxes a re  import d u t ie s ,  which a re  la id  on 
im ported goods ; . . . though u ltim a te ly  p a id  by the  consumer j 
a  few o f f ic e r s  can c o l le c t  them, and they  can be c a rr ie d  no 
h ig h er than  th e  tra d e  w i l l  bear . . , th a t  in  th e  very  na tu re  
o f  commerce, bounds a re  s e t  to  them. But in te rn a l  tax e s , as 
p o l l  and land  ta x e s , e x c ise s , d u tie s  on a l l  w r it te n  instrum ents,
&c. may f i x  them selves on every person and species o f p roperty  
in  th e  community J they  may be c a r r ie d  to  any le n g th s , and in  
p ro p o rtio n  as they  a re  extended, numerous o f f ic e rs  must be em­
ployed to  a s se s s  them, and to  enforce the c o lle c tio n  o f them.
• . . In te rn a l  ta x a tio n  in  th is  country  i s  more im portant, as 
th e  country  i s  so very  ex tensive  . . .  to  lay  and c o lle c t  taxes 
in  t h i s  ex ten siv e  coun try , must req u ire  a g re a t number o f con­
g re s s io n a l o rd in an ces , imm ediately opera ting  upon the  body o f 
th e  people; th e se  must c o n tin u a lly  in te r f e r e  w ith  the  s ta te  law s, 
thereby  produce d iso rd e r  and general d is s a t is f a c t io n ,  t i l l  the  
one system o f laws o r th e  o th e r , o p e ra tin g  on the same su b je c ts , 
s h a l l  be a b o lish e d .95
As the s ta te  governments have concurren t powers w ith th e  general govern­
ment, and given th e  same o b je c ts  to  be tax ed , iJie o b jec tio n  th a t  th e  
general government m ight suspend a s ta te  ta x  as a necessary  measure fo r  
the c o lle c t io n  o f th e  f e d e ra l  ta x  was no t w ithout foundation , Lee con­
tin u e d . Was i t ,  he asked, "w ise, p ruden t, o r  s a fe , to  v e s t  the  powers 
of lay in g  and c o l le c t in g  in te rn a l  taxes in  the general government, w hile 
im perfïic tly  o rgan ized  and inadequate; and to  t r u s t  to  amending the  Con­
s t i t u t i o n  a f t e r  r a t i f i c a t i o n ,  and making i t  adequate to  th is  p u rp o se ."9^
9U ibld . . pp . 292-293, 95i b id . ,  pp. 301- 302. ^^ Ib id . ,  p . 30U.
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This power to  la y  and c o l le c t  taxes was fu r th e r  o b jec tio n a b le ,
in  L e e 's  e s tim a tio n , because o f  o th e r  a sso c ia te d  general powers.
By th e  c o n s t i tu t io n  i t  i s  proposed th a t  the  congress s h a l l  have 
th e  power " to  r a is e  and support arm ies, but no ap p ro p ria tio n  o f 
money to  t h a t  use  s h a l l  be fo r  a lo nger term than  two years; 
to  prov ide and m ain ta in  a navy, to  provide f o r  c a l l in g  fo r th  
th e  m i l i t i a  to  execute th e  laws o f the  union . . . reserv ing  
to  th e  s t a te s  the  r ig h t  to  appoin t th e  o f f ic e r s ,  and to  t r a in  
th e  m i l i t i a  according to  th e  d is c ip l in e  p re sc rib ed  by congress 
. . . "  When an array s h a l l  be once ra is e d  fo r  a number o f  y e a rs , 
i t  i s  not probable  th a t  we w il l  f in d  much d i f f ic u l ty  in  g e ttin g  
congress to  pass laws fo r  applying monies to  i t s  support. 97
Lee d id  n o t, he made c le a r ,  o b je c t to  the  power o f  ra is in g  and m ain tain ­
ing arm ies. His o b je c tio n  was cen tered  on the f a c t  th a t  such power 
would be given to  a very  few men w ith  so very  few checks on i t s  exer­
c is e .
The people m ust, he in s is te d ,  have a check upon the  powers to  
la y  and c o l le c t  t ^ e ? ,  9Pd the power to  r a i s e  a m ie s . For laws to  
c a rry  th e se  powers in to  e f f e c t  must be made o f te n , and un less the people 
have a  check upon th ese  powers, e i th e r  through th e  s ta te  le g is la tu re s  
o r by th e  few n a tio n a l  re p re se n ta tiv e s  in  Congress, they may very grad­
u a l ly  bu t inexorab ly  lo se  t h e i r  proper negative  upon these  m atters
98u n t i l  they  a re  l o s t  fo rever.'^
The s t a te  governm ents, by the  C o n stitu tio n , have ac tu a l in fluence  
over the  m i l i t i a  only in  th e  appointm ent o f o f f ic e r s .  Otherwise, the 
s ta te s  must t r a i n  the  m i l i t i a  according to  such forms and by such ru les  
and re so lu tio n s  as p re sc r ib e d  by Congress, which botty has, a ls o , the 
power to  c a l l  o u t the  m i l i t i a s  to  execute the laws o f the fe d e ra l gov­
ernm ent. This l a t t e r  power, Lee complained, was in  e f f e c t  to give few
97 98
Ib id . .  pp . 301- 305.  I b id . .  p . 305.
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men in  th e  coraraonity g re a t advantage over o th e rs , and to  commit the 
many to  th e  mercy o r  prudence o f  th e  very  few .^^
Fears o f  th e  d is c re tio n a ry  powers g ran ted  Congress in  the  mat­
t e r s  o f  in te r n a l  ta x a tio n  and standing  armies and c o n tro l o f th e  m i l i t i a  
were the  most o f te n  expressed fe a rs  during th e  d eb a tes . P a tr ic k  Henry, 
George Mason, and W illiam  Grayson a l l  expressed apprehensions on those 
m a tte rs . Henry, f o r  example, contended th a t  Congress' powers on in te r ­
n a l tax es  and th e  armed fo rc e s  o f the  country were delegated  w ithout 
adequate, and c e r ta in ly  no t s a t is f a c to ry  checks. I t  i s  s a id  by c e r ta in  
F e d e ra l is ts ,  he added, th a t  the  means must be commensurate to  th e  ends. 
This would a p p aren tly  mean th a t  an in f in itu d e  in  the  government must 
req u ire  an in f in i tu d e  o f  means to  c a rry  i t  on. But consider the pro ­
p r ie ty ,  th e  s a fe ty  o f  such a  government. In  such a government, the  
se rv a n ts , th e  governing, become g re a te r  than those fo r  whom they e x is t  
a t  a l l .  That same argum ent, he continued, has been the means by vrtiich 
despotism s have been e s ta b lis h e d  elsew here in  th e  w orld. Furthermore, 
the  c o n tro l o f th e  m i l i t i a  by th e  Congress might very  w ell become the
instrum ent o f o p p ress io n . The s ta te s  re ta in e d  c o n tro l o f t h e i r  m il i -
100
t i a s  only by im p lic a tio n , a most u n s a tis fa c to ry  p ro v is io n .
George Mason lik ew ise  co n tested  Congress' power over the m i l i t i a .  
His o b jec tio n  was th a t  too  much power was given to  Congress, and th a t  
i f  th e  s ta te s  were competent to  use  th e  m i l i t i a  to  suppress in su rrec ­
t io n s ,  Congress ought n o t have a coex tensive power. There was the  f e a r  
in  h is  mind, m oreover, th a t  th e  Congress m ight i n f l i c t  severe punishments
99ib id . .  p . 306.
lO O E iiio t, D ebates. I l l ,  395-396, l;10-i|12, lil6-l|17.
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on th e  m i l i t i a  as a  necessary  incubus to  the  power o f o rganizing  and 
d is c ip l in in g  them, thereby  inducing th a t  body to  wish i t s  a b o li t io n , 
and which would a ffo rd  a p re te n se  fo r  th e  estab lishm en t o f a standing  
army. An a d d it io n a l  change sometime in  th e  fu tu re  m ight be made in  the  
o rg a n iz a tio n  o f  th e  m i l i t i a ,  be sa id  in  a l a t e r  speech, namely th a t  the  
m i l i t i a  th en  be c o n s t itu te d  only o f the  lower and middle c la sse s  o f  men, 
a l l  c la s s e s  o f men a t  p re s e n t , he s a id , being found in  i t .  I f  th a t  
should happen, given th e  inadequate and more a r i s to c r a t i c  re p re se n ta tio n  
o f th e  Congress, he foresaw  th e  lo s s  o f a l l  fe e lin g  fo r  the  lower c la s ­
ses by th a t  body. I t  m ight, then , d isc rim in a te  in  favo r o f people in
i t s  own c la s s ,  and exempt from duty a l l  th e  o f f ic e rs  and low est c re a -
101tu re s  o f  th e  n a tio n a l  government.
W illiam  Grayson agreed s u b s ta n t ia l ly  w ith these  obsenrations o f 
Hemy and Mason, adding th a t  Congress m ight m ain tain  a w ell aimed m il i ­
t i a  in  one a rea  o f th e  country  w hile n eg lec tin g  th a t  o f  ano ther. More­
over, he commented, th e re  was no assu rance , given th e i r  numerical 
advantage in  th e  Congress, th a t  the no rthern  s ta te s  might not push 
through b i l l s  fo r  th e  estab lishm en t and m ain tain ing  o f a  navy, the
e f f e c t  o f which would be to  f u r th e r  i t s  own economy a t  th e  expense o f
102th a t  o f  the sou thern  s t a t e s .
A r tic le  VI o f  th e  C o n s titu tio n  provided th a t  the C o n stitu tio n ,
the laws o f th e  U nited S ta te s ,  and a l l  t r e a t i e s  made under the a u th o r ity
103
o f the  United S ta te s  were to  be considered  the  supreme law of the land .
^ ^ ^ I b i d . t  p p .  Ü 0 2 , f i l ^ - l t l 6 ,  L 2 S -L 2 6 . 
^ ° ^ I b i d . ,  p p .  I i l 7- l i l 9,  L 2 9 -L 3 0 . 
^^^Madison, c i t . , p . 630.
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A ll judges y s t a t e  and f e d e ra l ,  were bound by th e  C o n stitu tio n  to  support 
t h a t  C o n s titu tio n , those  law s, and those  t r e a t i e s ,  s t a te  laws to  th e  
c o n tra ry  n o tw ith s tan d in g . The e f f e c t  o f  th is  a r t i c l e  would be, Lee 
in s i s te d ,  to  sweep away a l l  those customs, r ig h ts ,  law s, and c o n s titu ­
t io n s  h e re to fo re  e s ta b lis h e d , where th ese  l a t t e r  were incom patible w ith 
th e  C o n s titu tio n , laws o r t r e a t i e s .
Though Lee d id  n o t contend th a t  th e  n a tio n a l laws should be 
su p e r io r  to  s t a te  and d i s t r i c t  law s, he d id  i n s i s t  th a t  those laws 
ought to  y ie ld  to  u n a lie n a b le  o r  fundamental r ig h ts .  These n a tio n a l 
laws shou ld  extend to  only  a  few n a tio n a l concerns. But as the C onsti­
tu t io n  s to o d , th e se  laws would extend to  in te rn a l  and ex te rn a l o b je c ts , 
and to  those  o b je c ts  to  which a l l  o th e rs  a re  subord ina te . I t  i s  impos­
s ib le ,  he s t r e s s e d ,  to  have much conception o f  the  ex ten t o f those 
powers, o r  th e  e x te n t and number o f those laws which should be consid­
ered n ecessa ry  and p roper to  c a rry  these  powers in to  execution . In  
s h o r t ,  w hether Congress w i l l  re sp e c t those p r in c ip le s  o f the  people of
the  U nited S ta te s  by which they  have so long l iv e d  w il l  be merely up
10^to  th e  prudence o f  t h a t  body.
Like so many o f  th e  A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  elsewhere in  the country , 
lao k  ̂  o f j ^ t s ^ i c L t ^ ^  "There
a re ,"  he s a id ,  " c e r ta in  r ig h ts  which we have always he ld  sacred  in  the 
United S ta te s , and recognized  in  a l l  our c o n s t itu t io n s , and which, by 
th e  adoption o f  th e  new c o n s t i tu t io n  in  i t s  p resen t form, w il l  be l e f t  
u n s e c u r e d . A m o n g  th e s e , he in s i s te d ,  were th e  t r i a l  by ju ry  in  the
^®^Ford, E ssays, p p . 311-312.
^°^I b id . .  p p . 312-313. ^Q^Ib id . .  p . 310.
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J u d ic ia l  depaz*1aaent and th e  c o lle c t io n  o f th e  people by the  rep re se n ta ­
t iv e s  In  th e  l e g i s l a t iv e  branch. But by th e  C o n stitu tio n  th e re  Is  
no th ing  sa id  in  th ese  m a tte rs , nor Is  th e re  anything to  prevent Con­
g ress  from making a law to  suppress the freedom o f  th e  p ress  by lay in g
107a  ta x  on p r in t in g .  He d id  no t understand  the reasoning between h is
opponents ' p o s i t io n  th a t  a  b i l l  o f  r ig h ts  was unnecessary because a l l
powers n o t g ran ted  to  th e  f e d e ra l  government were reserv ed . R ather,
th e  C o n s titu tio n  I s  f u l l  o f  many undefined  powers. To make d e c la ra to ry
a r t i c l e s  In  a  governmental Instrum ent unnecessary , the  na tu re  o f the
reserv ed  r ig h ts  and th e  e x te n t o f  th e  powers delegated  must be d efin ed .
Omittance o f those  r ig h ts  he ld  d ear by Americans everywhere Im plies
th a t  th ey  were n o t considered  Im portant. And, fu rtherm ore, general
108
powers g ran ted  c a rry  w ith  them In c id e n ta l powers.
Why th e  A n ti-F edera l 1 s t fo rce s  In  the  V irg in ia  convention lo s t  
the  s tru g g le  f o r  no r a t i f i c a t i o n  w ithout amendments, given th e i r  numer­
ic a l  m a jo rity  throughout th e  course o f the  deba tes , must be the  conse­
quence o f the  few undecided d e leg a tes  In  th e  convention. Both sides 
r e a liz e d  th e i r  hopes re s te d  w ith  th ese  few men, and both made long and 
vigorous p lays f o r  t h e i r  su p p o rt. E ven tually , however, Gtoveraqr Edmund 
Randolph's d e c is io n  to  Jo in  th e  p ro -C o n stitu tio n  fo rce s  In  the conven-. _ F— ----   - —----- •
t lo n ,  and.jbhfl„^ews o f South C a ro lin a 's  r a t i f i c a t io n  made_Jsim d iffe re p c e , 
and gave a  p sy ch o lo g ica l u rge to  Jo in  the  tren d  o f support o f the  Con­
s t i t u t i o n . T h e  r a t i f i c a t i o n  o f  th e  C o n stitu tio n  by V irg in ia  on June
^Q '^Ibld.. p . 311.
*1 AA
Lee, o£, c i t . ,  pp . Iii2-1$3. 
^^^Rutland, o£. c H . ,  pp . 231-232.
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25, 1788, fo llow ed by th e  r a t i f i c a t i o n  by New York the fo llow ing day 
doomed A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts ' hopes o f  amending the  C o n stitu tio n  o r submit­
t in g  i t  to  a second convention . With th ese  two s ta te s  in  support of 
th e  C o n s titu tio n , the  Union was fo m ed j only Rhode Is lan d  and North 
C arolina^^^ and the  l a t t e r  was soon to  jo in  i t s  s i s t e r
s t a t e s .
The A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  fo rc e s  o f North C arolina had no co n test in  
t h e i r  debates w ith  th e  F e d e ra l is ts .  D espite th e  e f fo r ts  o f James I r e ­
d e l l  and W illiam  R. P ev ie , two v e iy  capable o ra to rs  and d eb a te rs , and 
t h e i r  F e d e ra l is t  c o llea g u es , th e  'A ntis* o f  th e  convention, under the  
le a d e rsh ip  o f  W illie  Jones, had no problem in  securing  a  vote o f no 
r a t i f i c a t i o n  w ithou t p r io r  amendments. So com pletely d id  the 'A n tis ' 
c o n tro l th e  convention th ey d id  no t f e e l  i t  necessa iv  to  go to  any 
g re a t le n g th s  to  a ttem p t to  convince any o f the de legates of the  value 
o f th e i r  p o s i t io n :  indeed , beyond th e  r e p e t i t io n  of fe a rs  of the fu tu re  
o f th e  American r ig h t  o f  n a v ig a tio n  on the  M iss iss ip p i R iver should
th e  r ig h t  o f concluding fo re ig n  t r e a t i e s  be given to  th e  Senate and
112the  P re s id e n t a lo n e , th e  A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  arguments from North Caro­
l in a  a re  o f  no p a r t i c u l a r  i n t e r e s t .
llO fhe  North C aro lina  r a t i f y in g  convention was c a lle d  Ju ly  21, 
1788. The A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  o f th e  s t a te  were in  complete c o n tro l o f 
■Ü1C convention, having 193 d e leg a tes  to  th e  F e d e ra l is ts ' 75 d e le g a te s . 
A fte r  l is te n in g  to  t h e i r  opponents' speeches f o r  two weeks, th e  North 
C arolina * A ntis ' c a l le d  f o r  and secured  a vo te  o f no r a t i f i c a t i o n ,  by 
the  same m argin as th a t  o f  th e i r  number o f  d e le g a te s , th a t  i s ,  193 
v o ted  a g a in s t r a t i f i c a t i o n  to  75 vo tes  fo r  r a t i f i c a t i o n .
^l^N orth  C aro lina  r a t i f i e d  th e  C o n stitu tio n  l a t e  in  1789.
l l ^ E i i i o t ,  D ebates, 17, 168.
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CONCLUSION
This th e s is  has been concerned w ith  an exam ination and the 
docum entation o f  th e  A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts ' f e a rs  o f the  strong  c e n tra l  
government proposed by the fe d e ra l  C o n stitu tio n  o f  the  United S ta te s .  
From a read ing  o f the debates on the  C o n stitu tio n  in  the  sev era l 
s t a t e s '  r a t i f y in g  conven tions, o r o f th e  A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts ' arguments 
expressed  in  newspapers and b roadsides, i t  i s  q u ite  easy to  c a l l  the  
A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  p o s i t io n  co n triv ed  and i t s  arguments u n r e a l i s t i c .  To 
do so , however, i s  to  m iss a g re a t d ea l o f th e  s ig n if ic an c e  of th e  
A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  in  th e  development o f  American c o n s titu tio n a l  and 
p o l i t i c a l  tiieory^j to  ignore th e  f a c t  th a t  th e  A nti-Fe d e ra l is ts  and 
the  F e d e ra l is ts  were f a r  c lo s e r  to  each o th e r  than they were a p a r t .
F in a lly , to  c a l l  t h e i r  arguments and p o s it io n  u n r e a l is t ic  is  to  m is­
rep re se n t an im portan t c h a r a c te r is t ic  o f  American p o l i t i c a l  th in k e rs  
in  th e  e a r ly  N ationa l P e rio d ,
The Anti-F e d e ra l  i s  t s , l ik e  v i r tu a l ly  a l l  Americans o f th e i r
age, were g re a t  con s t i tu t i o n a l i s t s .  A reading  o f th e  M assachusetts
2
C o n s titu tio n  o f  1780, f o r  example, p re sen ts  an e x c e lle n t in d ic a tio n  
o f  th e  g re a t le n g th s  to  which American p o l i t i c a l  th in k e rs  went in  t h e i r  
c o n s tru c tio n  o f  c o n s t i tu t io n s .  The Americans ty p ic a l ly  wanted a l l  
d e lega ted  powers in  w r i t te n  form, and s ta te d  in  such a way as to  leave
^C ecelia  M. Kenyon, The A n ti f e d e ra l is ts  (New York, 1966), p .
Ix x v i,
^Robert J .  T ay lo r, M assachusetts, Colony to  Commonwealth g Docu- 
ments on th e  Formation o f  i t s  C o n s titu tio n , 177S-17Ü0 (Chapel H i l l ,imr...................... . .....  . .....
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very  l i t t l e  to  Idie d is c re t io n  o r in te rp re ta t io n  o f t h e i r  re p re se n ta tiv e s . 
M oreover, the  ’A n tis ' c h a r a c te r i s t ic a l ly  had l i t t l e  f a i t h  in  a  re p u b li-
w » ■ iw r r — r — — — — ......    "■ ' ' —— -  — ..... ......... — — — —r ,  ,  , ,
can government th a t  could no t be c lo se ly  watched by th e  c o n s titu e n ts , 
and which was n o t so arranged as to  m ain tain  a se p a ra tio n  o f powers and 
branches o f  the  government* I h e i r  c r i t ic ism s  and th ei r  fe a rs  o f  th e  
C o n s titu tio n  r e s u l te d * in  p a r t  a t  l e a s t ,  p re c is e ly  from the ' e l a s t i c i t y ' 
o f  th e  C o n s titu tio n . The C o n stitu tio n , as Horton Borden p o in ts  o u t,^  
in s t i tu t io n a l iz e d  th e  fundam ental u n c e r ta in tie s  and am biguities in h eren t— - - . . --------- —  " « '  iTi.w
in  th e  American form o f democracy. I t s  so lu tio n s  were no t to  have any 
so lu tio n s  except a  b a s ic  agreement to  l iv e  by repub lican  p r in c ip le s  o f 
government and a s so c ia te d  m echanics, and to  so lve problems in  a s p i r i t  
o f m oderation and compromise* In  s h o r t ,  th e  C o n stitu tio n  d id  no t a t -  
tsm pt to  s e t t l e  perm anently th e  ex te rn a l issu es  o f government, but 
in s te a d  p rovided  th e  b a s is  whereby each genera tion  of Americans might 
apply i t s  own d e f in i t io n s  and in te rp re ta t io n s  to  the problem s.
I t  must no t be thought th a t  th e  p ic tu re  o f the C o n stitu tio n  
developed in  th e  above paragraph i s  an a ttem pt to  apologize fo r  th e  
A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts .  Nothing could  be fu r th e r  from th e  t r u th .  The A nti- 
F e d e ra l is ts  do n o t need, and c e r ta in ly  do no t deserve any attem pt a t  
apology* R ather, what i s  needed i s  an understanding o f the  A n ti- 
F e d e ra l is t  m e n ta li ty , t h e i r  conception  o f  man as a human being and as 
a p o l i t i c a l  be ing , and th e  consequent d e sc r ip tio n  o f th e i r  framework 
o f government.
B asic to  th e  understand ing  o f  th e  A n ti-F e d e ra lis t mind i s  tJ ie ir  
conception  o f th e  n a tu re  o f  man as a  human being and p o l i t i c a l  organism.
% k rto n  Borden, The A n t i f e d e r a l is t  Papers (Ann Arbor, 1961), 
p . x i i i .
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In  th is  reg a rd , th e  'A n tis ’ c lo se ly  resembled the F e d e ra l is ts .  Both 
saw any p o l i t i c a l  th eo ry  as n e c e ssa r ily  based on c e r ta in  p resupposi­
t io n s  o f  human n a tu re , m an's c h a ra c te r , and h is  behavior. Much of 
th i s  in s ig h t  was to  be gained from th e  study  o f  human h is to ry , and men 
o f both s id e s  made freq u e n t re fe ren ces  to  the  development o f man's 
governm ental and p o l i t i c a l  in s t i t u t io n s ,  e sp e c ia lly  American h is to ry  
in  th i s  re g a rd . N e ith e r th e  F e d e ra lis ts  nor the A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  were 
deceived in to  th in k in g  th a t  Americans were o th e r  than  human beings w ith 
a l l  th e  d e fe c ts  and c h a r a c te r is t ic s  o f human beings. Alexander Hamilton, 
f o r  example, in  F e d e ra l is t  Number 6 sa id , "Has i t  not . . . been found 
th a t  momentary p a ss io n s , and immediate in te r e s ts  have a more a c tiv e  and 
im perious c o n tro l over human conduct than  general o r remote considera­
tio n s  o f  p o lic y , u t i l i t y ,  o r  ju s t ic e ? " ^  In  F e d e ra lis t  Number 37. James 
Madison examined human n a tu re  and saw th a t  " . . .  the  h is to ry  of alm ost 
a l l  g re a t  councils  o f  mankind he ld  among mankind fo r  re c o n c illin g  th e i r  
d isc o rd an t op in ions . . .  i s  a h is to ry  o f  fa c tio n s , con ten tions, and 
disappointm ents . . . c la ssed  among the most dark and degraded p ic tu re s  
which d isp la y  the  in f i rm i t ie s  and d e p ra v itie s  o f the  human ch a rac te r ."  
In te re s t in g ,  to o , i s  th a t  f a c t  th a t  throughout the  ra th e r  depressing 
p ic tu re  o f human h is to ry  and n a tu re , th e  authors o f The F e d e ra lis t  
never attem pted  to  f l a t t e r  th e i r  read ers  by p ic tu rin g  them as d if fe re n t  
from o th e r  men. For example, th e  remark made in  F e d e ra lis t  Number ^  
th a t  " . . .  th e  v ig i l a n t  and manly s p i r i t  which nourishes freedom, and 
in  re tu rn  i s  nourished  by i t "  comes Immediately a f te r  th e  statem ent
^Alexander Ham ilton, James Madison, John Jay , The F ed e ra lis j^  
C lin to n  R o ss ite r  ( e d .) (New York, 1961), p . S7.
^ I b id . ,  p . 231.
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th a t  , th e  c ap rice s  and wickedness o f mankind" a re  " . . .  f a i l in g s
from Tdiich Americans a re  n o t expected to  be exempt."^ In  sh o r t , the  
F e d e ra l is ts ,  l ik e  th e  A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts , had no ex p ec ta tio n  th a t Ameri­
cans were o th e r  th an  human be ings, and th a t  government must be designed 
around and must tak e  in to  co n sid e ra tio n  th e  f a c t  th a t  man i s  in h e re n tly  
c o rru p tib le  and s e l f - in te r e s te d .  The d i f f erence^ th en , between t he men 
o f  the  two p o s itio n s  i s  the  willin g n e s s  and th e  degree to  \riiich the  men 
c o n tro llin g  th e  government were to  be tru s te d  to  use th e i r  d is c re tio n
in  e x e rc is in g  th e  powers o f th a t  government, and in  ab id ing  by the de-
 ̂ ip m , nil I ' '-------- -------------------------------------------- --------------- — ..............  -nf^  -II m ip im  ................. **
gree o f  t r u s t  p laced  in  them by th e  people o f the  country . As Madison 
sa id  in  F e d e ra l is t  Number S l , ^ " .  . . I n  framing a  government which i s  
to  be adm in istered  by men over men, th e  g re a t d i f f ic u l ty  l i e s  in  th is :  
you must f i r s t  enable th e  government to  c o n tro l the  government; and in  
the  nex t p lac e  o b lig e  i t  to  c o n tro l i t s e l f . "  The A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  
agreed in  both p r in c ip le  and substance w ith Madison on th is  p o in t. The 
issu e  o f  r a t i f i c a t i o n  a ro se  because th e  'A n tis ' believed  the fram ers o f 
the C o n s titu tio n , and th e re fo re  a lso  the  F e d e ra l is ts ,  were too lax  in  
the  checks and b a lan ces, and th e  degree o f se p a ra tio n  o f  powers they 
proposed in  th e  C o n s titu tio n .
Because th e  A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  were p resen ted  w ith a f in ish e d  
document w ith th e  demand f o r  immediate and uncond itional acceptance o r 
t o t a l  r e je c t io n ,  th ey  tended to  dem onstrate a certain^degree o f in f le x -
Q
i b i l i t y  and d o c tr in a ir e  th in k in g , This i s  not suggesting th a t  they 
were incapab le  o f a b s t r a c t  p o l i t i c a l  th e o r iz i i^ ,  though n e ith e r  s ide
^Ib id . .  p . 353. ^ I b id , , p . 322 .
op . c i t . .  p . x c i i .
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indulged in  such th e o riz in g  to  any ap p rec iab le  degree. I t  i s ,  r a th e r ,  
to  suggest th a t  in  the  face o f  th e  C o n s titu tio n , t r u ly  a new p o l i t i c a l
and governm ental fo ra ,  ^ e  * A ntis* could and d id  r e s o r t  to  t r a d i t io n a l
a n ^  as has been s tr e s s e d  rep ea ted ly  throughout th is  th e s is ,  
p roo fs  o f  t h e i r  own n o l i t i c a l  b e l ie f s .
g i ■. I .w   .......... ...... . T ,#r. # ,u,
Thus, th e  concern o f the  A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  in  the  r a t i f i c a t i o n
s tra g g le  o f  1787-1788 was ,.tJPL.P.Kea£ant- th e  acceptance o f a fo ra  o f gov­
ernment which_^ # @ y j2 s lla y a iL ja ra b ^ ^  of  a l l  th a t  Americans
had fough t f o r  and achieved by the  Revolution and independence—the, 
p e rso n a l and p o l i t i c a l  r ig h ts  and freedoms o f a l l  men. For them, the
p r eference  was fo r  a l im ite d  government, a h e rita g e  which, as C ecelia  
9
Kenyon sa y s , was d i r e c t ly  a t t r ib u ta b le  to  th e i r  English background 
and a n c e s try , ac.companie(l by_M rittep ..xonatitu tions c rea tin g  the s tru c ­
tu re  o f  and c lo s e ly  d e fin in g  the  powers and lim ita t io n s  of th a t  govern­
m ent. I t  was to  be a government on lA ich the  people could exerc ise  as
much d i r e c t  c o n tro l as p o s s ib le , and from which they  could derive  as
much b e n e f it  in  th e  form o f p ro te c tio n  o f th e i r  r ig h ts  and freedoms as
p o ss ib le .
The A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts ,  l ik e  th e  F e d e ra lis ts ,  were se lf-consc ious 
men in  t h e i r  re s p e c tiv e  p o s i t io n s . They were working and ac tin g  and 
th ink ing  n o t only  in  term s o f  the  p re se n t, but ju s t  as im portant, fo r  
what m ight be th e  co n d itio n s Of th e  f u t u r e . T h e i r  b e lie fs  of human 
na tu re  made them c a re fu l ly  consider governmental changes th a t  might 
a f f e c t  them and th e i r  p o s te r i ty  a l ik e .  Though the A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  
nowhere l a i d  down a framework o f  t h e i r  p o s it io n  on government as d id
^Ib id . . p . x x v i i i .  ^^ Ib id . ,  p . x lv .
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th e  F e d e ra l is ts  in  The F e d e ra l is t ,  t h e i r  basic  ideas o f government can 
be derived  from th e i r  speeches and e ssay s . And, though they were wrong 
in  t h e i r  m ajor prem ise—th a t  th e  O onstitu tion  would f a i l  and so bring 
an a r is to c ra c y  o r  monarchy upon America—i t  does not fo llow  th a t  the  
A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  were wrong e i th e r  in  t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  philosophy o r 
t h e i r  v is io n  o f  th e  American fu tu re .  Indeed, i t  seems l ik e ly  th a t  
t h e i r  own s o lu tio n s  to  th e  problems o f  American government in  the E arly  
N ationa l P erio d  could have opera ted  and re s u lte d  in  as much p ro g ress , 
p ro s p e r ity  and democracy as has been achieved under th e  C o n stitu tio n .^^
r --------_ _  f 7  —  I III-------------------------------- ----- ■ - -n-~i I ~i- iffi - II n riiT iii — i...........  i i n i i i— m 'l-n i i  rw »i i ii ' ~ i i r - r m - |r  a  ' ' *".. .............
^^Borden, c i t «, p .  x v i i i .
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
BIBLIOGRAPHT
A. SOURCES AM) DOCUMENTS
Borden, Morton ( e d . ) .  The A n t^ e d e r a l ls t  Papers. Ann Arbor: Michigan 
S ta te  H a iv e rs lty  P re ss , 196^.
E l l i o t ,  Jonathan ( e d . ) .  The Debates in  the  Several S ta te  Conventions 
on th e  Adoption o f  th e  F edera l C o n s tito tio n . P h ilade lph ia : J .  B, 
L ip p in c o tt Company, ^  volumes, 1876-1091.
Ford, Paul L e ic e s te r  ( e d . ) .  Essays on the  C onstitu tion  o f  the  United 
S ta te s  « Brooklyn: B iis to ric a l P rin tin g  Club, 1892.
. Pamphlets on the  C o n stitu tio n  o f  th e  United S ta te s . Brooklyn: 
H is to r ic a l  P r in tin g  d u b ,  1891.
Ham ilton, A lexander, Jaxàes Madison, and John Jay . The F e d e ra l is t . 
C lin to n  B o ss ite r  ( e d . ) .  New York: Macmillan, 1961.
Kenyon, C ece lia  M. ( e d . ) .  The A n t i f e d e ra l is ts . New York: The Bobbs- 
M e rr i l l  Company, In c . ,  19^6.
Lee, R ichard Henry. ^  A dd itiona l Number o f L e tte rs  from the Federal 
Farmer to  th e  R epublican. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1962.
Madison, James. The Debates in  th e  F ederal Convention o f  1787 Which 
Framed th e  C o n s titu tio n  o f  th e  U nited S ta te s  o f America. G a illa rd  
Hunt and James Brown S co tt (edsTJI New York, 1920.
Mason, Alphers Thomas. The S ta te s  R ights Debates ; A n tife d e ra lis ts  and 
th e  C o n s titu tio n . Englewood C lif f s  : P ren tice -H all In c .,  19% .
T aylor, Robert J  ( e d . ) .  M assachusetts « Colony to  Commomealth: Docu­
ments on th e  Form ation o f  i t s  C o n stitu tio n , 177^-1780. Chapel H ill ;  
U n iv ers ity  o f  North C aro lina  P re ss , 196 l.
B. SECONDARY SOURCES
Beard, Charles A u s tin , ^  Economic In te rp re ta t io n  of th e  C o n stitu tio n  
o f the  U nited S ta te s . New York: The Macmillan Company, 19hl.
Brown, Robert E. Charl aa BgaowT and th e  C o n stitu tio n : A C r i t ic a l  Analy­
s i s  o f "An Economic I n te rp r e ta t io n  of th e  United S ta te s  C o n stitu tio n ." 
P rin ce to n : P rin c e to n  U n iv e rs ity  P ress , 1 9 ^ ^
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
128
Brown, Robert E. R e in te rp re ta tio n  o f  the  Formation o f t ^  American 
C o n s ti tu tio n . Boston: Boston U n ivers ity  P re s s , 1963.
• Middle C lass Democracy and the Revolution in  M assachusetts «
I th a c a :  C ornell U n iv e rs ity  P re ss , 19
F isk e , John. The C r i t ic a l  Period o f American H is to ry . New York: 
H oughton-M ifflin  Co., 1Ô97.
Depauw, L inda G ran t, E leventh P i l l a r ; New York and the F ederal
C o n s ti tu tio n . I th a c a : C ornell U n iv e rs ity  P re ss , 196ST"
Jensen , M e r r i l l .  The New N ation ; A H isto ry  of th e  United S ta te s  Daring 
th e  C onfederation . New York: Knopf Company, 1950.
_______ . The Making o f  th e  American C o n s titu tio n . P rinceton : Von Nos­
tra n d , 196li.
Main, Jackson T urner. The A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts ; C r i t ic s  o f th e  C o n stitu tio n . 
1781- 1787. Chapel H i l l :  U n ivers ity  o f North C arolina P re ss , 1961.
MadDonald, F o r re s t .  E. P lu ribus Unum: The F o i^ t io n  o f the American 
R epublic . Boston: H oughton-M ifflin, 196^ .
_______ , We The People : The Economic O rigins o f th e  C o n stitu tio n .
Chicago: U n iv e rs ity  o f  Chicago P ress , 19^8.
R utland, Robert A llen . The Ordeal o f the  C o n stitu tio n : The A n tifed e ra l­
i s t s  and th e  R a ti f ic a tio n  S trugg le  o f 1787-1788. Norman: U niversity  
o f  Oklahoma P re ss , 1966.
R o ss ite r ,  C arl. 1787: The Grand Convention. Now York: Macmillan, 1966.
Rowland, Kate Mason. The L ife  and Correspondence o f George Mason. 2 
v o ls . New York: R u sse ll and R u sse ll, 196L.
. George Mason, R eluc tan t Statesm an. W illiamsburg: Colonial 
W illiam sburg, d is t r ib u te d  by H o lt, R inehart and Winston, 1961.
/  Spaulding, E rn e s t. His Excellency George C lin ton . New York: The Mac­
m illan  Company, 1938.
Van Doren, C a rl. ^  G reat R ehearsa l. The Story o f Making and 
R atify ing  o f C o n s titu tio n  o f th e  United S ta te s . New York:
Viking P re ss , 19ü?I
C. ARTICLES
Brooks, Robin. "Alexander Ham ilton, Melancton Smith, and the R a tif ic a ­
t io n  o f  the  C o n s titu tio n  in  New York," W illiam and Mary Q uarte rly , 
H IV  (1962).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
129
Corwin, Edward S. “The Progress o f  P o l i t i c a l  Theory Between the 
D e c la ra tio n  o f Independence and th e  Meeting o f the  P h ilade lph ia  
C onvention,” American H is to r ic a l  Review» H Z  (1925), 511-537.
Crewl, P h i l ip .  “A nti-F edera lism  in  M aryland,” William and Mary Quar­
t e r l y ,  17 (19U7), Itlt6-ii69.
H andlin, Oscar, and Mary F. H andlin . “R adicals and Conservatives in  
M assachusetts a f t e r  Independence,” New England Q uarterly . X7II
(I9iili), 31*3-355.
Jensen , M e r r i l l .  “The Idea o f  N ational Government Durii% the American 
R ev o lu tio n ,” P o l i t i c a l  Science Q uarte rly , LVIII (191*3).
Kenyon, C ece lia  M. "An Economic In te rp re ta t io n  o f  the  C o n stitu tio n  
A fte r  F i f ty  T e a rs ,” The C entennial Review, VII (1963).
_______ . "Men o f  L i t t l e  F a ith ; The A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  on the  Nature of
R ep resen ta tive  Government," W illiam and Mary Q uarterly , XII (1955), 
3-1*1*.
Mai2)onald, F o r re s t .  "The A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts ,  1781-1709/' Wisconsin Maga­
z ine  o f  H is to ry , XLVI (1963), 206-215.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
